PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ARBITRARINESS OF DISPUTES RELATING TO BILATERAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BETWEEN EUROPEAN MEMBER STATES (BITS) by Liakopoulos, Dimitris
      
                                                                                                            Número 1 
                                                                                              2019 
   
 
 
PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ARBITRARINESS OF 
DISPUTES RELATING TO BILATERAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 
CONCLUDED BETWEEN EUROPEAN MEMBER STATES (BITS) 1 
 
 CUESTIONES DE PROCEDIMIENTO E INTERPRETACIONES EN LAS 
ARBIETRARIEDADES POR DISPUTAS EN RELACIÓN CON TRATADOS 
BILATERALES DE INVERSION CONCLUIDOS ENTRE LOS ESTADOS MIEMBROS 
EUROPEOS (TBIs) 
 
Dimitris Liakopoulos * 
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1. Introduction. 
 
Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Union has begun the process that should 
end with the definition of a ruropean investment policy. On the one hand, it has prepared 
Regulation n. 1219/20122, which establishes a transitional legal framework within which the 
non-EU BITs subsume-those subscribed by Member States and third countries-and thus 
ensure that they remain in force. The ultimate goal is to get early to their replacement with 
European Union (EU) agreements. In so doing, the Union is proceeding similarly to what it 
had already done on the occasion of the conferral on it of competence in other matters. The 
procedural process followed by the Union seems to be the same: the transfer of powers from 
Member States to the Union must take place gradually, and this too, and perhaps above all, 
to guarantee commercial partners from third countries already bound by relations with 
Member states. Therefore, first we proceed to the definition of a transitional regime within 
which to subsume the agreements stipulated by the Member States-possibly also amending 
the forecasts that are contrary to EU law-after which the Union is active for the negotiation 
of new agreements with the same partners, destined to replace the previous ones. This 
solution is suitable for preserving the balance of an integrated regional system, such as the 
ruropean one. Indeed, the effective exercise of a supranational competence can not be 
immediate; the literal reformulation of the institutive Treaties must be followed by a change 
in the internal structure of the EU system which will inevitably require some time. In the 
specific case of investments, the time it took the Union to start defining an autonomous 
policy was not much, far from it. The extension of the new european investment competence 
is outlined3, partly confirming the above mentioned position: in all the mandates to be 
negotiated adopted by the Board, there are also clauses concerning the protection of the 
investment. From this it emerges that the EU has interpreted the new competence as 
extended to both phases of the investment transaction: the pre-and post-establishment ones. 
This position seems to conform to the conclusions that would have been reached on the sole 
basis of a teleological-systematic interpretation of the normative dictate. In this way, the 
distortive consequences that could result if Member States were left to regulate the post 
phase, thus limiting the power of the Union to access policies alone, are avoided. 
 
2. The lasting validity of the BITs that have become intra-EU from an international 
and european perspective. 
 
The legality of the referral to arbitration in relation to bilateral agreements concluded 
between Member States (Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs)) intra-EU arises as a result of 
the accession of a party to the EU agreement thus transforming the relationship from extra-
                                                 
2Regulation n. 1219/2012 of the European éarliament and of the Council of the 12 December 2012 establishing 
transitional arrangements for bilateral investment agreements between member States and third States, OJ 
L.351/30 of 20 December 2012. For analysis see: P. EECKHOUT, M. LOPEZ-ESCUDERO, The EU's external 
action in times of crisis, Hart Publishing, Oxford & Oregon, Portland, 2016. J. BAUGARTNER, Treaty 
shopping and international investment law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016, pp. 235ss. 
3M. MOSES, Arbitration/Litigation interface: The european debate, in Northwestern Journal of International 
Law & Business, 35 (1), 2014, pp. 8ss. 
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EU internal to the Union4. These investment relationships enter the EU system and give rise 
to questions of compatibility of the provisions contained therein with EU law, regardless of 
the transfer of powers pursuant to art. 207 TFUE5. In general, it is a question of the 
succession of treaties, given that the accession to the Union is, like the BITs, an international 
treaty. 
One wonders, in such cases, whether the BITs, which subsequently became intra-EU BITs6, 
should be considered extinct as they are entirely replaced by the provisions of the Treaties 
which were established and applied as a result of the EU accession treaties. In the event of a 
negative reply, it is necessary to further assess whether certain forecasts contained in the 
same can be disregarded, as it is contrary to EU law7. And indeed, these agreements, 
although governed by international law, once ratified, become part of the state system and, 
therefore, like other national sources, must be compatible with the pre-eminent EU law8. The 
effects of a possible overlap or incompatibility between the two sources, the international 
and EU law, must be framed in light of the provisions of the Vienna Convention on Law of 
Treaties (VCLT) of 23 May 1969, some of which are part of customary international law and 
as such are binding for all Member States9. In particular, from the application of art. 59 
VCLT10 could result in the extinction of intra-EU BITs, while art. 30.3 VCLT would lead to 
the termination of the arbitration clause if the latter were incompatible with EU law11. 
In practice, it is observed that the consequences that derive from the application of the 
VCRT are not uniform and depend on the interpretation, more or less broad, that is given to 
the presupposition necessary for the application of  articles 59 and 30.3 VCTR contained 
                                                 
4EU, Treaty of Athens, Treaty of Accession of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Republic of Latvia, 
Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Polonica, Slovak Republic, AA2003 final of April 16, 2003 in Gazz. Uff. A. Eur. N 
L. 236. 
5A. HARTKAMP, C. SIBURGH, W. DEVROE, Cases, materials and text on EU law and private law, hart 
Publishing, Oxford & Oregon, Portland, 2017, pp. 282ss. K. LENAERTS, I. MASELIS, K. GUTMAN, EU 
procedural law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014, pp. 133ss. 
6U. KRIEBAUM, The fate of intra-EU BITs from an investment law and public international law perspective, 
in Elite Law Journal, 1, 2015, pp. 28s. S.MIRON, The last bite of the BITs-Supremacy of EU law versus 
investment Treaty arbitration, 20 in European Law Journal, 20, 2014, pp. 332ss. A. RADU, Foreign investors 
in the EU: Which "best treatment"? Interactions between bilateral investment Treaties and EU law, in European 
Law Journal, 14, 2008, pp. 238ss. 
7CJEU, 22/62, Van Gend en Loos of 5 February 1963, ECLI:EU:C:1963:1, I-00001. The fundamental 
characteristics of the Community legal order are in particular its pre-eminence over the rights of the Member 
States and the direct effect of a whole series of rules which apply to the citizens of those States, as well as to 
the States themselves. For an analysis on the fundamental principles of EU law. 
8B. POULAIN, Quelques Interrogations sur le Statut des Traites Bilatéraux de promotion et de protection des 
Investissements au sein de l’Union Européenne, in Revue Générale de droit international public, 111 (3), 2007, 
pp. 802ss. 
9According to art. 59 of VCTL of 1969. O. CORTEN, P. KLEIN, The Vienna Conventions on the law of 
treaties. A commentary, Oxfrod University Press, Oxford, 2011. 
10A. REINISCH, Articles 30 and 59 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in action: The decisions 
on jurisdiction in the Eastern Sugar and Eureko investment arbitrations, 39 in Legal Issues of Economic 
Integration, 39, 2012, pp. 158ss, according to the author: “(...) the intra-EU BITs and the EU accession treaties 
of new members do not relate to the “same subject matter“. The EU accession treaty made EU law applicable 
to them. It provides for a highly integrated economic union based on a customs union and is enriched by a vast 
set of additional common policies, whereas the BITs provide for a limited number of very specific investment 
protection standards, which may be enforced, among others, but most importantly, by direct investor-state 
arbitration. While there may be some partial overlap between BITs and EU law, this cannot change the fact 
that they are addressing different subject matters (...)“. 
11O. CORTEN, P. KLEIN, The Vienna Conventions on the law of treaties. A commentary, op. cit., 
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therein. The latter are in fact applied only if the object's equality is evident12. 
The lively doctrinal dispute that developed on the issue was partially resolved following the 
arbitration proceedings Eureko13 and Eastern Sugar14, in which the arbitrators, in assessing 
whether the defendant States-respectively the Czech Republic and Republic Slovak-acted in 
violation of the BITs underwritten by them, they have preliminarily investigated the question 
of the maintenance in force of such agreements and, subsequently, the compatibility of their 
clauses with EU law15. 
By proposing very similar arguments, the arbitration boards accepted the position of the 
majority doctrine16. According to the latter, the conditions for the application of articles 59 
and 30.3 of the VCLT17;  as a consequence, the "new" intra-EU BITs should not be 
                                                 
12It is noted that both forecasts are applied when the successive agreements between them are signed between 
the same parties. On this point, there is no doubt that the parts of the intra-EU BITs are also parts of the 
accession treaties and, consequently, of the institutional treaties. No part of the judgments has objected that the 
bilateral nature of the first and multilateral ones of the latter could exclude the application of the articles. 59 
and 30.3 of the Convention. 
13Perhaps the most significant cases are: Jan Oostergetel & Theodora Laurentius v. Slovak Republic 
(UNCITRAL) Decision on Jurisdiction of 30 April 2010; European American Investment Bank AG v. Slovak 
Republic (UNCITRAL) (PCA Case No 2010-17) Award on Jurisdiction of 22 October 2012; Charanne B.V. 
and Construction Investments S.à.r.l. v. Kingdom of Spain (SCC Case No 062/2012) Final Award of 21 
January 2016; RREEF Infrastructure (G.P.) Limited and RREEF Pan-European Infrastructure Two Lux S.à.r.l. 
v. Kingdom of Spain (ICSID Case No ARB/13/30) Decision on Jurisdiction of 6 June 2016; Isolux 
Infrastructure Netherlands B.V. v. Kingdom of Spain (SCC Case V 2013/153) Award of 12 July 2016; WNC 
Factoring Ltd v. Czech Republic (UNCITRAL) (PCA Case No 2014-34) Award of 22 February 2017; Anglia 
Auto Accessories Limited v. Czech Republic (SCC Case V 2014/181) Final Award of 10 March 2017; I.P. 
Busta and J.P. Busta v. Czech Republic (SCC Case V 2015/014) Final Award of 10 March 2017; and Eiser 
Infrastructure Limited and Energía Solar Luxembourg S.à.r.l. v. Kingdom of Spain (ICSID Case No 
ARB/13/36) Award of 4 May 2017. WNC Factoring LTD v. The Czech Republic, PCA Case No 2014-34, 
Award (hereinafter WNC award), 22 February 2017, par. 295. A.M. LÓPEZ-RODRÍGUEZ, P. NAVARRO, 
Investment arbitration and EU law in the aftermath of renewable energy cuts in Spain, in European Energy & 
Environmental Law Review, 25, 2016, pp. 4ss. 
14Arbitration ad hoc, partial award of 27 March 2007, case Stockholm Chamber Commerce. No. 088/2004, 
Eastern Sugar v. The Slovak Republic; Permanent Court of Arbitration, Decision on Jurisdiction, Arbitration 
and Suspension of 26 October 2010, in case n. 2008-13, Eureko B.V. v. The Slovak Republic of 19 August 
2005. For details see: C. BROWN, Evolution in investment treaty law and arbiration, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2011, pp. 30ss. S. LUTTRELL, Bias challenges in international commercial arbitration. The 
need for a "real danger" test, Kluwer Law, The Hague, 2009. pp. 64ss. Y. AKSAL, Implementing international 
economic law. Through dispute settlement, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston, 2011, pp. 158ss. I.A. 
LAIRD, B. SABQHI, F.G. SOURGENS, T.J. WEILER, Investment treaty arbiration and international law, Juris 
Publishing, New York, 2015. J.E. KJOS, Applicable law in investor-State arbitraton. The interplacy between 
national and international law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, pp. 123ss. 
15Arbitration ad hoc, partial award of 27 March 2007, case Stockholm Chamber Commerce. No. 088/2004, 
Eastern Sugar v. The Slovak Republic; Permanent Court of Arbitration, Decision on Jurisdiction, Arbitration 
and Suspension of 26 October 2010, in case n. 2008-13, Eureko B.V. v. The Slovak Republic. 
16A. DIMOPOULOS, The validity and applicability of international investment agreements between EU 
Member States under EU and international law, in Common Market Law Review, 47, 2011, pp. 64ss. H. 
WEHLAND, Intra-EU Investment agreements and arbitration: Is EC law an obstacle?, in International 
Comparative Law Quarterly, 58, 2009, pp. 298ss. T. EILMANSBERGER, Bilateral Investment Treaties and 
EU law, in Common Market Law Review, 46, 2009, pp. 384ss. M. BURGSTALLER, European Law and 
Investment Treaties, in Journal of International Arbitration, 26, 2009, pp. 182ss. C. SÖDERLUND Intra-EU 
BIT investment protection and EC Treaty, in Journal of International Arbitration, 24, 2007, pp. 456ss. 
17Article 65 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969: "1. The party which, under the provision, the 
present Convention, invokes both a defect of its consent to be bound by a treaty, or a ground for challenging its 
validity or for supporting the termination of the treaty, the withdrawal from it or the suspension of its 
application, it must notify its claim to the other parties ". The notification must indicate the proposed measure 
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considered extinct and the arbitration clause should not be considered incompatible with EU 
law18. The conclusion of the arbitrators seems completely correct and legally founded. In 
particular, the aforementioned art. 59 VCLT provides that, in the presence of two successive 
agreements, the previous one can be considered extinct if there is at least one of the 
following assumptions: the clear intention of the parties to that effect or, alternatively, the 
perfect overlap of the provisions of the two agreements. As regards the first condition, it is 
to be excluded that the adhesion of a State to the EU implies the intention to terminate the 
international agreements previously stipulated by the same19.  In fact, the express declaration 
referred to in the aforementioned rule must be made with the procedures enumerated in art. 
65 VCLT20, according to which, to assert the extinction of a treaty, the party concerned must 
notify its claim to the other21.  As an alternative to the express manifestation of the intention 
                                                                                                                                                      
with regard to the Treaty and the reasons for it. However, the notification must have certain characteristics. In 
the Eureko case, the Court denies that an email sent by the State with the subject of a unofficial position may 
be notified, despite the fact that it expressed the latter's intention to terminate the BIT. On this point, the Court 
declares that: “it is painly established that the parties to the BIT-Respondent and the Netherlands-subsequently 
intended that EU law should apply in full between them”. Case Eureko, op. cit., par. 244. The fact that the 
Netherlands-Slovakia BIT was not concluded by the EU, suggesting that if that had been the case, the 
arbitration provision might have  been compatible with EU law.This is the interpretation given by the Tribunal 
in Masdar Solar & Wind Cooperatief U.A. v. Kingdom of Spain (ICSID Case No. ARB/14/1), award dated 16 
May 2018, parr. 678-683. The Tribunal considered that the Achmea judgment: "(...) had no bearing upon the 
present case and was of only of limited application to BITs concluded between EU Member States. As such, 
the tribunal said it “cannot be applied to multilateral treaties, such as the ECT, to which the EU itself is a party 
(...)”. Similar treatment (…) presupposes that those two taxable persons are regarded as being in the same 
situation (…) The fact that those reciprocal rights and obligations apply only to persons resident in one of the 
two Contracting Member States is an inherent consequence of bilateral double taxation conventions. It follows 
that a taxable person resident in Belgium is not in the same situation as a taxable person resident outside 
Belgium so far as concerns wealth tax on real property situated in the Netherlands. A rule such as that laid 
down in Article 25(3) of the Belgium-Netherlands Convention cannot be regarded as Csongor István Nagya 
benefit separable from the remainder of the Convention, but is an integral part thereof and contributes to its 
overall balance. Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue. 
Even where such provisions extend to the situation of a company which is not resident in one of the contracting 
Member States, they apply only to persons resident in one of those Member States and, by contributing to the 
overall balance of the DTCs in question, are an integral part of them.  The fact that those reciprocal rights and 
obligations apply only to persons resident in one of the two contracting Member States is an inherent 
consequence. See also: O. CORTEN, P. KLEIN, The Vienna Conventions on the law of treaties. A commentary, 
op. cit. 
18Lodo, Eureko v. The Slovak Republic, op. cit., par. 65-77/86-96/109-119/127-138; Award, UNCITRAL, 
partial award of 27 March 2007, case no. 088/2004: Eastern Sugar v. Czech Republic, parr. 95-113. S. 
HINDELANG, Circumventing Primacy of EU Law and the ECJ’s Judicial monopoly by resorting dispute 
mechaniMember States provided for in Inter-States Treaties?, in Legal Issues of Economic Integration, 39 (2), 
2012, pp. 180ss. 
19CJEU, C-284/16, Slovak Republic v. Achmea BV of 6 March 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:158, published in the 
electronic Reports of the cases. 
20O. CORTEN, P. KLEIN, The Vienna Conventions on the law of treaties. A commentary, op. cit. 
21S.R. CUENDET, Les investissements intracommunautaires entre droit communautaire et Accord 
internationaux sur l’investissement: concilier l’inconciliable?, in Revue Générale de Droit International Privé, 
115 (4), 2011, pp. 853-895. Against,  J.A. BISCHOFF, Just a little bit of mxity? The EU’s role in the field of 
international investment law, in Common Market Law Review, 48, 2011. A. DE LUCA, New Developments, 
on the scope of the EU Common Commercial Policy under the Lisbon Treaty, in Yearbook on International 
Investment Law & Policy, 2010-2011, pp. 165-215. A. REINISCH, Articles 30 and 59 VCLT: The Decisions 
on Jurisdiction in the Eastern Sugar and Eureko Investment Arbitration, in Legal Issues of economic 
integration, 39 (2), 2012, pp. 158ss. C. SÖDERLUND, Intra-EU BIT investment protection and EC Treaty, in 
Journal of International Arbitration, 24, 2007. 
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of the parties, the extinction of the previous agreement occurs if the provisions of the second 
treaty are incompatible with the former, so much so that the simultaneous application of both 
is impossible. 
In this regard, it can refer to what was established in the Eureko case, in which the defendant 
Member States claimed that the BITs were no longer effective because they were included in 
an integrated legal order, the EU one, offering investors the same substantial and procedural 
guarantees as the international bilateral agreement22. The overlapping of the two sources 
should have led to the extinction of the previous one, ie the BIT, which had become intra-
EU. Adopting the internationalist perspective, however, this position can not be accepted. 
The concept of overlapping referred to in art. 59 VCLT must be interpreted in a teleological 
way; in this sense, the extinction of the previous agreement exists only when there is a 
conflict that prevents the application of the next one. This contrast, however, does not seem 
to be recognizable in the relationship between an intra-EU BIT and EU law; the application 
of the first, in fact, does not prevent the implementation of the second and vice versa. 
It is clear also from a combined reading of the Ascendi23, Merch Canada24, Genetech25 and 
Electrabel26 judgments that arbitral tribunals whose jurisdiction emanates from an 
arbitration clause freely entered into by the parties in the course of their contractual 
negotiations do not fall within the meaning of the term “court or tribunal of a Member State” 
used by article 267 TFEU27. This effectively bars arbitral tribunals in commercial arbitration 
from submitting references for preliminary rulings to the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU). Therefore, jurisdiction over a preliminary reference submitted by such 
arbitral tribunals cannot be established by the Court without revisiting its case-law28. 
According to our opinion the BITs and the EU legal order govern29 the free movement of 
capital under uniform principles of non-discrimination and treatment, with a constant 
recognition of rights in property. Thus, they address the same subject matter, even if the 
scope of EU law is much wider, and thus qualify for the threshold application of tests of 
incompatibility found in the international law principles reflected in articles 59 and 30(3) of 
the VCLT30. Even if article 59(1) would provide for ex lege termination, such effect could 
                                                 
22Against in case Eastern Sugar, the Board of arbitrators has excluded the applicability of the art. 30.3. 
precisely because it did not find a perfect overlap between the BIT and EU law, lacking in the second the 
arbitration clause. Award, Eastern Sugar v. Czech Repubblic, op. cit., parr. 180ss. 
23C-377/13, Ascendi of 12 June 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:1754, published in the electronic Reports of the cases. 
24CJEU, C-553/13, Marck Canada of 13 February 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:92, published in the electronic 
Reports of the cases. 
25C-567/14, Genentech of 7 July 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:177, not yet published, parr. 59-61.   
26C-357/14 P, Electrabel et Dunamenti Erőmű v. European Commission of 1st October 2015, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:642, par. 171. 
27N.N. SHUIBHNE, L.W. GORMLEY (a cura di), From single market to Economic Union. Essays in memory 
of John A. Usher, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, pp. 176ss. 
28G. BLANKE, Actions under Article 101 and 102 TFEU in international arbitration, in Singapore Academy of 
Law Journal, 22 (3), 2010, pp. 540ss. 
29C.E. ANDERER, Bilateral investment treaties and the EU legal order: Implications of the Lisbon Treaty, 35 
in Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 35, 2010 
30For more analysis and details see: M. FITZMAURICE, O. ELIAS, P. MERKOURIS (eds), Treaty 
interpretation and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 30 years on, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 
2010, pp. 9ss. G. NOUTE, Treaties and subsequent practice, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, pp. 224ss. 
E. BJORGE, The evolutionary interpretation of treaties, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014. O. CORTEN, 
P. KLEIN, The Vienna Conventions on the law of treaties. A commentary, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2011. O. DÖRR, Article 31. General rule of interpretation, in O. DÖRR, K. SCHMALENBACH (a cura di), 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. A commentary, Springer, Heidelberg-New York 2012, pp. 536ss. 
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only be achieved when the contracting states agree over its applicability, which implies that 
the party that relies on the article would at least have had to consult the other party so as to 
ensure that a mutual intention to terminate exists. In some cases (e.g. in case Binder v. Czech 
Republic, Award on Jurisdiction, 6 June 2007 (note 27)) the argument about implied 
termination also failed to recognize that the claimant’s cause of action related to events that 
preceded the respondent state's EU accession. BITs typically contain so called “sunset 
clauses“31, which stipulate that the treaties' provisions continue to be effective in respect of 
investments made before the date of termination for a further specified period (usually ten or 
fifteen years)32. Assuming that EU accession had miraculously terminated intra-EU BITs, 
such termination could not extend to sunset clauses without explicit agreement of the 
contracting States. To terminate sunset clauses with immediate effect, the contracting states 
would need to expressly agree on this; the 'general' application of article 59 (1) VCLT 
cannot, surely, create such effect33. 
It must also be considered that the conditions and the aims of EU law and the BITs are not 
similar: the formulation of the protections for the investor in the two legal corpora is indeed 
different, as is the scope ratione materiae. The BITs contain broad and often unqualified 
protection clauses, to the point, almost, not to allow the courts to proceed with the balancing 
between private and public interests that they underlie34. Furthermore, the BITs are only 
signed to settle the investment transactions between the two States party to the agreement35. 
The forecasts of the founding Treaties are, on the contrary, more defined, thus reducing the 
freedom of judges to interpret them and therefore to apply them in a more or less extended 
way. Above all, the institutive Treaties contain forecasts aimed at protecting goals and 
objectives that go beyond the single investment transaction36. 
                                                                                                                                                      
M. SAMSO, High hopes, scant resources: A word of scepticism about the anti-fragmentation function of article 
31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, in Leiden Journal of International Law, 24, 2011, 
pp. 5ss. R. GARDINER, Treaty Interpretation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008. G. NOUTE, Treaties 
and subsequent practice, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, pp. 224ss. 
31M.A. GWYNN, Power in the International Investment Framework, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2016 
32M.A. GWYNN, Power in the International Investment Framework, op. cit. D. CARON, L. CAPLAN, The 
UNCITRAL arbitration rules: A commentary, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013.  The establishment of 
rules at such fora might take longer and be more difficult, but the deficiencies of the current international 
investment framework have proven the problems that can derive from agreeing to something just because it is 
faster and more convenient. This is comparable to the effect of acquiring a cheap product that turns out to be of 
bad quality and inevitably does not last long. Further work to improve the current international investment 
framework lies in States’ increase awareness of the advantages of a multilateral forum. It promises more 
success in overcoming the existing deficiencies, because actors at such a forum can reach an agreement on 
rules that are balanced because the rules reflect the interests of all parties at stake in the framework.  Philip 
Morris Brands Sarl, Philip Morris Products SA and Abal Hermanos SA v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, 
ICSID Case No ARB/10/7 (formerly FTR Holding SA, Philip Morris Products SA and Abal Hermanos SA v 
Oriental Republic of Uruguay), Award (8 July 2016). D. MOSVAN, The EU’s competence on foreign 
investment: “New and improved”?, in San Diego International Law Journal, 18, 2017. 
33C. SÖDERLUND, Intra-EU BIT investment protection and EC Treaty, in Journal of International Arbitration, 
24, 2007. 
34T. EILMANSBERGER, Bilateral Investment Treaties and EU law, op. cit., pp. 402ss. J. KLABBERS, Treaty 
conflict and the EU, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009, pp. 24ss. 
35M. WIERZBOWSKI, A. GUBRYNOWICZ, International investment law for the 21st century, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2015. 
36In particular see the analysis of S. MENÉTREY, Droit international des investissements et droit de l’Union 
Européenne, in C. LEBEN (ed.) Droit international des investissements et de l’arbitrage transnational, ed. 
Pedone, Paris, 2015, pp. 614ss. 
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In the Eureko case to exclude the application of art. 30.337, the arbitrators carried out the 
combined examination of each clause in the relevant legal sources, the BIT and EU law, 
focusing in particular on the clauses of the free transfer of capital and fair and equitable 
treatment, on the protection clause and security as well as on the arbitration clause. At the 
end of the investigation, the arbitrators of the Eureko case38 found that the rights and 
obligations contained in the BIT inter partes did not overlap with EU law and that there was 
no incompatibility between the forecasts, not even with regard to the arbitration clause in the 
BIT object of the dispute but not in EU law. It is believed that the arguments of the Tribunal 
of First Instance (General Court after Lisbon Treaty) have been corrected, and in this sense 
they make two considerations. The presence in the BIT of some clauses absent in EU law-
such as that on fair and equitable treatment and the arbitration clause-does not determine ex 
if the incompatibility of the provisions of the first with the second. On the contrary, these are 
mere differences and, in any case, the wider guarantees contained in the bilateral agreement 
can not be considered, in themselves, in contrast with the provisions of the founding 
Treaties. However, the GC's position regarding the absence of fair and equitable treatment 
guarantees in EU law can not be shared. In fact, there are three principles of EU law, the 
specification of which derives from the overlap with the international principle of fair and 
equitable treatment, guaranteed in every investment relationship39. This is the principle of 
non-discrimination, proportionality and legal certainty40. Contrary, in the Eureko case, the 
european executive highlights the reasons that must lead to considering the invalidity of the 
arbitration clause contained in the intra-EU BITs41. On the one hand, the principle of mutual 
trust42 between the national forums of each Member State prevails in the EU system and 
                                                 
37In Eureko for CJEU's affirmation of the prevalence of EU law in case of conflict with bilateral agreements 
between Member States see Case C-10/61, Commission v. Italy of 27 February 1962, ECLI:EU:C:1962:2, 
00001; C-3/91, Exportur SA v. Lor SA and Confiserie du Tech SA of 10 November 1992, 
ECLI:EU:C:1992:420, I-5529, par. 8, "(...) the institution and pursuit of proceedings before the Arbitral 
Tribunal, in the circumstances (involving the application of EU law), involve a manifest risk that the 
jurisdictional order laid down in the Treaties and, consequently, the autonomy of the Community legal system 
may be adversely affected (...)". 
38Case n. 2008-13, Eureko B.V. v. The Slovak Republic of 19 August 2005, op. cit. 
39M.A. CLODFELTER, The future direction of investment agreements in the EU, in Santa Clara Journal of 
International Law, 12, 2013, pp. 160ss 
40As to the legitimate expectations principle under EU law, the CJEU according to conditions must be satisfied 
in order for a claim to entitlement to the protection of legitimate expectations to be well founded. EU or 
national authorities must have given precise, unconditional and consistent assurances to the person concerned. 
The assurances must be of such nature as to give rise to a legitimate expectation on the part of the person to 
whom they are addressed. The assurances "must comply with the applicable rules" (with reference e.g. to case 
from the CJEU: T-347/03, Branco v. Commission of 30 June 2005, ECLI:EU:T:2005:265, II-02555, par. 102 
and T-282/02, Cementbouw Handel & Industrie v. Commission of 26 February 2006, ECLI:EU:T:2006:64, II-
00319, par. 77.). The principle of legal certainty, in turn, requires that EU law rules be clear and precise so 
that interested parties canascertain their position in situations and legal relationships governed by EU law.  
The CJEU held that the applicants had not received any assurances over the compatibility of the PPAs with EU 
law, meaning that no legitimate expectations had arisen. For details see also:  A.H. TÜRK, Judicial review in 
EU law, Edward Elgar Publishers, Cheltenham, 2010. L. WOODS, P. WATSON, Steiner & Woods EU law, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017, pp. 37ss C. BARNARD, S. PEERS, EU law, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2017, pp. 788ss. 
41D. MOSKVAN, The clash of intra-EU bilateral investment treaties with EU law. A bitter pill to swallow, in 
Columbia Journal of European Law, 22, 2015-2016, pp. 105ss. 
42See the ultimate Regulation (EU) 2018/1805 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 
2018 on the mutual recognition of freezing orders and confiscation orders, PE/38/2018/REV/1, OJ L 303, 
28.11.2018, p. 1-38. 
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therefore the necessity-which gives rise to the investment arbitration43-to remove the 
disputes to the national courts in favor of a neutral hole. On the other hand, the arbitration 
clause violates the principle of non-discrimination enucleated in art. 18 TFUE44, since it 
places on two separate levels the investors protected by a BIT, who can refer to arbitration 
and EU investors to whom this method of resolving disputes is precluded45. 
The absence of incompatibility does not have any effect on the validity of the BIT and the 
arbitrators can therefore recognize their competence and apply the clauses contained in the 
agreement46. The principle of the primacy of EU law can, in fact, render the intra-EU BITs 
inapplicable limited to those forecasts contrary to the primary and secondary law of the 
Union, which the State has not conformed to EU law as prescribed by articles 4.3 TEU and 
10 TFEU47. However, there is no incompatibility between the provisions of BIT and EU law, 
if a provision of the former can be respected without violating the EU law "this conclusion is 
not affected by the principles of supremacy, direct effect or direct application of EU law 
(...)"48. 
Moreover, the primacy of EU law49 and the principle of direct effect apply only in european 
terms and, therefore, can not be imposed also on relationships that find their source in 
another legal system, such as the international one50. The visive aspect of EU law can not go 
                                                 
43J. WAINCYMER, Procedure and evidence in international arbitration, Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan 
den Rijn, 2012, pp. 5ss. 
44C. BLUMANN, L. DUBOUIS, Droit institutionnel de l’Union européenne, op. cit., N.N. SHUIBHNE, L.W. 
GORMLEY (a cura di), From single market to Economic Union. Essays in memory of John A. Usher, op. cit., 
45From the European perspective, the validity of intra-EU BITs clauses as well as for incompatibility with EU 
law could possibly be questioned if an infringement of the division of competences between the Union and 
Member States could be identified. But even this last violation does not exist because, until the entry into force 
of the Lisbon Treaty, the competence in matters of investments has been shared between the Union and the 
Member States and therefore the first have signed the BITs having jurisdiction. The transfer of powers deriving 
from the Lisbon Treaty has recognized the exclusive power of the Union to regulate foreign investments, but 
this can not lead to the cancellation of all pending relationships. This also applies to extra-EU BITs, now 
subject to the provisions of European Regulation no. 1219/2012 which defined the legal regime to ensure its 
maintenance in force. 
46M. OLÍK, D. FYRBACH, The competence of investment arbitration tribunals to seek preliminary rulings 
from European Courts', in Czech Yearbook of International Law, 2, 2011, pp. 192ss. 
47P. CRAIG, The Lisbon treaty. Law, politics and treaty reform, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012. V. 
CUESTA LOPEZ, The Lisbon treaty's provisions on demoratic principles. A legal framework for participatory 
democracy, in European public Law, 13 (1), 2010, pp. 123ss. K. TUORI, The european financial crisis. 
Constitutional aspects and implications, in EUI Working papers-law 2012/28, pp. 4ss. A. BOGDANDY, The 
european lesson for international democracy. The significance of articles 9 to 12 EU Treaty for International 
Organizations, in Jean Monnet Working papers, n. 2/2011. M. POIARES MADURO, B. WITTE, M. KUMM, 
The euro crisis and the demoratic governance of the euro: Legal and political issues of a fiscal crisis, in 
RSCAS Policy Papers 2012/08. J.H. BINDER, Komplexitätsbewältigung durch Verwaltungsverfahren? 
Krisenbewältigung und Krisenprävention nach der EU-Bankensnierungs und Abwicklungsrichlinie, in 
Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handelsrecht und Wirtschaftesrecht, 173 (1), 2015, pp. 84ss. 
48Against in case Eureko, the respondent State has stated that: “(...) as a matter of EU law, the Dutch-Slovak 
BIT’s arbitration clause was no longer applicable since it was incompatible with the EU Accession Treaty (...) 
the arbitration clause provided for arbitral Tribunals to take into account Slovak law, of which directly 
applicable EU law forms part (...) EU law has direct effect and prevails over national law.” Lodo Eureko v. The 
Repubblic Slovak, op. cit., par. 276. 
49M. CLAES, The balidity and primacy of EU Law and the "cooperative relationship" between National 
Constitutional Courts and the Court of Justice of the EU in Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative 
Law, 23 (1), 2016.M. AVBELJ, Supremacy primacy of EU Law-(Why) does it matters, in European Law 
Journal, 17 (6), 2011, pp. 746ss. 
50In favor of this position they also issue two rulings in which, independently of the outcome of the trial, the 
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CJEU has had the opportunity to exclude the application of art. 344 TFEU to disputes between private parties, 
according to case: 459/03, European Commission v. Ireland of 30 May 2006, ECLI:EU:C:2006:345, I-4635.  
On the other hand, in the opinion of the Court of Justice, requested by the Council with regard to a project for 
the establishment of a single European patent court, the Court has contested the provision of exclusive 
jurisdiction of that court, as it is capable of rescinding national courts the overwhelming power to verify 
compliance with EU law, but also expressly reiterated that art. 344 applies exclusively to disputes between 
States. Opinion of 8 March 2011, in case 1/09,  I- 01137. Opinion 1/09: The Court recognized that it has no 
jurisdiction to rule on disputes between individuals in the field of patents, as that jurisdiction belongs to 
national courts. Member States were not entitled to transfer that jurisdiction to a court such as the European 
and Community Patents Court, in as much as this would deprive national courts of their power to apply EU law 
and to use the preliminary reference procedure in the patent field. The Court underlined the importance of the 
preliminary ruling procedure in ensuring that EU law has the same effect in all member states and in all 
circumstances, and described it as indispensable to the preservation of the very nature of the law established by 
the Treaties. For practical purposes, and despite textual differences, the preliminary ruling procedure in the 
draft agreement was identical to the one established in Article 267 TFEU, but this was not enough for the 
Court, also because there were two more specific problems with the Unitied Patent Court system. The first 
problem stemmed from the fact that under EU law member states are obligated to compensate damages (on 
certain conditions) that individuals incur as a result of violations of EU law, and this includes the obligation to 
compensate damages caused by decisions of judicial bodies. The second problem related to the fact that under 
EU law the Commission can start infringement proceedings against a member state if the decisions of its 
domestic courts violate EU law. In contrast, if the Unified Patent Court were to render decisions that violate 
EU law, those decisions could not be the subject of infringement proceedings', nor cause financial liability for 
any member state. Put differently, under the draft agreement the CJEU was not in a position to judicially 
review the decisions of the Unitied Patent Court, and individuals incurring damages as a result of Unitied 
Patent Court's decisions (which violate EU law) could not receive compensation.  R. HILTY, T. JAEGER, M. 
LAMPING, H. ULLRICH, The unitary patent package: Twelve reasons for concern, Max Planck Institute for 
Intellectual Property & Competition Law Research Paper, 2012, pp. 12ss. M. LAMPING, Enhanced 
cooperation-A proper approach to market integration in the field of unitary patent protection?, in International 
Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 8, 2011. M. TRONCOSO, European Union Patents: A 
Mission Impossible? An Assessment of the Historical and Current Approaches, in Marquette Intellectual 
Property Law Review (International Intellectual Property Scholars Series), 17, 2013, pp. 232ss. H. ULLRICH, 
Enhanced cooperation in the area of unitary patent protection and European integration, in ERA Forum, 13 (4), 
2013, pp. 589-610. J. PILA, C. WADLOW, The unitary European Union patent system, Hart Publishing, 
Oxford & Oregon, Portland, 2015. CJEU, C-235/87, Matteucci of 27 September 1988, ECLI:EC:1988:460, 
ECR 05589, para. 22. T. STOREY, A. PIMO, Unlocking European Union law, ed. routledge, London & New 
York, 2018. See also from CJEU: C-478/07, Budĕjovický Budvar National Corporation v. Rudolf Ammersin 
GmbH of 8 September 2009, ECLI:EU:C:2009:521, ECR I-07721,  para. 44. CJEU, C-121/85, Conegate 
Limites v. HM Customs & Excise of 11 March 1986, ECLI:EU:C:1986.114, ECR I-01007. CJEU, Joined cases 
C-241/91P and C-242/91P, Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publications Ltd (ITP) v. 
European Commission of 6 April 1995, ECLI:EU:C:1995:98, ECR I-00743. C-351/15P, European Commission 
v. Total and Elf Aquitaine of 18 January 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:27, published only in the electronic Reports of 
cases. C-434/13P, European Commission v. Parker Hannifin Manufacturing and Parker-Hannifin of 18 
December 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2456, published only in the electronic Reports of cases. T-747/15, EDF v. 
European Commission of 16 January 2018, ECLI:EU:C:T-2018:6, published only in the electronic Reports of 
cases.  C-473/93, European Commission v. Luxembourg of 2 July 1996, ECLI:EU:C:1996:263, I-3207.E. 
ROSATI, Originality in European Union copyright. Full harmonization through case law, Edward Elgar 
Publishers, Cheltenham, 2013. C. BARNARD, The substantive law of the European Union law, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2016. E. CLOOTS, National identity in European Union law, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2015. S. ANDERSEN, The enforcement of European Union law: The law of the European 
Commission, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012. K. BRADLEY, N. TRAVERS, A. WHELAN, Of courts 
and constitutions. Liber amicorum in honour of Nial Fennelly, Hart Publishing, Oxford & Oregon, Portland, 
2014, pp. 178ss. A. ILARDI, The new european patent, Hart Publishing, Oxford & Oregon, Portland, 2015, pp. 
146ss. W. TILMANN, C. PLASMANN, Unified patent protection in Europe. A commentary, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2018, pp. 210ss. A. ROSAS, The national judge as EU judge: Opinion 1/09, in P. 
CARDONNEL, A. ROSAS, N. WAHL (eds) Constitutionalising the EU judicial system: Essays in honour of 
Pernilla Lindh, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, pp. 105ss. T. LOCK, Taking national courts more 
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so far as to replace the provisions of international agreements which are binding on the 
Member State, where these agreements have been taken in an area which falls within the 
jurisdiction of the State and do not conflict with EU law51. The extension of european 
sovereignty to the relations between Member States that derive their origin from 
international law can not be reconciled with the current structure of relations between EU 
and international law. It is observed, in fact, that in cases where the Union has prevented the 
application of international rules in the EU system, it did so to protect its "constitutional" 
order, which, in the case of intra-EU BITs, does not seem be questioned52. Ultimately, as 
long as such intra-EU BITs remain in force for international law, the arbitral tribunals can 
not disregard the rights and obligations set out therein53. Therefore, the guarantees of intra-
EU BITs will continue to apply, if they are compatible with EU law. Otherwise, it will be the 
latter to find application. 
 
3.Arbitration clause of intra-EU BITs: The (alleged) incompatibility with EU law and 
validity for the right of arbitration. 
 
Jurisprudential practice has not only excluded the extinction of intra-EU BITs due to the 
accession of the second part of the agreement to the european area, but has also declared the 
compatibility of the provisions of these agreements with EU law. Among these, the 
arbitration clause is included. There are two reasons for supporting the compatibility of this 
clause with EU law54. First of all, the founding Treaties do not exclude, directly or indirectly, 
                                                                                                                                                      
seriously? Comment on opinion 1/09, in European Law Review, 36 (4), 2011, pp. 576ss. K. LENAERTS, I. 
MASELIS, K. GUTMAN, European Union procedural law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014, pp. 552ss. 
M. PARISH, International courts and the european legal order, in European Journal of International Law, 23 
(1), 2012, pp. 143ss. P. JAN KUIJPER, J. WOUFERS, F. HOFFMEISTER, The law of European Union 
external relations: Cases, materials and commentary on the European Union as an international legal actor, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018, pp. 520ss. M. DERLÉN, J. LINDOLM, The Court of Justice of the 
European Union: Multidisciplinary perspectives, Oxford Unviersity Press, Oxford, 2018. : T. JAEGER, 
Shielding the unitary patent from the ECJ: A rash and futile exercise, in International Review of Intellectual 
Property and Competition Law, 44 (4), 2013, pp. 389ss. J. PILA, C. WADLOW, The unitary European Union 
patent system, Hart Publishing, Oxford & Oregon, Portland, 2015, pp. 93ss. 
51C. SÖDERLUND, Intra EU-BITs investment protection and the EC Treaty, op. cit., pp. 455-468. 
52In case Eureko, Bermann stated that: “(...) the Tribunal disagreed over matters related to the exclusivity of 
ECJ jurisdiction over matters touching on EU law and the fundamental principle of non-discrimination under 
EU law. More generally, the Tribunal held in effect that the EU may represent a new legal order for constituent 
States but that, from an international legal perspective, it is nevertheless a subject of international law, and 
bound along with its member States by its international engagements”. G.A. BERMANN, Navigating EU Law 
and the Law of international arbitration, in Arbitration International, 28 (3), pp. 434ss. 
53In its frequent interventions in intra-EU BIT arbitration proceedings, the European Commission has 
consistently stressed this conception. For example in its letter dated 11 October 2011 to the CPA concerning 
European American Investment Bank AG (Austria) v. The Slovak Republic of 22 October 2012 (PCA case n. 
2010/17), the Commission indicated that: “(...) insofar as the arbitration claims involve questions of application 
and interpretation of law covered by the EU treaties, EU law takes precedence. Where there is а conflict with 
EU law, the general international law rule of "pacta sunt servanda" does not apply to treaties concluded 
between EU Member States (...) an investor cannot rely on provisions of bilateral investment treaties concluded 
between EU Member States which are inconsistent with EU law and the Union's judicial system (...)”. For 
details see: M. SCHERER, International arbitration in the energy sector, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2018, pp. 206ss. P. DUMBERRY, A guide to state succession in international investment law, Edward Elgar 
Publishers, 2018. J. D'ASPREMONT, S. BESSON, S. KNUCHEL, The oxford handbook of the sources of 
international law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017. 
54C.I. NAGY, Developments intra-EU bilateral investment treaties and EU law after Achmea: "Know well 
what leads you forward and what holds you back", in German law Journal, 19 (4), 2018. C.I. NAGY, Free 
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the use of intra-Union arbitrations and, in this sense, the reference of art. 344 TFEU55 to de-
legitimize the arbitration courts is juridically improper56. This provision, in fact, requires 
Member States to refer to the CJEU disputes which have two Member States as their 
partners and not a State and a private one, as happens in the investment arbitration. On the 
other hand "the same literal tenor of art. 344 TFEU57 makes it clear that this provision 
applies only to disputes between Member States and not to (...) disputes between a 
contracting State and private individuals (...)"58. Secondly, the arbitration clause, normally 
included in the BITs, explains its effects also, and independently of the fact that it is not 
provided for by EU law. The parties to a BIT have in fact a legitimate expectation to devolve 
a dispute to arbitration tribunals. This expectation, which is a binding obligation enshrined 
in an international agreement, can not be frustrated by the european principle of mutual 
trust59. The latter is the principle of soft law and it derives from it, among other things, that 
each Member States puts trust in the jurisdictional system of the others60. In EU practice the 
                                                                                                                                                      
trade, public interest and reality: New generation free trade agreements and national regulatory sovereignty 9 
in Czech Yearbook of Internatonal Law, 9, 2018. 
55D. LIAKOPOULOS, Art. 344 TFUE, in  P.E. HERZOG, C. CAMPBELL, G. ZAGEL, Smit & Herzog on the 
law of the EU, ed. LexisNexis, 2018. 
56In this regard, in the Eureko case, the Commission notes that, in any case, discrimination can not be resolved 
by extending the use of arbitration to all European investors as this would result in conflicts of jurisdiction and 
forum shopping. The referral to arbitration must therefore be excluded for all. On the other hand, the 
Commission always challenges the claim of the company, Eureko, that in the EU system there being no 
meccanism to obtain damages, then arbitration proceedings must be used. On this point, the executive 
emphasizes that in the Francovich ruling the plaintiff was recognized as compensation for damages deriving 
from the violation of EU law. Case, Eureko v. The Repubblic Slovak, op. cit., par. 186ss. J. BAUMGARTNER, 
Treaty shopping in international investment law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016. D. LIAKOPOULOS, 
The case of referrals from the International Arbitration in the Court of EU, in International and EU Legal 
Matters, 2015. 
57For example, whereas in the Charanne case the European Commission had objected in its amicus curiae to 
the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal apprised of the matter, the latter ruled that it did indeed have jurisdiction. 
Charanne BV and Construction Investments Sàrl v Kingdom of Spain (SCC Case No 062/2012) Final Award of 
21 January 2016, par. 409. The CJEU was careful to distinguish between the BIT arbitral tribunal and 
commercial arbitration tribunals, the awards of which can be subject to limited review by the national courts. 
Indeed, the domestic courts can verify whether the fundamental provisions of EU law have been respected and, 
if necessary, refer questions to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling according to the case: C-394/11 Belov of 31 
January 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:48, published in the electronic Reports of the cases, par. 38. The commercial 
arbitration procedure originates in the “freely expressed wishes of the parties”, whereas the investment 
arbitration at issue stems from a bilateral treaty, by which Member States agree “to remove from the 
jurisdiction of their own courts, and hence fromthe systemof judicial remedies which the second subparagraph 
of Article 19(1) TEU requires them to establish in the fields covered by EU law”. (case Achmea) 
58Alternatively, the arbitrator may also apply the national law of the country where the arbitration is based, 
which has a rule of law applicable to all international arbitrations established in its territory. This is the case 
with Swiss law, the Swiss Federal Code on private international law, which laid down regulative principles for 
the validity of the Arbitration Convention as regards the form, art. 187.1, both from the substantive point of 
view. 
59A. BAKARDJIEVA ENGELBREKT, N. BREMBER, A. MICHALSKI, Trust in the EU in challenges time. 
Interdisciplinary european studies, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2018, 
60In case Eureko, the respondent State stated that: “(...) even if art. 59 of the VCLT does not operate to 
terminate teh BIT, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to decide this case because teh arbitration clause in the BIT 
is not “compatible” with the EC Treaty within teh meaning of art. 30 of the VCLT (...) in alternative, to a 
finding under the VCLT, Respondent argue that the Tribunal lacks jurisdition as a matter of EU law, which teh 
Tribunali s bound to apply in accordance with art.8.6 of the BIT (...) under german law (lex loci arbitri) award 
issued in non-arbitrable dispute may be set aside by a german Court, EU Law constitues an integral part of the 
legal order applicable in Germany as an EU MS (...) EU does not allow teh conferral on an arbitral tribunal of 
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principle of mutual trust61 has led to the definition of Regulation 1215/2012 from January 
                                                                                                                                                      
jurisdiction over the area covered by the BIT and therefore the dispute would not be arbitral (...)”. Case, 
Eureko v. The Repubblic Slovak, op. cit., par. 131-144. 
61M. WELLER, Mutual trust in search of the future of EU private international law, in Journal of Private 
International Law, 11 (1), 2015, pp. 66ss. M. ZILINSKY, Mutual trust and cross-border enforcement of 
judgments in civil matters in the EU. Does the step-by-step approach work?, in Netherlands International Law 
Review, 64 (1), 2017, pp. 117ss. A. BAKARDJIEVA ENGELBREKT, N. BREMBER, A. MICHALSKI, Trust 
in the EU in challenges time. Interdisciplinary european studies, op. cit., pp. 179ss. See also: CJEU, joined 
cases: P. Aranyosi and R. Căldăraru, C-404/15 and C-659/15 of 5 April 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:198, published 
in the electronic Reports of the cases. In particular the attitude of the Luxembourg courts in relation to the 
interpretation of the principle of mutual recognition and mutual trust in civil procedural matters is intended to 
align with the "warnings" enucleated by the European Court in Avotinš. The reasons behind the less rigorous 
interpretation of this principle in the aforementioned ruling-based on the derivation of a new mandatory reason 
for non-execution of a European arrest warrant, where such execution exposes the person concerned to the 
actual risk of suffering treatment inhuman or degrading-they can not in fact move perfectly within the civil 
procedural matter, considering the ontological difference of the fundamental rights at stake. The CJEU has 
gone further on the mutual recognition and has been based on another interpretative way stating that the art. 3 
of the ECHR and 4 of the CFREU must be interpreted: “(...) in a convergence between (...)“. In particular the 
Advocate General Yves Bot ha dichiarato relativamente che: “(...) In the AG’s search for balance he considers 
first whether Article 1(3) FDEAW constitutes a ground for non-execution of an arrest warrant. He rejects such 
a notion for the following three reasons. First off, interpreting Article 1(3) as a non-execution ground would 
run counter to the phrasing of that Article, which due to its place and wording does not express a non-execution 
ground, but rather the principle of mutual trust. Secondly, such a notion would not be in agreement with the EU 
legislator’s intent to create a system of surrender with exhaustively enumerated non-recognition grounds, 
whereby, in addition to the grounds in Articles 3, 4, and 4a FDEAW, only in the exceptional circumstances 
described in Recitals (10) and (13) surrender can be suspended or removal, expulsion or extradition can be 
prohibited. Last, a ground of non-recognition in Article 1(3) would severely damage mutual trust between 
judicial authorities on which the Framework Decision is based and would, as a result, make the principle of 
mutual recognition meaningless (...)“. We are also talking about another principle-value of the Union, that of 
proportionality as a balancing of interests and the widening of the discretionary sphere of the internal judge, 
and the circumstances in speciem. Criminal cooperation does not seem to be comparable with the similar 
ground and dates back to the experience of the single market, in terms of decisive jurisprudential protagonism. 
Let us not forget that criminal cooperation has been based on the definition of common minimum standards for 
delineating spaces and limits of cooperation between judicial and police authorities in the areas selected by the 
Member States and by the Union legislator. Of course we can speak of a positive and normative unification for 
years in the criminal sector and especially after the Treaty of Lisbon the merit belongs to the principle of 
mutual recognition of judicial decisions which continues to guarantee a median solution to integration that is 
summarized in the protection of rights fundamental rights, the inalienable rights of individuals and a 
continuous progress dictated by the Member States towards an increasingly active and proactive contribution, a 
harbinger of innovations and achievements with the main objective among others the continuous accelerated 
integration but within a harmonious development and development of all the individual interest and not the 
state one. S. GÁSPÁR-SZILÁGY, Joined cases Aranyosi and Căldăraru. Converging human rights standards, 
mutual trust and new grounds for postponing a european arrest warrant, in European Journal of Crime, 
Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 24 (1), 2016, pp. 198ss. K. BOVEND’ EERDT, The joined cases Aranyosi 
and Căldăraru: A new limit to the mutual trust presumption in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice?, in 
Utrecht Journal of International and European Law, 32, 2016, pp. 112ss. M. GUIRESSE, Confiance mutuelle et 
mandat d’arrêt européen: Evolution ou inflexion de la Cour de justice?, in GDR-ELSJ, 12 avril 2016. R. 
NIBLOCK, Mutual recognition, mutual trust?: Detention conditions and deferring an EAW, in New Journal of 
European Criminal Law, 24 (2) 2016, pp. 250ss. A.E. VERVAELE, Mutual legal assistance in criminal matters 
to control (transnational) criminality, in N. BOISTER, R.J. CURRIE (a cura di), Handbook of transnational 
criminal law, ed. Routledge, London & New York, 2015, pp. 123ss. N. SYBESMA-KNOL, The european 
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2015-which establishes, inter alia, the automatic recognition of judgments rendered by 
Member States' authorities. The rulings are excluded from the scope of the Regulation and, 
therefore, it is assumed that the arbitration proceedings must be able to be initiated without 
being subject to principles that, vice versa, are valid only in relations between Member 
States. 
In speciem, article 71 of the Brussels I Regulation62 expressly states that the Regulation will 
not undermine the duties of Member States under other international treaties regarding the 
jurisdiction, recognition, and enforcement of judgments. The CJEU has confirmed this broad 
exclusion of arbitration in several judgments concerning the admissibility of preliminary 
references from arbitral tribunals such as the Marc Rich63, Van Uden64, and West Tankers 
cases65. Most problematic was the judgment in the West Tankers case that shed light on the 
efficiency of the arbitration exclusion under EU law and its consequences for lis pendens 
and parallel arbitration and litigation proceedings. the CJEU stated that the issues at stake, 
including those concerning the validity of the arbitration agreement, did fall within the scope 
of the Brussels I Regulation. Furthermore, the CJEU noted that granting an anti-suit 
injunction in the case before it was incompatible with EU law for policy reasons66. 
Actually, the scope of the arbitration agreements’ exclusion is not clear in article 1(2)(e) of 
the Rome I Regulation67. It is stated that these applicable laws are, at least, the law 
governing the arbitration agreement itself, the law governing the arbitration proceedings (the 
curial law or the lex arbitri) and the law governing the merits of the dispute (the applicable 
law, the governing law, the proper law or the substantive law)68. Besides the application of 
EU competition law, the arbitrators’ duty to apply the secondary EU law can also be raised 
by considering the CJEU's decision in Ingmar GB Ltd v. Eaton Leonard Technologies 
Inc69.The CJEU interpreted those provisions which are designed to protect commercial 
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agents as mandatory and stated that they must be observed throughout the Union. Having 
considered the Union legal order, it was held that the principal cannot simply evade those 
provisions by a choice of-law clause70. In the light of the decision, the application of 
mandatory EU provisions by arbitrators can also be argued by taking account of a possible 
challenge of the arbitral award under the public policy exception in case of the non-
application of those provisions, if such an exception is available in the arbitration law of the 
Member State in question.The answer depends on the arbitrators’ right or power to raise 
issues of law of their own motion under the procedural law of the arbitration. If they have 
such a right or power under the procedural law of the arbitration, they will be required to 
raise issues of EU law including the Rome I Regulation of their own motion. If they are not 
enabled to raise issues of law of their own motion, they will not be required to apply the 
Regulation provided that the parties have been given an effective opportunity of enforcing 
their rights founded on EU law71. The consequences of the non-application of the Rome I 
Regulation by arbitrators sitting in the EU would constitute an error of law and a breach of 
EU law. The arbitral award could be challenged if recourse to the courts for an error of law 
is available under the national law of the Member State in which the arbitration was held, 
such as English or Scots law. Due to the breach of EU law, the aggrieved party could also 
bring an action for damages against that Member State under the principle of state liability. 
The use of arbitration, as provided for only in the BITs, could at most create discrimination 
between investors who can resort to them and those to which, instead, access to the 
arbitration courts is precluded. The appeal to an internal judge is not, by its nature, less 
favorable than resolution by arbitration or, as such, a source of discrimination for investors 
who can not resort to arbitration. Excluding the incompatibility of the arbitration clause with 
EU law, it is necessary to consider its validity with respect to the right of arbitration, which 
is a legitimate assumption of the jurisdiction of the arbitrators. In fact, when the arbitral 
tribunals are appealed for the alleged violation of a bilateral agreement or the contractual 
regulation inter partes, they must first assess the existence of their jurisdiction by looking at 
the source from which they derive their power of judgment, that is to say only to the 
arbitration clause. The principle of autonomy of the arbitration clause72 allows the latter to 
operate independently from the validity, suspension or extinction of the source-contract or 
BIT-in which it is inserted. The arbitrator therefore has the power to decide his own 
jurisdiction even if the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement is questioned, as has 
happened in the disputes concerning intra-EU BITs. The validity of the arbitration clause 
does not therefore depend on the compatibility with EU law, but on the existence of the 
conditions identified by the right of arbitration: the ability and power to compromise in 
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arbitrators, the exact definition of the object of the arbitration agreement, the form of the 
latter and the arbitrability of the disputes. An international arbitrator is not bound by the lex 
fori73 and, therefore, to assess the existence of the aforementioned requirements, applies the 
law or conflict rule74 that the parties have indicated to him or, in the absence, the rules he 
deems most appropriate. EU law does not take into account the extent to which it is part of 
the applicable national law or is directly referred to; in any case, in the absence of express 
bans on the arbitration provided for by EU law-and such as to be valid as regards public 
order rules75 or of necessary application-there is no obligation on the part of the colleges to 
decline their jurisdiction for the only reason that, otherwise, there would be an alleged 
violation of EU law. For the right of arbitration, therefore, is the presence of the two 
requisites-validity of the clause and consent of the parties-which legitimizes the arbitration 
proceedings, in general and intra-Union in particular. In the jurisprudential practice of the 
european BITs, the colleges have correctly rejected the exceptions of lack of jurisdiction, 
based on the relationship between EU law and international law and on the presumed 
incompatibility between the two76; on the contrary, they recognized it, noting the existence 
of the aforementioned conditions and the criteria defined by the procedural Regulation 
applied by them. 
In this regard, in the Electrabel case77 the Court replied to the exceptions of lack of 
jurisdiction, noting that “the Tribunal is an international Tribunal established under the 
Energy Charter Treaty, and the ICISD Convention78. From its perspective under 
international law, the Court notes the establishment under international law of Parties’ 
consent to international arbitration under ICSID Convention and also the effect of article 26 
of the ICSID convention, providing for ICSID arbitration to the exclusion of any other 
remedy”79. The Court based this on a negative interpretation of article 351 TFEU80 and 
meant that EU law must prevail over earlier agreements concluded between two Member 
States. According to our opinion the role of EU law in investor-state arbitration commenced 
under an ECT is analogous to that within intra-EU BITs, so that EU law may be applied for 
the identification of rights in rem and as a tool for the interpretation of the investment 
agreement. The Court's reasoning regarding the relationship of ECT and EU law could be 
applied to the relationship of intra-EU BITs and the EU law. 
Actually we notice that arbitral tribunals operating under the ICSID Arbitration Rules, 
however, seem to view amicus under a different light. In the Suez/Vivendi v. Argentina 
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case81, the tribunal defined the role of amici in the following terms: "(...) the traditional role 
of an amicus curiae in an adversary proceeding is to help the decision maker arrive at its 
decision by providing the decision maker with arguments, perspectives, and expertise that 
the litigating parties may not provide. In short, a request to act as amicus curiae is an offer of 
assistance-an offer that the decision maker is free to accept or reject. An amicus curiae is a 
volunteer, a friend of the court, not a party (...)"82. The tribunal in Biwater v. Tanzania stated 
that: “(...) amicus are not expected (...) to consider themselves as simply in the same position 
as either party’s lawyers, or (...) see their role as suggesting to the Arbitral Tribunal how 
issues of fact or law as presented by the parties ought to be determined (which is the sole 
mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal itself) (...)"83. 
As far as international law is concerned, therefore, there are no legal reasons for excluding 
the validity and applicability of the arbitration clause even before having carried out the 
aforementioned survey84. Ultimately, it seems that, in the view of those who deny the 
legitimacy of arbitration, the real problem is not the arbitration proceeding as such, the more 
the protection of the uniform application of EU law. 
On this point, it is noted that the effects of arbitration decisions on the interpretation of EU 
law are not a problem anyway, since they only bind the parties to the proceedings and are 
not intended to extend or reinterpret the acquis communautaire. In any case, the direct 
effectiveness of EU law, as well as the supremacy of this body of law, can not replace a 
provision of international law to which the Member States have chosen to be bound, which 
is fully effective for the right of arbitration and which, on the other hand, is not incompatible 
with EU law85. The most reasonable conclusion seems to be the one proposed by the ad hoc 
College in Mr. and Ms. O. v. the Republic Slovak case86, or which the legitimacy of the 
arbitration and the non-incompatibility of the intra-EU BITs can be sustained until a final 
decision on the merits of the CJEU can be found, which recognizing the incompatibility may 
not be well known legal bases-to exclude their effectiveness. 
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4.The admissibility of the arbitration clause in extra-EU BITs. 
 
We have to make two separate observations regarding the legitimacy of the use of arbitration 
in the judgments that remain in the context of intra-EU BITs, one wonders whether the 
referral to arbitration in the disputes arising in relation to an extra-EU BIT is admitted. 
On the one hand, it is a question of legitimizing the use of arbitration proceedings in cases of 
disputes arising on non-EU BITs that have been signed before the transfer of powers 
pursuant to art. 207 TFUE87. On the other hand, the question concerns the inclusion of the 
arbitration clause in the investment agreements that the Union will sign with third countries, 
precisely because of the aforementioned passage. With regard to the first problem 
concerning non-EU BITs signed before the transfer of powers, the question is solved by 
looking for the effects of art. 207 TFEU: one wonders, therefore, whether the transfer of 
powers referred to in the aforementioned law has had not only substantial effects, but also 
procedural effects88. In this regard, it seems reasonable to exclude these seconds: this is 
stated in the light of a literal interpretation of the norm and a systemic consideration. Firstly, 
the letter of the provision says nothing about a presumed legitimation of the Union to the 
arbitration proceedings arising on the basis of the BITs signed by the Member States. 
Secondly, legitimizing the participation of the Union in substitution of Member States, 
would imply recognition of retroactive ex tunc effectiveness of the new formulation of art. 
207 TFEU89, since the provision contained therein would have effects on agreements before 
its entry into force. Given this, it can be ruled out that the aforementioned rule has 
invalidated the arbitration clause inserted by the parties-rectius by the Member State and the 
third country-agreement. Excluding the procedural effects, if disputes arise on an extra-EU 
BIT stipulated before 2009 and maintained in force due to the provisions of Regulation no. 
1219/201290,  the reference to arbitration is legitimate, if it is compatible with EU law and 
the arbitration clause is valid. As for the intra-EU BITs, the solution to the question is found 
by adopting a double perspective, of EU and international law. As regards the compatibility 
of the arbitration clause contained in pre-EU BITs stipulated before Lisbon, it is noted that 
the non-compliance of the aforementioned clause with EU law has never been raised. On the 
contrary, the recognition by the Union of the arbitral proceedings arising on the basis of 
these agreements has been confirmed by the jurisprudential practice. In this regard, suffice it 
to consider that the European Commission (EC) has agreed with the CJEU three Member 
States, noting that the clause on the transfer of capital contained in the extra-EU BITs signed 
by them was incompatible with the european principle of free movement of capital91. The 
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arbitration clause, although contained in the agreements, has not been challenged. The 
absence of judgments about the incompatibility of the arbitration clause with EU law leads 
us to suppose that the latter does not give rise to questions of compatibility, so that an 
analysis of the validity of the aforementioned clause is required to establish the jurisdiction 
of the arbitrators. For procedural purposes, therefore, it does not matter that the State has lost 
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the BIT. If this were not the case, and therefore if the 
investor was obliged to sue the Union because of the transfer of powers, he would be 
deprived-if only to the extent possible-of his "natural" counterpart92. On the other hand, the 
rule of the process requires that the rights arising from an agreement between the parties can 
only be actuated by one against the other; the exclusion of the legitimate passive can not be 
imposed on the plaintiff, but should eventually be accepted by the plaintiff and/or the referee 
judge. Any agreement between the defendant and a third party, which intended to replace the 
first, would not in fact be applicable to the plaintiff. 
In speciem, in the same argument we could say that there are of course a number of 
differences between extra-EU BITs and the Open Skies agreements93. First, the Council had 
used its competence (under what is now article 100(2) TFEU) to regulate air transport, 
whereas prior to the Lisbon Treaty the EU's competences over FDI were not express 
(whether shared or exclusive)94 in the sense that the competences related to areas that 
touched upon some aspects of foreign investments. Second, the provisions of the Open Skies 
agreements over which the EU had exclusive competence regulated narrow technical matters 
in a particular business sector, whereas extra-EU BITs regulate across-the-board, as all 
qualified investors and investments in all business sectors come within their protective 
scope. Third, investment protection (in respect of non-direct investments) and investment 
arbitration is an area of shared competence, whereas the EU's competences in the area of air 
transport were exclusive. Whether these differences matter, and what the CJEU really meant 
in the relevant parts of the Open Skies judgments95, remain open questions. This short 
                                                                                                                                                      
Commission v. Austria of 3 March 2009, ECLI:EU:C:2009:118, I-01301; C-249/06, European Commission v. 
Sweden of 3 March 2009, ECLI:EU:C:2009:119, I-0130; 118/07, European Commission v. Finland of 19 
November 2009, ECLI:EU:C:2009:715, I-10889. In these judgments, the Court developed the hypothetical 
compatibility test which allows the Member States to be convicted if a clause in the international agreement 
signed by the same is also hypothetically incompatible with EU law. By adopting this approach, the Court on 
the one hand sought to protect the interests of the Union and, on the other, imposed an immediate revision and 
renegotiation of all non-EU BITs already underwritten, which contain clauses of a similar content to that 
considered illegitimate.  A. ARNULL, C. BARNARD, M. DOUGAN, E. SPAVENTA (a cura di), A 
constitutional order of States. Essays in EU law in honour of Alan Dashwood, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2011, pp. 7ss. l. TRAKMAN, N. RANIERI, Regionalism in international investment law, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2013. M. BUNGEWBERG, J. GMEBEL, S. HINDELANG, International investment 
law and EU law, ed. Springer, 2011, pp. 59ss. A. BIONDI, P. EECKHOUT, S. PIPLEY, EU law after Lisbon, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012. 
92A. BIONDI, P. EECKHOUT, S. PIPLEY, EU law after Lisbon, op. cit. 
93F.W. VON PAPP, Competition law, extraterritoriality & bilateral agreements, in A. WZRACHI (ed.), 
Research handbook on international competition law, Edward Elgar Publsihers, Cheltenham, 2012. M. 
ZWARTJES, L. VAN LANGEHOVE, S. KINGAH, L. MAES, Determinants of regional leadership: Is the EU 
a leading regional actor in peace and security?, in Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 12 (3), 2012, pp.  
394ss. C. WOLL, “Open skies, closed markets: Future games in the negotiation of international air transport, in 
Review of International Political Economy,  19 (5), 2012, pp.  921ss. T. DELREUX, The relation between the 
European Commission and the EU member states in the transatlantic Open Skies negotiations: An analysis of 
their opportunities and constraints, in Journal of Transatlantic Studies 9 (2), 2011, pp. 114ss. 
94J. BAUGARTNER, Treaty shopping and international investment law, op. cit., 
95CJEU, Judgments in Cases C-466/98, Commission of the European Communities v. United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, ECLI:EU:C:2002:624, I-09427; C-467/98 Commission of the European 
      
                                                                                                            Número 1 
                                                                                              2019 
   
 
discussion shows that the question of competence is shrouded in uncertainty. Generally 
speaking, the above discussion has demonstrated that it would appear that member state 
BITs violate the principle of non-discrimination as a matter of EU law. The following 
section discusses whether this finding is undermined by countervailing considerations and 
what the implications of such finding are as a matter of EU law and international law. 
In 26 May 2017, the CJEU published the Opinion 2/1596 where it held that matters related to 
Foreign Direct Investment fall within the exclusive competence of the EU97, apart from 
investment protection (to the extent it relates to non-direct investments) and investment 
arbitration, which fall within a competence shared between the EU and the member States. 
As to extra-EU BITs, in Opinion 2/15 the CJEU held that investment protection, to the 
extent it relates to non-direct investments, and investment arbitration fall within a 
competence shared between the EU and the member states. This indicates that member State 
parliaments have to ratify EU agreements containing provisions on investment protection 
and arbitration before they can enter into force. What implications does this have for extra-
EU BITs? It seems clear that the EC will not raise the issue of discrimination for political 
reasons, and the main purpose of the Grandfathering regulation is to allow extra-EU BITs to 
remain in force, even if their provisions may conflict with EU law. That Member States are 
obligated to eliminate conflicting provisions from extra-EU BITs is a truism, but this 
obligation should be seen against the broader political context. Extra-EU BITs are perceived 
as important (in particular) for the protection of outbound investments of the old member 
states, and the EC has no interest in challenging them under the principle of non-
discrimination, also because investment protection and arbitration has been a central part of 
the EU's own investment policy. In this light, whether extra-EU BITs breach the principle of 
non-discrimination is an academic concern98. 
 
5.The non-EU BITs stipulandi and sources different issues. 
 
In these cases, it is a matter of understanding whether there are grounds for the Union to 
include the arbitration clause in it. The insertion of the latter would in fact amount to the 
                                                                                                                                                      
Communities v. United Kingodm of Denmark of 5 November 2002, ECLI:EU:C:2002:625, I-09519; C-468/98, 
Commission of the European Communities v. United Kingom of Sweden of 6 November 2002,  
ECLI:EU:C:2002:626, I-0957; C-469/98, Commission of the European Communities v. Republic of Finland of 
5 November 2002, ECLI:EU:C:2002:627, I-08627; C-471/98, Commission of the European Communities v. 
Kingdom of Belgium of 6 November 2002, ECLI:EU:C:2002:628, I-09681; C-472/98, Commission of the 
European Communities v. Grand Duchy of Luxembourg of 5 November 2002, ECLI:EU:C.2002:629, I-09741; 
C-475/98, Commission of the European Communities v. Republic of Austria of 5 November 2002, 
ECLI:EU:C.2002:630, I-09797; C-476/98, Commission of the European Communities v. Federal Republic of 
Germany of 5 November 2002, ECLI:EU:C.2002:631, I-09855. For details see: M. CHAROKOPOS, Asserting 
a leading role for the EU in international aviation: when aspirations meet reality, in International Journal, 70 
(1), 2015, pp. 42ss. 
96ECLI:EU:C:2017:376, par. 305 
97A. MYBURG, J. PANIAGUA, Does international commercial arbitration promote foreing direct investment?, 
in The Journal of Law and Economics, 59 (3), 2016. D.H. ENDRAWAN, Arbitration and justice denial on 
foreign direct investment, in Indonesian Journal of International Law, 13, 2015-2016, pp. 438ss. 
98For analysis see: M. CREMONA, Shaping EU Trade Policy post-Lisbon: Opinion 2/15 of 16 May 2017, in 
European Constitutional Law Review, 14, 2018, pp. 232ss. D. GERAERTS, Changes in EU trade policy after 
opinion 2/15, in Global Trade and Customs Journal, 13, 2018, pp. 14ss. D. KLEIMANN, G. KÜBEK, The 
signing, provisional application, and conclusion of trade and investment agreements in the EU-The case of 
CETA and Opinion 2/15, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper No RSCAS 2016/58, 
November 2016. 
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consent to arbitration and, therefore, would determine for the Union the obligation to take 
part, as an actor or defendant, in proceedings that could be incardinated before foreign 
jurisdictions. Therefore, for the non-EU BITs99 stipulating the admissibility of the arbitration 
clause can only be assumed if the availability of the Union to accept the jurisdiction of 
foreign courts in general and arbitration, in particular, is recognized. In this regard, the 
jurisprudential guidelines that emerged and the practice (ie, the EC Regulation Proposal No. 
2012/0163) lead us to believe that the arbitration clause will be included in future non-EU 
BITs100. 
The Union has already recognized the jurisdiction of foreign courts; on the other hand, the 
EU commercial agreements signed by the Union before the Treaty of Lisbon already contain 
the reference to the arbitration-State-to resolve the disputes that might arise. With regard to 
the first point, it is sufficient to recall that the Union has already taken part in judgments 
before extra-european forums. More specifically, since 1994 the Union, becoming a member 
of the WTO, has also been bound by the Dispute Settlement Understanding, which defines 
an exclusive mechanism for resolving disputes between States Parties of WTO101. This has 
led the Union, and for it the CJEU, to renounce its jurisdiction over cases involving it under 
WTO law102.  The Union, then, together with Member States, is part of the Energy Charter 
                                                 
99Award, 27 December 2016, Blusun S.A., Jean-Pierre Lecorcier and Michael Stein v. Italian Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/14/3, par. 289. In the same spirit see: CJEU, 6 March 2018, Cases C-52/16 and C-113/16 
"SEGRO" Kft. v. Vas Megyei Kormányhivatal Sárvári Járási Földhivatala and Günther Horváth v. Vas Megyei 
Kormányhivatal of 6 March 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:157, published in the eelctronic Reports of the cases. As 
of today, extra-EU BITs, including arbitration clauses, are still applicable. In a more or less near future, they 
will progressively disappear as a consequence of the transfer to the EU of exclusive competence over foreign 
direct investment by the Lisbon Treaty. BITs entered into by Member States with third States will continue to 
exist until they are replaced by EU agreements. 
100European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council, 
establishing a framework for managing financial responsibility linked to investor-state dispute settlement 
tribunals established by international agreements to which the EU is party, n. 2012/0163 (COD), 21 June 2012. 
101J. ERRICO, The WTO in the EU: Unwinding the knot, in Cornell International Law Journal, 44, 2011, pp. 
180ss. As the CJEU put it: 'To accept that the role of ensuring that Community law complies with those rules 
[i.e. WTO rules] devolves directly on the Community judicature would deprive the legislative or executive 
organs of the Community of the scope for manoeuvre enjoyed by their counterparts in the Community's trading 
partners (...)". See, C-149/96, Portuguese Republic v. Council of 23 November 1999, op cit., parr. 40-47 (the 
quote is from par. 46). For a general analysis of this matter, H. RUIZ-FABRI, Is there a case-legally and 
politically- for direct effect of WTO obligations?, in European Journal of International Law, 25 (1), 2014), pp. 
152ss, according to the author: "(...) the Court has shown some acceptance of WTO rulings. After the AB had 
ruled that the so called "zeroing" method breached WTO law, the ECJ held that the method violated EU law as 
well, but the judgment made no references to the AB ruling, as the violation was based solely on a relevant EU 
regulation (...)". in the same spirit see also: CJEU, C-351/04, Ikea Wholesale Ltd v. Commissioners of Customs 
& Excise of 27 September 2007, ECLI:EU:C:2007:547, I-07723. Similarly, the CJEU has held that a DSB 
decision may in certain circumstances be used to interpret EU law. See Joined Cases C-319/10 and C-320/10, 
X and Y & X BV of 10 November 2011, ECLI:EU:C:2011:720, I-00167. See for details: H. LENK, Investment 
arbitration under EU investment agreements: Is there a role for an autonomous EU legal order?, in European 
Business Law Review, 28, 2017, pp. 136ss. S. MAZUMDER, Can i stay a BIT longer? The effect of bilateral 
investment treaties on political survival, in The Review of International Organizations, 11, 2016, pp. 478ss. M. 
MENDEZ, The legal effects of EU agreements, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013. 
102WTO litigation settles disputes between two Member States of the Organization. The procedure is governed 
by Annex II of the WTO Agreement which contains the rules and procedural rules of the MechaniMember 
States of dispute resolution. As a preliminary step, the parties are expected to seek the solution through 
negotiations. In the event of a negative outcome, a panel will proceed with the dispute, whose members are 
chosen by the parties in a pre-established list of names-if the parties do not reach agreement, the panel 
members are identified in the light of the art. 8 of Annex II. The panel report can be appealed before the 
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Treaty103, multilateral international treaty, which contains an entire section dedicated to 
investments for which said substantive and procedural norms104. As for the latter, art. 26 
reference is made to an arbitration panel if a dispute arises between a State party to the 
Treaty and an investor from another State party105.  In the case of proceedings against the 
Union for violation of the Energy Charter Treaty106, the Union must appear before the 
arbitral tribunal constituted, without being able to raise exceptions on the jurisdiction based 
on its domestic law107. In order the commercial agreements signed by the Union, in 
autonomy or in concert with Member States, since 2000 the EU has also included 
mechanisms for the resolution of disputes, created along the lines of the WTO108 model. By 
way of example, in the third chapter of the EU-Chile Agreement of 18 November 2002, the 
provisions for the settlement of disputes between two States Parties are included and it is 
prescribed that, after seeking a mutual agreement, they are referred to a arbitration board109.  
In any case, the reference to the arbitration proceeding, which supports the traditional ones- 
                                                                                                                                                      
Appelate body. If the unsuccessful party does not comply with the reccomendation of the court, then the party 
can comply with commercial sanctions, in the form of suspension of concessions (Article 22) or may request 
the initiation of an arbitration proceeding. 
103A. EZRACHI, EU competition law. An analytical guide to the leading cases, Hart Publishing, Oxford & 
Oregon, Portland, 2018. R. LEAL-ARCAS, A. FILIS, The energy community and the Energy Charter Treaty: 
Special legal regimes, their systemic relationship to the EU, and their dispute settlement arrangements, in Oil, 
Gas & Energy Law Intelligence, 12, 2014. 
104“(...) One of the chief features of the ECT is indeed the promotion and protection of investments in the 
energy sector. Part III of the Treaty, entitled "Investment promotion and protection", offers protection that is 
similar to that accorded by most bilateral investment treaties, including such rights as the fair and equitable 
treatment, the most constant protection and security of investments, the prohibition of discriminatory measures, 
the most-favored-nation treatment, and the payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation for any 
nationalization, expropriation or measures having an effect equivalent to nationalization or expropriation(...)”, 
according to: E. GAILLARD, Investments and investors covered by the energy charter Treaty, in C. RIBEIRO 
(eds.), Investment arbitration and the energy charter treaty, in Arbitration institute of the Stockholm Chamber 
of commerce, Jurisnet, pp. 56ss. 
105Art. 26.4.b: "If an investor chooses to submit the dispute for settlement pursuant to paragraph 2, letter c), he 
must also notify in writing his consent that the dispute is subject to: b) a single arbitrator or a ad hoc arbitration 
tribunal, established in accordance with the arbitration rules of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (hereinafter referred to as "UNCITRAL"); or c) an arbitration proceeding by the 
Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce". 
106CJEU, C-264/09, European  Commission v. Slovakia, Opinion of AG Jääskinen of 15 March 2011, 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:580, I-000, par. 109. "(...) the detailed provisions contained in Directive 2003/54 (...) cannot 
be overridden by the more general provisions contained in the Energy Charter Treaty (...) EU energy law as it 
stands (...) cannot be considered as failing to achieve the standards required by the Energy Charter Treaty (...) 
with respect to the enjoyment and protection of investments, the general level of the protection of fundamental 
rights provided by EU law affords protection to investors, which fulfils the obligations resulting from Articles 
10(1) and 13(1) of the Energy Charter Treaty (...)". For details see: D. KOCHENOV, F. AMTENBRINK, The 
EU's shaping of the internatonal legal order, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014. L. TRAKMAN, 
N. RANIERI, Regionalism in international investment law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, pp. 376ss. 
107“(...) as the EU becomes an even more integral and active member of the international investment 
community, it will become less confortable requiring or even permitting, member State courts to subordinate 
their obligations under international investment law and arbitration to policies internal to the EU”, according to 
G.A. BRENNAN, Navigating the EU law and law of international arbitration, in Arbitration international, 28 
(3), 2012, pp. 438ss. 
108E. RAMIREZ-ROBLES, Political and quasi-adjudicative dispute settlement models in EU free trade 
agreements. Is the quasi-adjudicative model a trend or is it just another model?, in Staff Working Paper ERSD-
2006-09, November 2006. 
109EU, Association Agreement between the European Community, Member States and the Republic of Chile of 
30 December 2002, in Gazz Uff. A. Eur., N. L. 352 vol. 35, artt. 182 ss. 
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consultations and mediations-mostly political in nature-certainly marks a passage of great 
importance in the recognition of foreign jurisdictions. Among the agreements that come into 
force after Lisbon, we refer to the Association of Free Exchange with South Korea of 14 
May 2011 which provides for the mechanism for resolving state-to-state disputes110. More 
specifically, in art. 84 of the aforementioned agreement, it is provided that if a dispute arises, 
the parties-always after a conciliatory experiment-refer it to a panel of arbitrators111. It is 
very likely that the solution adopted in this agreement will become a model for the 
subscription of the next, in terms of investment. 
In the aforementioned cases, the commercial arbitration, then the arbitration between states, 
has inevitably been introduced, since the agreements mainly concern commercial exchanges, 
having been signed at a time when the Union did not yet have exclusive competence on 
foreign direct investment112. The next step will be to legitimate the state-private arbitration. 
On the other hand, when the Union prepares "an effective and expedient state-to state 
dispute settlement, that will in the future cover the investment provisions of EU trade and 
investment agreements (...)"113. On this point, the European Institutions have shown a 
tendency to admit the reference to this type of proceedings, even though they have 
conditions of no secondary importance. Firstly, the EC, already in the 2010 Communication 
attached to the Proposal for a Regulation for the definition of a transitional regime for non-
EU BITs114, stated that "future EU agreements including investment protection should 
contain provisions on the resolution of disputes between investors and the State"115. This 
resolution system is, in fact, the one that most guarantees the investor and therefore 
constitutes an indispensable tool without which it would be difficult to arrive at the 
conclusion of future agreements with third countries. The intent of the executive is to 
"exploit the practice of Member States to define an ideal mechanism to ensure transparency 
(of procedures) and consistency and predictability (to stem the problems fragmentation of 
the modalities of resolution and interpretation)"116. The EC, therefore, has admitted the use 
                                                 
110EU, Free Trade Agreement between the EU and the Republic of Korea, of May 14, 2011, OJ L. 127, vol. 54. 
111The agreement provides that the arbitrators will be chosen by the parties or, if the agreement is missing, 
identified by the Trade Committee established by "(...) the task of overseeing the implementation of the FTA 
(Free Trade Agreement) and to study the ways to foster more intense commercial relations between the parties. 
An effective meccanism for the resolution of disputes is also envisaged (...)". Council, Proposal for a Council 
Decision authorizing the signing and provisional application of the free trade agreement between the EU and 
its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part COM2010/0936, of 9 April 
2010, par. 2. 
112See for details: C. HERRMANN, J. CRÁMER, Foreign direct investment. A "coincidental" competence of 
the EU?, in Hitotsubashi Journal of Law and Politics, 43, 2015, pp. 87ss. 
113“(...) tout récemment en vigueur, cet accord de libre-échange donne une perspective de l’intérieur de ce à 
quoi ressemble un system de règlement de différends interétatiques acceptable à l’Union, du moins en matière 
de commerce international (...)”. S. NAPPERT, Composition du Tribunal Arbitral, in C. KASSEDJIAN (sous la 
direction de), Le droit européen et l'arbitrage d'investissement, op. cit., p. 125. 
114A. C. SÖDERLUND, The future of the Energy Charter Treaty in the context of the Lisbon Treaty, in G. 
COOP (ed.), Energy dispute resolution: Investment protection, transit and the Energy Charter Treaty, JurisNet, 
Huntigton, 2011, pp. 99-124. S. EL. BOUDOUCHI, L’avenir des traités bilatéraux d’investissement conclu par 
les Etats membres de l’Union européenne avec des Etat tiers, Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Europèenne, 47 (1), 
2011, pp. 85ss. P. JUILLARD, Investissement et droit communautaire. A propos des accords bilatéraux 
d’investissement conclu entre Etats membres et Pays tiers, Liber Amicorum Philippe Manin, ed. Pedone, Paris, 
2010, pp. 446ss. 
115S. MIRON, The last bite of the BITs versus investment treaty arbitration, in European Law Journal, 20 (3), 
2013, pp. 334ss. 
116See fore details: S. GÁSPÁR SZILÁGUI, Transparence investment protection and the role of the European 
Parliament, in European Investment Law and Arbitration, 2 (1), 2017, pp. 372ss. D. EULER, M. GEHRING, 
      
                                                                                                            Número 1 
                                                                                              2019 
   
 
of arbitration provided that this allows to achieve greater transparency, not only with regard 
to the identification of arbitrators, but also with regard to access to information of 
proceedings, the participation of third parties, the publication of praise, the latter 
guaranteeing the consistency and predictability of decisions117. The intent is therefore to 
evaluate which arbitration center, as well as which procedural rules118, can guarantee the EC 
under these three resolutions119. The Council, in October 2010, reiterated the need to prepare 
State-private resolution mechanisms in future european international agreements. In the 
mandate to negotiate with India, Singapore and with the United States of America, the 
Council then envisaged the inclusion of the arbitration clause; in the latter, it has been 
specified that the investor-state resolution procedures will have to provide "transparency120, 
independence of arbitrators and predictability of the Agreement including through the 
possibility of binding interpretation of the Agreement by the parties (...) considerations 
should be given to the possibility of creating an appellate body"121. The European 
Parliament in Resolution of April 2011 stated that "in addition to state-to-state dispute 
settlement procedures, investor-state procedures must also be applicable in order to secure 
comprehensive investment protection"122. The European Institutions have taken a unanimous 
                                                                                                                                                      
M. SCHEREL, Transparency in international investment arbitration. A guide to the UNCITRAL rules on 
transparency in treaty based investor-State arbitration, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015. A. 
MARQUES DA SILVA MARTINS, Challenges  to transparency and ethics in alternatives to arbitration in the 
realm of international investments, in Revista de Direito Internacional Econômico e Tributario-RDIET, 11 (1), 
2016, pp. 329ss. J.A. MAUPIN, Transparency in investment law. The good, the bad and the murky, in A. 
BIANCHI, A. PETERS, Transparency in international law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013. 
117G. RUSCALLA, Transparency in international arbitration: Any (cocnrete) need to codify the standard?, in 
Groningen Journal of Internatonal law, 3 (1), 2015. 
118See the analysis of B. WIECZOREK, A.R. SCHÜTZE and others (eds.), Zivilprozessordnung und 
Nebengesetze Großkommentar, De Gruyter, Hamburg, 2014, pp. 602ss. 
119On the subject of transparency, it is noted that, if the Union wants to maintain the format of the agreement 
with Korea, in future agreements the criteria for identifying the arbitrators who are identified among people in 
the Agreement with Korea are better considered: "Specialized knowledge or experience of law and 
international trade. They shall be independent, serve in their individual capacities (...) comply whit annex 14-
C". These are conditions that, due to their vagueness, reduce the transperency of the selection and identification 
process; transparency which, on the other hand, is one of the requirements that the institutions demand to admit 
the use of arbitration proceedings. Also the meccanism of choice adopted in the WTO system would seem to be 
excluded due to the low level of transparency that guarantees in the choice of the panalist. More specifically, 
para. 8.2 of Annex II of the WTO Agreement is provided that: Panel members should be selected with a view 
to ensuring the independence of the members, a sufficiently diverse background and a wide spectrum of 
experience che vengono scelti dalla parti, con il supporto del Segretariato tra quelli di una lista predefinita. Al 
para è prescritto che: “4. To assist in the selection of panelists, the Secretariat shall maintain an indicative list 
of governmental and non-governmental individuals possessing the qualifications outlined in paragraph 1, from 
which panelists may be drawn as appropriate. That list shall include the roster of non-governmental panelists 
established on 30 November 1984 (BISD 31S/9)”. 
120See in particular: J. RIBEIRO, M. DOUGLAS, Transparency in investor-State arbitration: The way forward, 
in Asian International Arbitration Journal, 11 (1), 2015, pp. 50ss. L. MALINTOPPI, N. LIMBASAN, Living in 
glass houses? The debate on transparency in international investment arbitration, BCDR Internatonal 
Arbitration Review, 2 (1), 2015, pp. 32ss. 
121Recommendation for a COUNCIL DECISION authorising the opening of negotiations for a Convention 
establishing a multilateral court for the settlement of investment disputes, COM/2017/0493 final: “(...) the need 
for an effective investor-to-state dispute settlement mechanism in the EU investment agreements and invites 
the Commission to carry out a detailed study on the relevant issues concerning international arbitration 
systems, including inter alia the legal and political feasibility of EU membership in international arbitration 
institutions as well as the question of liability arising from arbitration procedures and the responsibilities of the 
Member States in this respect (...)”. 
122Council, Recommendation for a decision authorizing on negotiations on a comprehensive trade and 
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stance on the opportunity to foresee the postponement to arbitration in future international 
agreements with third countries. The last confirmation is found in the recent Proposal for 
Regulation n. 2012/0163, in which the EC sanctioned the admissibility of arbitration in the 
State-investor disputes123, on agreements to which the Union is also a member; in this way, 
it confirms the intention to include the arbitration clause in the next commercial agreements. 
It is noted that the need to include the arbitration clause in future EU agreements is a 
consequence of the new Union's recognized competence in the field of investment124. The 
Union, indeed, because part of the agreements defines its substantive norms and, inevitably, 
the control on the effective implementation must be delegated to a center that is a guarantee 
of third party respect to the parties. Hence the choice, almost obligatory, to admit the 
reference to the arbitration proceeding. Any other solution, such as the appeal before the 
CJEU, could not be accepted by the european business partners. On the other hand, the 
arbitration proceedings arise precisely from the need to "delocalize" the disputes125 outside 
the national forums which, despite the guarantee of a well-structured and functioning court 
system, equipped with complex procedural rules, still have the limit of do not act as a third 
party between the parties. Therefore, with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the 
provisions contained therein, the inclusion of the arbitration clause in future investment 
agreements is no longer a faculty, but becomes a soft law obligation. Moreover, once the 
State-State arbitration proceedings have been admitted and therefore the fear that a third 
judge is deciding on matters that may involve a european State and, even if only indirectly, 
EU law, the next step will be the one to recognize the EU-investor arbitration. 
 
6.The procedural legitimacy of arbitration regarding investments. Proceedings 
between Member States and between Member States and third Countries with regard 
to extra-EU BITs stipulated before the Treaty of Lisbon. 
 
One wonders now on the part, EU or Member States, legitimized to stand trial if the dispute 
arises on an extra-EU BITs126. In general, in the arbitration judgments, the parties who have 
given their valid consent to refer any disputes before arbitrary courts have the capacity to 
stand trial. The capacity concerns the subjective situation of the party that has signed the 
arbitration clause that can be a natural person or a juridical person distinguishing himself, in 
this second case, between a juridical person of public or private right. When part of the 
relationship is a juridical person, it is opportune to look for which organ has the power to 
                                                                                                                                                      
investment agreement, called the Transatlantic trade and investment partnership, between the EU and the 
United States, COM(2013)136, def., of 21 May 2013, p. 15. See also: European Parliament, Report on the 
Future European International Investment Policy (2010/2203(INI)), adopted on 22 March 2011. 
123For more details and analysis see: J. BONNITCA, Substantive protection under investment treaties: A legal 
and economic analysis, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014. J. KLEINHEIRSTERKAMP, Financial 
responsibility in european international investment policy, in International & Comparative Law Quarterly, 63 
(2), 2014, pp. 452ss. 
124F. BAETENS, Investment law within international law. Integrationist perspectives, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2013, pp. 399ss. 
125F. BAETENS, Investment law within international law. Integrationist perspectives, op. cit. 
126Procedural capacity is a very different matter than responsibility; this second fact concerns the merit of the 
dispute, being instead the first necessary requirement for the activation and continuation of the trial activity. 
The lack of responsibility leads to a ruling on merit, with effects of res judicata, which precludes the repetition 
of equal questions between the same parties. Otherwise, a ruling on the procedural aspects, therefore also on 
the procedural capacity of the parties, does not prejudice the merit, thus allowing the beginning of a new 
procedure between parties who are entitled to stand trial. 
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form the will of the subject and thus manifest it outside. The same is true when part of the 
agreement is a state. In the arbitration judgments it is necessary to distinguish between 
capacity and power to compromise for arbitrators. The power to compromise consists in 
exercising the right to engage and therefore presupposes that the part that lends it to the 
organ of the State has the capacity to assume that commitment. In other words, capacity is a 
logical antecendor of the power to compromise: in the litigation phase, such power confers 
to the subject, active and passive, the relationship powers or faculties or burdens and 
provides them with rights or duties or, in some cases, even responsibility. The ability to 
compromise a State and public juridical persons can give rise to some problem about the 
subject legitimated to give consent; the State normally has jurisdictional immunity and, 
therefore, if it appears that the consent given to arbitration with the arbitration clause is 
invalid, because it has not been given by an organ that has the power to compromise, the 
award can not be his comparisons-even, the procedure, should have been concluded with a 
non-place ruling to proceed. 
If, in fact, it has been excluded that the law in question derives effects such as to 
delegitimize the consent to arbitration posed by Member States, it is now necessary to assess 
whether art. 207 TFUE127 applies as consent of the Union, determining, in this case, the 
passage of the legitimacy to stay in court by the member State of the BIT to the same Union. 
If this effect is also excluded, then it will be necessary to question the need to lay down 
specific obligations of conduct on the part of the State towards the Union once it is involved 
in an arbitration proceeding. The first question, which concerns the party entitled to stand 
trial, must be resolved by assessing whether the provision contained in art. 207 TFEU may 
apply as a consensus to the arbitration given by the Union. Article 207 TFEU would be 
worthy of recognition of power over substantive matters and would at the same time give the 
EU the power to take legal action in place of Member States128. The rule in question, 
therefore, would legitimize the Union to represent Member States in the proceeding, thus 
exercising all the rights and obligations that fall on the part of the judgment-choice of the 
arbitrators, drafting the defense briefs. 
The basis of this assumption is a rather extensive interpretation of direct foreign investment 
pursuant to art. 207 TFUE129, which includes all the issues that, even indirectly, involve this 
                                                 
127J.USHERWOOD, S. PINDER, The EU. A very short introduction, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018. 
128CJEU, 45/07, European Commission v. Greece of 12 February 2009, ECLI:EU:C:2009:81, I-00701, par. 30-
33. In this case, the Commission has agreed on Greece, part of the International Maritime Organization (IMO)-
of which the EU is not a member-pleading against the alleged infringement, among others, of the principle of 
loyal cooperation requiring each Member State to act in compliance with European obligations and to promote 
Union action. In fact, Greece would have proposed at international level the adoption of a Regulation on a 
matter which has become the exclusive competence of the Union, without submitting the proposal to the 
scrutiny of the competent European Committee for the regulation of maritime safety. The Court condemns 
Greece for breaching the principle of loyalty cooperation. 
129See in particular: R.V. PUIG, The scope of the new exclusive competence of the EU with regard to "foreign 
direct investment", in Legal Issues of Economic Integration, 40 (2), 2013, pp. 134ss. M. BUNGENBERG, S. 
HOBE, The relationship of international investment law and EU law, in M. BUNGENBERG, J. GRIEBEL, S. 
HOBE, A. REINISCH, International investment law, Hart Publishing/Nomos, Baden-Baden/Oxford, 2015, pp. 
1602ss. C. BROWN, I. NAGLIS, Dispute settlement in future EU investment agreements, in M. 
BUNGENBERG, A. REINISCH, C. TIETJE (eds), EU and investment agreements: Open questions and 
remaining challenges, Hart Publishing/Nomos, Oxford/Baden-Baden, 2013, pp. 18ss. A. TITI, The right to 
regulate in international investment law, ed. Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2014. C. HENCKELS, Indirect 
expropriation and the right to regulate: Revisiting proportionality analysis and the standard of review in 
investor-State arbitration, in Journal of International Economics Law, 15 (1), 2012, pp. 223. R. DOLZER, C. 
SCHREUER, Principles of international investment law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, pp. 146ss. 
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matter, so that substantial and procedural issues would be included. As a result of the latter, 
the Union also accepted to be a party to arbitration proceedings. In reality, this position does 
not seem to be acceptable for an absorbing reason. Article 207 TFEU confines itself to 
conferring on the Union only the power to sign and implement international agreements, not 
to resolve disputes that originate from those already stipulated by Member States. 
The aforesaid provision therefore produces only substantial effects, since it expressly 
attributes to the Union exclusive competence over a raw material of shared competence. The 
recognition of exclusive jurisdiction, however, does not affect the legitimacy in court. Given 
that it derives from the consensus-except for certain exceptions such as the hypothesis of 
death of the physical person, extinction of the legal person or representation-in the absence 
of an express provision that may be valid as such, the aforementioned rule should not 
produce procedural effects, leaving so that the counterpart legitimated to be in court is, and 
remains, the Member State. From this it follows, as a corollary, that the non-EU BITs that 
remain in force due to the provisions of Regulation no. 1219/2012130 are not modified and, 
therefore, the parties to the agreement are unchanged and, for them, who has given the valid 
consent to the arbitration proceedings. This situation is similar to that which arises when 
judgments arise on an international agreement concluded by a Member State, which 
regulates a matter which, after signing, becomes the exclusive competence of the Union. In 
these circumstances, the position expressed by the CJEU goes in the sense of not justifying 
the replacement of Member States by the Union131. Thus, in the C-45/07 case, European 
Commission v. Greece of 12 February 2009, the CJEU has ruled that if an international 
agreement concerns a matter that has become of exclusive EU competence, then the EU, or 
becomes part of the agreement or has the right to exercise, in an international context, the 
Member States, replacing it. In this regard, the CJEU stated that "the fact that the 
Community does not have the status of a member of an international organization does not 
prevent its external competence from being effectively exercised, in particular through the 
Member States acting jointly in the interest of the Community (...)"132. Therefore, Member 
States acting in an area which has become the exclusive competence of the Union must 
relate to the EU in accordance with the principle of loyal cooperation133 enshrined in the 
Founding Treaties, but the provisions of the international agreement, both substantive and 
procedural, remain unchanged. The Member States remains the only counterpart of the third 
country. Moreover, from a perspective of international law, the transfer of powers within the 
Union could in no case produce effects on third parties. Conclusions to the contrary would 
                                                 
130J. BAUGARTNER, Treaty shopping and international investment law, op. cit. 
131The duty of loyalty cooperation comes in a series of obligations on the part of the Member States, which 
take shape in the light of the matter and / or the context in which that duty is to be applied. These obligations 
have been overlapped over time by jurisprudence and doctrine. As for the first, in the case of the Commission 
c. Ireland, states that: "the requirement of close cooperation in the context of a mixed agreement implied, 
according to Ireland, a duty to inform and consult with the competent Community institutions before launching 
a procedure for resolving the dispute regarding the MOX plant in the context of the Convention". CJEU, C-
459/03, European Commission v. Iralnd, op. cit., par. 179. See also: M. CREMONA, Defining competence in 
EU external relations: lessons from the Treaty reform process, in A. DASHWOOD, M. MARESCAU, Law and 
Practice of EU external relations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008, pp. 34-69. 
132K. LENAERTS, I. MASELIS, K. GUTMAN, EU procedural law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015 
133A. VON BOGDANDY, M. IOANNIDIS, Systemic definiciency in the rule of law: What is this, what has 
been done, whtat can de done, in Common Market Law Review, 51, 2014, pp. 64ss. A. JAKAB, D. 
KOCHENOV, The enforcement of EU laws and values. Ensuring member States compliance, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2017.C. KLAMMERT, The principle of loyalty in EU law, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2014. 
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violate the principle set out in article 34 VCLT134. 
It can be considered that the provision referred to in art. 207 TFEU does not imply consent 
to the arbitration and, therefore, the Union does not acquire the legitimacy to stand trial in 
the event that there are disputes over the BIT signed before Lisbon between a Member States 
and a third country. The above provision, therefore, does not prejudice the right of Member 
State to be convened in an arbitration proceeding arising on an extra-EU BIT stipulated 
before the Lisbon Treaty of which the EU is not a party. Given this, the only remaining issue 
concerns the nature of the relationship established between the Member State and the Union 
when an arbitration proceeding begins. This question finds a solution in art. 4.3 TFEU135 
which enumerates the principle of sincere cooperation. The Member State involved in the 
proceeding acts in such a way that it does not violate the primauté and the direct effect of 
EU law and does not adversely affect the future exercise by the EU of the competence 
referred to in article 207 TFUE136. In order not to violate the aforementioned principle, the 
Member State must keep the Union continuously informed of the progress of the procedure 
and, if requested, facilitate the participation of the EC in drafting the defense briefs. 
Obviously, nothing prevents the EC from intervening in the proceedings-if the procedural 
rules applied allow it137-as a third party to the dispute or is brought to trial directly by the 
judging panel to express its position on any controversial aspects of EU law138. 
 
7.(Follows) Disputes relating to agreements concluded after the Treaty of Lisbon: 
Solution of lege ferenda. 
 
Since arbitrations find the basis and legal legitimacy in the arbitration clause, the 
legitimation of the case will be recognized to the party, or to the parties, who will, or will, 
have signed the next commercial and investment agreements including the aforementioned 
clause. If a Member State, due to the provisions of Regulation n. 1219/2012, is authorized to 
enter into a new BIT with a third country, the legitimacy of the case falls to him alone. The 
Member States is the only party to the agreement and, as such, is the only one to have the 
ability to include the arbitration clause, thereby giving consent to the arbitration139. The 
                                                 
134C. SÖDERLUND, Intra-EU BIT investment protection and EC Treaty, op. cit. 
135A. ARNULL, C. BARNARD, M. DOUGAN, E. SPAVENTA (a cura di), A constitutional order of States. 
Essays in EU law in honour of Alan Dashwood, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011, pp. 7ss. 
136J.USHERWOOD, S. PINDER, The EU. A very short introduction, op. cit. 
137K. LENAERTS, I. MASELIS, K. GUTMAN, EU procedural law, op. cit. 
138ICSID, final award of 23 October 2010, case ARB/07/22, AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Isza 
Eromu Kft v. Hungary, par. 3.25 , which is stated that: “under cover of a letter of 15 January 2009, the 
European Commission filed a written submission pursuant to ICSID Arbitration Rule 37, in accordance withthe 
Tribunal’s Procedural Order No. 3”. Otherwise, in the Eureko case, the Court requested the Commission to 
participate in the procedure:“(...) after the hearing on the Intra-EU Jurisdictional Objection and following 
consultations with the Parties, on 10 May 2010, the Tribunal wrote to the Director General of the Legal Service 
of the European Commission providing information about the present arbitration, referring to observations that 
the European Commission had made in the Eastern Sugar BV (Netherlands) v. Czech Republic arbitration 
(“Eastern Sugar”) concerning the effect upon the Tribunal’s jurisdiction of the fact that both the Respondent 
and the national State of the Claimant are Member States of the EU,13 and inviting the European Commission 
to submit any further observations on that jurisdictional question that it might wish to communicate to the 
Tribunal (...)”, PCA, Eureko v. The Repubblic Slovak, op. cit , par. 31. 
139European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing a farmework for managing financial responsibility linked to investor-state dispute settlement 
tribunals established by international agreements to which the EU is party, COM(2012) 355 final of 21 June 
2012. 
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second case contemplates, instead, the hypothesis in which the future agreements are signed 
in mixed form, between the Union, Member States and a third country. In this last 
circumstance, the ability to stand before arbitration courts falls to all parties to the 
agreement. In fact, both the Union and the Member States, by signing the international 
agreement containing the arbitration clause, have given their consent to the arbitration and, 
therefore, both have the capacity to act or stand trial. The hypothesis that Member States are 
authorized to sign new bilateral investment agreements is not remote. In Article 7 of Reg. 
1219/2012 is in fact prescribed that: "under the conditions set out in articles 8 to 11, a 
Member State is authorized to enter into negotiations with a third country in order to amend 
a bilateral agreement on existing investments or conclude a new one (...)"140. 
The hypothesis in which the Union will sign the future agreements autonomously is less 
probable; as a rule, in fact, the Union signs multidisciplinary agreements, which include 
matters for which exclusive competence is not attributed to it and which, therefore, require 
the intervention of Member States. The same applies to the hypothesis in which the Union 
intends to sign BITs; In fact, such agreements normally also regulate portfolio investments 
for which it is not clear whether the Union can exercise exclusive implicit competence. 
Assuming this, one wonders then if there are criteria to identify the part that will take part in 
the judgments. This issue is purely internal to the Union, without taking into account at 
international level, except in the limits in which the investor can be affected by the scarce 
timeliness of the choice. For a solution to the problem now under consideration, interesting 
insights can be found in the recent Proposal for Regulation n. 2012/0163141. The Member 
States, for their part, respond for their actions or if the Union has recourse to article 2.1 
TFEU142.  In this second case, the Member State acquires procedural legitimacy in 
judgments concerning a matter which, although the exclusive competence of the Union, has 
been re-delegated to it143.  It is noted, however, that the principle of parallel Member States 
between legitimacy to respond in judgment and responsibility by non-fulfillment-rectius 
financial responsibility-is not perfect. In fact, the Proposal for Regulation establishes cases 
in which the Member State, although responsible, does not act independently in court. In 
article 8.2 of the Proposal for a Regulation, the Union is expected to respond in court if it 
could indirectly suffer financial consequences144, the role of its own emanation is questioned 
                                                 
140L. PANTALEO, Member States prior agreements and newly EU attributed competence. What lesson from 
foreign investment, in European Foreign Affairs Review, 9 (2), 2014. N. DE SADELEER, The end of the 
game. The autonomy of the EU legal order opposes arbiral tribunales under bilateral investment treaties 
concluded between two member States, in European Journal of Risk Regulation, 9 (2), 2018, pp. 358ss. 
141It is noted that the Union replaces the Member State even if the dispute is resolved through the consultative 
procedure. In such circumstances, the Member State conducting the proceedings can reconcile provided that it 
recognizes its financial responsibility, the conciliation agreement is only enforceable against it, the provisions 
of this agreement comply with EU law and there is no greater Union interest preventing the conciliation. In any 
case, the forecast under consideration establishes that the Commission and the State enter into consultations 
before the latter reaches the conciliation with the plaintiff. Finally, so as to ensure the monitoring of the work 
of the Member State, the Commission must receive a draft of the conciliation agreement and, in the ninety days 
following the notification, has the right to initiate a revision procedure. If the term lapses, the principle of silent 
consent is valid for which the State can sign the agreement. 
142J.L. DA CRUZ VILAÇA, EU law and integration. Twenty years of judicial application of EU law, Hart 
Publishing, Oxford & Oregon, Portland, 2014. T.H. FOLSOM, Principles of EU law, including Brexit, West 
Academic, Minesotta, 2017, pp. 278ss. 
143In point 12 of the premises of the Proposal, the power to replace the Union is established in rather vague 
terms: “(...) It is appropriate that the Commission decide, within the framework set down in this regulation, 
whether the Union should be the respondent or whether a Member State should act as respondent (...)”. 
144N. DE SADELEER, The end of the game. The autonomy of the EU legal order opposes arbiral tribunales 
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or, as a result of a probabilistic judgment, and this reversal of roles is justified, as shown 
from point 11 of the premises, because of the need to ensure the interest of the Union and, 
therefore, of all  Member States. The cases listed in art. 8.2 of the Proposal, in the opinion of 
EC145, deserve to be dealt with directly by the Union to ensure, in addition to integration and 
uniform external representation, also compliance with art. 4.3 TUE146. The failure to obtain 
the qualified majority vote in the Council would thus thwart the EC’s efforts to establish 
such a new policy. The situation could be different if the EC first managed to obtain a series 
of mandates for including the sought features into bilateral EU agreements with third 
countries so as eventually to show a "concerted strategy" for the inclusion of such features 
which could suffice for then forcing recalcitrant member states to fulfil their duty of 
cooperation as to abstain from blocking a renegotiation. This constellation is, however, quite 
unlikely to arise, and, once the EC has consolidated its outline for a new EU investment 
policy, including certain concessions to the member states, it can be expected that the 
member states will accept moving towards new standards of investment protections also in 
the Energy Charter Treaty. 
The criteria set by the Proposal should resolve any doubts as to the identification of the party 
that has legitimacy to be in court, but in this regard it is noted that the provision referred to 
in the aforementioned art. 8.2 are rather vague formulations: It is not clear whether the EC 
can impose its choice, to replace itself, or to be replaced by the Member State or, conversely, 
the latter has room for reply and, if so, if the solution can become object of definition of the 
CJEU; and the conditions that can justify the substitution of the Union are too vague, 
especially when they refer to similar claims-it is not clear whether similarity should relate to 
the petitum or the petendum-to overridding Union interests or ultimately to the unsettled 
issues of law - where law is presumed to refer to EU law147. 
The European Parliament approved at first reading a text of the partially amended proposal, 
which helps the interpreter on certain issues. Specifically, in art. 2 lett. j) the definition of 
overridding interests of the Union148 has been added; the co-legislator then proposed to 
insert a provision as a result of which the choice of the Union to replace the Member State is 
binding on the plaintiff and the Arbitration Tribunal. The EC solution and the amendments 
of the European Parliament comply with the rules of the arbitration procedure, which is 
based on the consent of the parties. However, this solution could not guarantee the right 
process, since the right of Member States to defend itself independently could be precluded. 
For the sake of completeness, however, it is noted that no case has been made of the 
possibility of a joint legal participation, as defendants, of the Union and the Member State. 
Such a solution, if ever it should be proposed, would not be excluded from the arbitration 
                                                                                                                                                      
under bilateral investment treaties concluded between two member States, op. cit. 
145N. DE SADELEER, The end of the game. The autonomy of the EU legal order opposes arbiral tribunales 
under bilateral investment treaties concluded between two member States, op. cit. 
146J. USHERWOOD, S. PINDER, The EU. A very short introduction, op. cit. 
147N. DE SADELEER, The end of the game. The autonomy of the EU legal order opposes arbiral tribunales 
under bilateral investment treaties concluded between two member States, op. cit. 
148In the amendment proposed by the Parliament, it is added to the art. 2 the letter (ja) which prescribes that: 
“(...) overriding interests of the Union’ means any of the following: (i) there is a serious threat to the consistent 
or uniform application or implementation of investment provisions of the agreement subject to the investor-to-
state dispute to which the Union is a party (ii) a Member State measure may conflict with the development of 
the Union's future investment policy, (iii) the dispute implies a possible significant financial impact on the 
Union budget in a given year or as part of the multiannual financial framework (...)”. European Parliament, 
Amendments adopted by the European Parliament on May 2013 on the Proposal for a Regulation n. 2012/0163 
A7-0124/2013 of 23 May 2013. 
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rules. On the contrary, the solution proposed in the Proposal seems to go in the direction of 
avoiding the inconveniences that could derive from the joint participation of the Union and 
the Member State involved149. Internationally, the practice seems oriented in the opposite 
direction. 
The Convention on the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay) does not preclude the possibility that 
an organization and its member state may take legal action or be jointly agreed150.  The 
responsibility derives, in fact, from the competence on the subject matter of the dispute. In 
article. 7.3 of Annex IX of the aforementioned Convention151  it is prescribed that: "when, 
however, a Member State has chosen only the International Court of Justice (ICJ) it is 
considered that the organization and the Member State involved have accepted the 
arbitration provided for by Annex VII, unless the parties to the dispute decide otherwise 
(...)"152. 
The solution adopted by the aforementioned Proposal aims to preserve the external 
                                                 
149“La Communauté et ses Etats membres participent à l’accord mixte dans un mesure diffèrent, mais l’étendue 
de exacte de leur participation est une question intra-communautaire (...) au niveau de la conclusion de l’accord 
mixte on ne distingue pas la Communauté de ses Etats membres, puisque la répartition intra-communautaire 
des compétences reste une question intra-communautaire”. E. NEFRAMI, Les Accords mixtes de la 
Communauté Européenne: aspects communautaires et internationaux, ed. Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2007, pp. 447ss. 
150Arbitral tribunals will not make formal declarations on alleged breaches of EU law. EU law can be part of 
the applicable law only if a member state argues that its obligation to implement an EU act takes priority over 
its BIT (or UNCLOS) obligations, which assumesthe existence of conflict, but even in this scenario the tribunal 
would not rule on breaches of EU law, as the conflict could only be resolved by applying a conflict rule of 
international law. The point of this quibbling is that unless conflict arguments are raised, EU law is necessarily 
a factual element in the tribunal's analysis, although it may constitute a direct (and only) basis for the finding 
that the challenged measure was (or was not) a rational public interest measure which does not breach the BIT. 
Another scenario is one where the member state argues that the challenged measure is attributable to the EU, 
which would render the claim inadmissible as a matter of international law, but here too EU law would not be 
part of the applicable law as the question of attribution is decided on the basis of the relevant rules of 
international law. 
151D. KÖNIG, The enforcement of the international law of the sea by coastal and port States, in Zeitschrift für 
ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, 62, 2002, pp. 6ss. H. RINGBOM, The EU maritime safety 
policy and international law, The Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston, 2008, pp. 216ss. 
152In Article. 26.3.b.ii. of the Energy Charter it is prescribed that: "the communities and the Member States 
will, if necessary, determine among them, who is the respondent party to arbitration proceedings initiated by an 
investor of another contracting parties". As regards the correct interpretation to be given to this clause, in the 
Electrabel case, the Commission has tried to show that, since the Energy Charter was not attached, a specific 
division of responsibilities between the Union and Member States was not attached, part actress has the burden 
of starting a procedure by quoting both and letting them decide, within a period of 30 days, which of the two is 
legitimated to respond: “(...) the Communities and the member States will, if necessary, determine among them 
who is the respondent party to arbitration proceedings initiated by an investor of another contracting party, in 
such case, upon request of the investor, the Communities and the member States concerned will make such 
determination within a period of 30 days”. ICSID, Electrabel v. Hungary, op. cit., par. 47, part V, p. 48. 
According to Rhine Convention was stated that: Nella Convenzione per la protezione del Reno, è stabilito che: 
"In the event of a dispute between two Contracting Parties, of which only one is a Member State of the 
European Community, also a Contracting Party, the other Party shall address the request both to this Member 
State and to the Community, which shall notify the joint reply, within two months of receipt of the request, if 
the Member State, the Community or the Member State and the Community jointly form part of the dispute. In 
the absence of such notification within the prescribed period, the Member State and the Community shall be 
regarded, for the purposes of applying the provisions of this Annex, as one and the same party to the dispute. 
The same provision shall apply if the Member State and the Community are jointly constituted part of the 
dispute (...)". Convention for the protection of the Rhine of 27 June 200, in Gazz. Uff. A. Eur. C. n. 177, art. 8, 
attached. 
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representation of the Union153 and, at the same time, for reasons of purely political 
opportunities, preserves the definition of internal relations, preventing the arbitrator from 
ruling on the EU-Member States relationship. 
The purpose of the Proposal seems to be to clarify the relations between the parties to a 
mixed agreement, providing for binding and knowable ex ante solutions. It is therefore 
assumed that in future agreements signed jointly by the Union and Member States, a clause 
of the same standard as the ones already provided for in some mixed agreements will be 
inserted154; they provide that, in the event of a dispute, the defendant in court must rule on 
who, between the Union or Member States, has the legitimacy to stand in court. In the event 
of a dispute that arises on future investment agreements, this clause should lead the 
defendant, EU or Member States, to resolve the question of passive legitimacy by making 
reference to the content of the Proposal, which will hopefully soon become Regulation. 
 
8.(Follows) The case of financial responsibility. 
 
The principle of attribution is one of the fundamental principles of the EU, by virtue of 
which it can act only within the limits of the competences expressly attributed to it by the 
Treaties, those recognized in application of the jurisprudential theory-implicit powers or 
flexibility clause, pursuant to art. 352 TFEU155. In the event of a dispute over a mixed 
agreement, the judge can not decide on matters relating to the division of competences 
between EU and Member States. The search for the part that has jurisdiction over the subject 
matter of the litigation and which, as a consequence, is entitled to stand trial, can only be 
performed within the EU system. The provisions on the division of competence within the 
Union are not, in fact, opposable to third parties and, therefore, can not be relied upon either 
by the EU or by the Member States to exclude their responsibility or, in parallel, must be 
referred to by the third party156. 
                                                 
153N. DE SADELEER, The end of the game. The autonomy of the EU legal order opposes arbiral tribunales 
under bilateral investment treaties concluded between two member States, op. cit. 
154See in particular: S. LALANI, R. POLANCO LAZO, The role of the State in investor State arbitrator, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 2014. M. AKBABA, G. CAPURRO, International challenges in 
investment arbitration, ed. Routledge, New York, 2018. 
155D. LIAKOPOULOS, Art. 352 TFUE, in  P.E. HERZOG, C. CAMPBELL, G. ZAGEL, Smit & Herzog on the 
law of the EU, ed. LexisNexis, 2018. 
156“(...) Pour un grand partie de la doctrine la Communauté et ses Etats membres sont considérée comme 
conjointement responsable, sans qu’ils puissent opposer une fin de non recevoir lorsque le tiers s’adressent à 
l’un ou à l’autre, selon l’imputabilité de l’acte ou de considérations d’opportunité. Pour précisément, les 
auteurs qui acceptent la responsabilité limitée a la violation des dispositions qui relèvent des compétences 
respectives on préalablement accepté l’opposabilité de la répartition intra-communautaire des compétences au 
niveau de la conclusion de l’accord. En revanche, pour les auteurs qui acceptent la non-répartition de l’effet 
obligatoire de l’accord mixte lorsqu’une telle répartition ne découle pas de son texte, la Communauté et ses 
Etats membres sono conjointement responsable de l’ensemble de l’accord”. See the opinions of the Advocate 
General Jacobs and Tesauro in case: CJEU, 316/94, European Parliament v. Council of 6 February 1997, 
ECLI:EU:C:1997:59, I-02785; 53/96 Hermès International v. FHT marketing choice BV. of 16 June 1998, 
ECLI:EU:C:1998:292, I-3603. With regard to the second, Tesauro noted that: "it should be recognized that the 
Member States and the Community constitute, in relation to the third party contracting parties, a single 
contractual party or at least contracting parties equally responsible with respect to any breach of the agreement. 
The obvious consequence is that, in the hypothesis of this type, the division of competences is of only internal 
relevance. This same circumstance, as will be better seen, may not be irrelevant to the solution of the problem 
that concerns us". In practical terms, the recognition of joint liability takes place in the first instance of the 
proceedings, when the third party then notifies the beginning of the proceedings to the Union or to the State or 
to both. The defendants, the Union and the Member States, can not plead the defect of their powers, which is 
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In this regard, it is noted that the Proposal for Regulation no. 2012/0163157 distinguishes 
between internal and external responsibility. The first concerns the relationship between 
Member States and Union, while the second one has international repercussions since it 
defines the part that assumes responsibility and which, as already mentioned, is not 
necessarily the one that has competence on the subject in which the violation occurred158.  
                                                                                                                                                      
an intra-union issue. Following notification, recognition of responsibility takes place, in the light of the 
division of intra-EU competences. In this sense, the request for judgment proposed by the third party will 
therefore be answered by the party, Union or Member State, which will have jurisdiction to stand in court 
because, for EU law, directly or indirectly responsible. 
157Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for 
managing financial responsibility linked to investor-state dispute settlement tribunals established by 
international agreements to which the EU is party, COM/2012/0335 final-2012/0163 (COD). For details see: J. 
BONNITCHA, Substantive protection under investment treaties. A legal and economic analysis, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2014. J. KLEINHEISTERKAMP, Financial responsibility in european 
international investment policy, in International & Comparative Law Quarterly, 63 (2), 2014, pp. 450ss. J. 
KLEINHEISTERKAMP, Investment protection and EU law: The intra-and extra-EU dimension of the energy 
charter treaty, in Journal of International Economic Law, 15 (1), 2012, pp. 86ss. 
158In this regard, it is noted that the CJEU has accepted that the Union and the Member States can take part in 
meccaniMember Statesi to resolve international disputes, provided that this is done with respect for the 
autonomy of the European legal order and the monopoly of the Court of Justice for the interpretation of EU 
law. For the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice on this point, please refer, ex multis, to: Opinion in case 1/91 
of 14 December 1991, ECLI:EU:C:1991:490, I-06079, parr. 39-40; In Opinion 1/91, on the first EEA 
agreement, the CJEU proclaimed the constitutional character of the EU, asserting that this constitutional nature 
distinguished it from international law. In Opinion 1/00 the Court stated more specifically: "(...) preservation of 
the autonomy of the Union legal order requires therefore, first, that the essential character of the powers of the 
(Union) and its institutions as conceived in the Treaty remain unaltered (...) it requires that the procedures for 
ensuring uniform interpretation of the rules of the (...) Agreement and for resolving disputes will not have the 
effect of binding the (Union) and its institutions, in theexercise of their internal powers, to a particular 
interpretation of the rules of (Union) law referred to in that agreement (...)". See also the Opinion 1/00, 
Opinion pursuant to Article 300(6) EC-Proposed agreement between the European Community and non-
Member States on the establishment of a European Common Aviation Area) of 18 April 2002, 
ECLI:EU:C:2002:231, I-03493, par. 12-13, to which par. 12 states that: "Ensuring the autonomy of the 
Community legal order therefore presupposes, on the one hand, that the competences of the Community and its 
institutions, as conceived in the Treaty, are not distorted: “(...) since the draft agreement substantially 
establishes a new jurisdictional structure, it is necessary to recall, in the first place, the fundamental elements 
of the legal system and the judicial system of the Union, as conceived by the founding Treaties and developed 
by the jurisprudence of the Court in order to assess the compatibility with those elements of the TB institution 
(...)".  In Opinion 1/00 the Court stated more specifically: "(...) preservation of the autonomy of the Union legal 
order requires therefore, first, that the essential character of the powers of the (Union) and its institutions as 
conceived in the Treaty remain unaltered (...) it requires that the procedures for ensuring uniform interpretation 
of the rules of the (...) Agreement and for resolving disputes will not have the effect of binding the (Union) and 
its institutions, in theexercise of their internal powers, to a particular interpretation of the rules of (Union) law 
referred to in that agreement (...)". from the perspective of the autonomy of EU law, it is not clear at all that the 
principle of mutual trust, as a “specific characteristic” of EU law, trumps the protection of fundamental rights. 
It is true that the principle is a cornerstone of the Area of Freedom Security and Justice, and that the relevant 
TFEU provisions make several references to mutual recognition. But the protection of fundamental rights is a 
foundational EU value, and the TFEU’s opening provision on the AFSJ predicates the area on respect for 
fundamental rights-such respect is also a “specific characteristic” of EU law. According to our opinion arbitral 
tribunals have no obligation to keep up to date and take account of the CJEU's case law when the disputing 
parties invoke EU law arguments. Tribunals can of course do so either on their own initiative or by hearing the 
parties and expert witnesses, but the essential question is whether the general ability of arbitral tribunals to 
interpret and apply EU law, to be discussed further below, constitutes a problem in light of Opinions 1/91 and 
1/00. Situations where the CJEU's rulings are open to different interpretations, or where the Court has not 
clarified the meaning of specific EU law provisions may arise, and this will compel the tribunals to interpret 
the relevant rulings and provisions in one or another way. See for details: B. DE WITTE, EU law: How 
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With regard to the division of internal responsibility between the EU and the Member States, 
the Proposal indicates that for the division of competences reference should be made to the 
institutive Treaties159. In other words, regardless of who answers and takes responsibility in 
court, any compensation arising from the sentence is attributed to the party that has 
jurisdiction over that particular matter on the basis of the criterion of allocation EU-Member 
States160. The party who acted in a matter for which he is responsible is financially 
responsible161. The identification of the responsible party is therefore a particularly sensitive 
matter, since the recognition of responsibility results in the obligation to pay compensation, 
with consequences that may be particularly burdensome for the finances of the Union or the 
State162. 
At this stage the foreign investor-actor of the instaurando judgment-and the arbitration panel 
                                                                                                                                                      
autonomous is its order?, in Zeitschrift für Öffentliches Recht, 65, 2010, pp. 162ss. P. JAN KUIJPER, J. 
WOUFERS, F. HOFFMEISTER, The law of EU external relations: Cases, materials and commentary on the 
EU as an international legal actor, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018, pp. 520ss. M. DERLÉN, J. 
LINDOLM, The Court of Justice of the EU: Multidisciplinary perspectives, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2018. F. CASTILLO DE LA TORRE, Opinion 1/00, Proposed agreement on the establishment of a European 
Common Aviation Area, in Common Market Law Review, 39 (6), 2002, pp. 1373-1393 pp. 1392ss.   
159Consequently, in the case of disputes arising from an agreement concluded in mixed form, in order to 
identify the competence on a matter and thus divide the financial responsibility between the Union and the 
Member State, one must have regard to the internal provisions of the founding Treaties. Mixed agreements are, 
indeed, underwritten both by the Union and by the Member States and include matters that can be attributed to 
the competence of the first, second or both competing. 
160For the identification of the responsible party, in light of the practice of the Mixed International Agreements, 
two options can be developed. In some cases it is the same text of the Agreement that specifies the division of 
responsibility between the Union and the Member States. Among these, we recall the art. 6.2, Annex IX of the 
UNCLOS 1982 Convention for which: "The parties that have the competence pursuant to article 5 of this 
annex are responsible for the non-fulfillment of the obligations and any other violation of the present 
convention" and the art.4.5 of the Kyoto Protocol, 1999 which states that: "If the Parties, acting jointly, do so 
within the framework of a regional organization of economic integration and in concert with it, any variation in 
the composition of said organization, subsequent to the adoption of the present Protocol , will not affect the 
commitments undertaken under this Protocol. Any change in the composition of the organization will only take 
effect for the purposes of implementing the commitments referred to in Article 3 that are adopted after the 
modification". A second type of Agreement, which represents the rule, is silent on the division of responsibility, 
more specifically it does not crystallize it when the Agreement is signed and therefore imposes the reference to 
the norms of the Institution Treaties which, in fact, provide for the distribution of competences Union and, 
therefore, the division of responsibility. In Article. 104 of the Agreement between the European Community 
and Russia, for example, it has been established that: "for the purposes of this Agreement, the term" shall mean 
the Community, or its Member States, or the Community and its Member States, in accordance with their 
respective powers, of the one part, and Russia, of the other part (...)". EU, Agreement on partnership and 
cooperation establishing a partnership between the European Communities and their Member States, of one 
part, and the Russian Federation, of the other part, doc. n. 21997A1128(01) 24 June 1994. 
161The CJEU clarified that the Member States are bound by Community obligations (now European), in fact: 
"establishing a Community without any duration limitation, endowed with its own bodies, personality, legal 
capacity, representation capacity at international level, and in particular of effective powers deriving from a 
limitation of jurisdiction or a transfer of powers of the States to the Community, these (the Member States) 
have limited their sovereign powers, albeit in limited fields, and thus created a binding legal framework for 
their citizens and for themselves (...)". case: 6/64, Costa v. ENEL of 15 July 1964, ECLI:EU:C:1964:66, I-
01141, p. 1144. From this it follows that, if we accept the theory of control, that if the Member States does not 
respect the obligations imposed by the Union, the latter can be held responsible. 
162“Should it be the case that both the EU and the Member States are parties to an Agreement and it needs to be 
decide who is responsible as a matter of International law for any particular action, the Commission takes the 
view that this has to be decide not by the Author of the Act but on the basis of the competence for the subject 
matter of the international rules in question, as set down in the Treaty”. European Commission, Proposal for a 
Regulation n.2102/0163, Explanatory memorandum, op. cit., par.1.2. 
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appealed to, have no power, being a choice purely internal to the Union163. As a rule, in fact, 
in mixed agreements164, the Union and the Member State have a joint responsibility towards 
the third party-take note that they are not subsidiary-so they are presented to the latter both 
as direct responsibles165. On the other hand, the question concerning external liability, which 
as such, assumes importance under international public law, is different. In this regard, in the 
Proposal for Regulation n. 2012/0163 an approach was adopted on the basis of which the 
party who, in light of the founding Treaties, has jurisdiction over the matter concerned by 
the non-compliance is not always in court. The Member State, on the other hand, replies to 
the direct debts directly attributable to him166. Regarding the allocation of external 
responsibility between the Union and Member States, it is noted that doubts may arise 
regarding the choice of the EC-not modified in the first reading by the European Parliament-
to recognize responsibility for acts performed by the State member acting as a result of a 
european restriction167. In the case of EU, not being able to speak of a federal state, the 
legitimacy of EC's choice to hold the Union accountable for an act performed by Member 
States must be assessed in light of the sources of international law prepared for International 
Organizations168. Therefore, the division of responsibility must comply with the regime 
                                                 
163In this regard, it should be noted that even from a purely internal EU perspective, therefore referring to the 
provisions of the institutional treaties, doubts may arise regarding the traceability of a specific sector to the 
exclusive competence of the Union or concurrent Union-Member States. The tax sector, for example, falls 
within the exclusive competence of the Member States, but is nevertheless subject to the impact of 
international agreements between the Union and third States. In the area of education, then, Member States 
provide for the organization of home education, leaving the EU with a supporting competence on the basis of 
which it can adopt legislative acts for the achievement of the objectives in the aforementioned sector (Article 
165.4 TFEU). In terms of external relations, this means that the education sector can be included among the 
subjects regulated by a mixed investment agreement. In these circumstances, it may happen that the foreign 
investor agrees with the EU attaching that certain legislative measures taken by the Member State violate, for 
example, the national treatment clause included in an Investment Agreement between the EU and the third 
country. In these cases, the Union has no exclusive jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the dispute and 
therefore may not be responsible for the conduct of the Member State, unless the latter has acted in compliance 
with European obligations. 
164P. CRAIG, G. DE BÚRCA, EU law. Text, cases and materials, op. cit. 
165This position is shared by the majority doctrine as well as by the Special Rapporteur Prof. Gaja, of the Draft 
of articles on the responsibility of international organizations that on the topic establishes: “in case of 
infringement of a mixed agreement that does not distinguish between the respective obligations of the EC and 
its member States-either directly or by referring to their respective competencies-responsibility would be joint 
towards the non-meber States party to the agreement”. ILC, Second report on responsibility of international 
organizations, Special Rapporteur Gaja, 53th  session, UN DOC A/CN.4/541 of 2004, pp. 4-5. 
166The Proposal then provides for the hypothesis where responsibility lies with more than one Member State. In 
these cases, as required by art. 47.1 of the draft article on the responsibility of States, the responsibility 
between the parties can be common in the sense that a plurality of states can be at the same time responsible 
for the commission of an offense. The provision referred to in art. 47 does not establish a general rule for 
identifying joint and solidary liability always in the case of mixed agreements; it simply states that two states 
can be simultaneously responsible for the same internationally illegal act. This depends on the circumstances 
and obligations that derive from each State. See, ILC, Report of the International Law Commission, 53rd 
session, A756/10 of 2001, pp. 341. 
167There is a great deal of jurisprudence on the alleged violation by a State of an international agreement for the 
execution of a European obligation. Former multis, please refer to: ICSID, Decision containing the settlement 
agreement of the parties of March 11, 2011, in case ARB/09/6, Vattenfall AB, Vattenfall Europe AG, Vattenfall 
Europe Generation AG v. Germany; ICSID, Decision on jurisdiction, applicable law, respnsibility of 30 
November 2012, in case ARB07/19, Electrabel S.A. v. Hungary; ICSID, Decision on jurisdiction of  13 
September 2006, in case ARB/04/15, Telenor Mobiel Communications A.S. v. Hungary; ICSID, Award of 8 
October 2009, in case ARB/05/13, EDF (Services) Limited v. Romania. 
168As a rule, for third parties, part of an agreement with a federal state, it is indifferent at what level of state the 
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established by the text on the Responsibility of Internatioanl Organizations, approved in 
second reading by the International Law Commission (ILC) in 2011169,  which provides for 
International Organizations a subsidiary responsibility with respect to the main one of the 
State party that allegedly committed the violation object of the judgment170. 
Therefore, even in the case of the Union, the Member State should be held responsible for 
breaches of an agreement arising from conduct attributable to it, irrespective of whether the 
latter acted in compliance with a european restriction. However, art. 64 of the 
aforementioned text recognizes that these provisions do not apply if the responsibility of 
International Organizations is defined by its own internal regulations, which are of the 
nature of lex specialis and, as such, prevail171. International Organizations can therefore 
define an autonomous system of division of responsibility; this is the case of liability 
between the Union and the Member State if disputes arise over an investment agreement. 
From the foregoing, it follows that the solution of the Proposal to impute the conduct of the 
State to the Union if the same conduct has been carried out to respect a european bond is in 
                                                                                                                                                      
violation was committed; international responsibility is always and only the head of the federal state, 
regardless of whether the violation is directly attributable to it, or has only been carried out on its territory. 
Obviously, differences can be found between the individual jurisdictions of the federal states that depend on 
the existence-Germany-or not-the United States and Canada-of express constitutional provisions that divide the 
responsibility among the various entities of the federal state. For an analysis of the division of responsibility 
within federal states. See in argument: C. TIETJIE, E. SIPIORSKI, G. TOPFER, Responsibility in investor-
State-arbitration in the EU-managing financial responsibility linked to investor-State dispute settlement 
Tribunals established by EU’s international investment agreements, in Transnational Dispute Management, 10, 
2013. 
169For details see: S. D. MURPHY, Codification, progressive development, or scholarly analysis? The art of 
packaging the ILC’s work product, in M. RAGAZZI (ed.), Responsibility of International Organisations-
Essays in Memory of Sir Ian Brownlie, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,  Leiden, Boston, 2013, pp. 29-40. N.M. 
BLOKKER, Preparing articles on responsibility of International Organisations: Does the International Law 
Commission take International Organisations seriously? A midterm view, in J. KLABBERS, A. 
WALLENDAHL (eds), Research handbook on the law of International Organisations, Edward Elgar 
Publishers, Cheltenham 2011, pp. 313ss. F. HOFFMESITER, Litigating against the EU and its member States: 
Who responds under the ILC’s draft articles on international responsibility of International Organisations?, in 
European Journal of International Law, 21, 2010, pp. 724ss. A. DELGADO CASTELEIRO, The international 
responsibility of the EU-The EU perspective: between pragmatism and proceduralisation, in Cambridge 
Yearbook of European Legal Studies, 15, 2012-2013, pp. 564ss. M. SZABÓ, International legal responsibility 
of the EU according  to the Draft Articles of the International Law Commission, in M. SZABÓ (ed.), State 
responsibility and the law of treaties, Eleven International, The Hague, 2009, pp. 186ss. V. LANOVOY, 
Complicity and its limits in the law of international responsibility, Hart Publishing, Oxford & Oregon, 
Portland, 2016. 
170In 2002 the International Law Commission appointed G, Gaja special rapporteur for the codification of the 
responsibility of international organizations. Gaja presented eight reports and, according to them, the ILC 
adopted the text of 67 articles at second reading. With Resolution 66/100 of 27 February 2012 the United 
Nations AG took note of the codification work and postponed to a subsequent session the decision about the 
legal framing of the text. For a detailed analysis of the division of responsibilities between the Union and the 
Member States. 
171ILC, Draft Articles of InternationalOrganisations, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.778 del 30 Maggio 2011, art. 64: 
“These draft articles do not apply where and to the extent that the conditions for the existence of an 
internationally wrongful act or the content or implementation of the international responsibility of an 
international organization, or of a State in connection with the conduct of an international organization, are 
governed by special rules of international law. Such special rules of international law may be contained in the 
rules of the organization applicable to the relations between an international organization and its members”. 
ILC, Report of International Law Commission, Responsibility of international Organizations, Sixty first 
session UN doc. A/64/10, del 2009, pp. 173-175.CDI, A/57/10, Report del 2002, Cap. VIII, par.465-488; CDI, 
A/58/10, Report (2002), cap. IV, par. 
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conformity with international law. In these circumstances, the act is imputed to the Union as 
a result of the theory of control, enucleated in the second and third reports of the ILC on the 
responsibility of international organizations. The aforesaid situations are regulated in light of 
the provision referred to in art. 17 of the draft article on the responsibility of States that 
applies, by analogy, also to international organizations172. The responsibility of the Union is, 
therefore, determined in relation to the effective degree of control exercised by the same on 
the State. The latter, indeed, remains responsible for the acts carried out by the Member 
States in compliance with a european restriction, except in the case where the EU has no 
connection with the action taken by the State. The responsibility of the Union exists, as 
culpa in vigilando, since the same did not exercise effective control over the action of the 
state. In other words, the Union, by placing a restriction contrary to an obligation, has not 
guaranteed the correct implementation by the State of international obligations173. In these 
cases, therefore, the control theory174, is correctly applied, from which the Union's 
responsibility is derived from the third parties of the violated agreement. The position 
adopted by the ILC in the articles on the responsibility of  International Organizations is 
therefore in conformity with the provisions of international law, interpreted in the light of 
the theory of control175. However, it is noted that, in general, the division of responsibility 
                                                 
172On the other hand, according to settled jurisprudence, international agreements become European sources 
and for the effect, a State that violates or does not correctly apply it, is in contrast with a European obligation 
and can, for this reason, suffer a procedure by the Union. Article. 8 of the articles on the responsibility of 
international organizations provides that: “The conduct of an organ or agent of an international organization 
shall be considered an act of that organization under international law if the organ or agent acts in an official 
capacity and within the overall functions of that organization, even if the conduct exceeds the authority of that 
organ or agent or contravenes instructions”. 
173Against, “The fact that a member State may be bound towards an international organization to conduct itself 
in a certain manner does not imply that under international law conduct should be attributed to the organization 
and not to the State”, ILC, Second report on responsibility of international organizations, Special Rapporteur 
Gaja, 53°session, UN DOC A/CN.4/541 del 2004, p. 7. For details see: A. DELGADO CASTELEIRO, The 
international responsibility of the EU-The EU perspective: between pragmatism and proceduralisation, in 
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, 15, 2012-2013, pp. 564ss. M. SZABÓ, International legal 
responsibility of the EU according  to the Draft Articles of the International Law Commission, in M. SZABÓ 
(ed.), State responsibility and the law of treaties, Eleven International, The Hague, 2009, pp. 186ss. V. 
LANOVOY, Complicity and its limits in the law of international responsibility, Hart Publishing, Oxford & 
Oregon, Portland, 2016. 
174Against: “During the discussions which led to the adoption of the ILC articles on the responsibility of 
international organizations, the European Commission took a different view on the attribution of conduct 
implementing obligations under EU law. According to this view, State organs act quasi as organs of the EU 
when they implement an obligation under EU law which leaves them no discretion. Responsibility for their 
conduct would have to be attributed only to the EU, which, unlike other international organizations, does not 
shy away from international responsibility (...)”. ILC, Second report on responsibility of international 
organizations, Special Rapporteur Gaja, 53°sessione, UN DOC A/CN.4/541 del 2004, p. 7. For details see: J. 
KLABBERS, A. WALLENDAHL (eds), Research handbook on the law of international organizations, Edward 
Elgar Publishers, Cheltenham 2011, pp. 313ss. F. HOFFMESITER, Litigating against the EU and its member 
States: Who responds under the ILC’s draft articles on international responsibility of international 
organizations?, in European Journal of International Law, 21, 2010, pp. 724ss. G. NOLTE, The International 
Law Commission facing the second decade of the twenty first century, in U. FASTENRATH et al., From 
bilaterism to community interests, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2011, pp. 782ss. S. VILLALPANDO, 
Codification light. A new trend in the codification of international law at the United Nations, in Brazilian 
Yearbook of International Law, 2013, pp. 118ss. Y. CHEN, Structural limitations and possible future of the 
work of the ILC, in Chinese Journal of International Law, 2010, pp. 478ss. 
175ECtHR M. & Co. v. Germany of 9 February 1990: “(...) the Commission first recalls that it is in fact not 
competent ratione personae to examine proceedings before or decisions of organs of the European 
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between the Union and Member States does not always take place according to the 
aforementioned approach and accepted in the Proposal. 
Indeed, in the Union Accession Agreement to the European Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR)176, in spite of the EC-instances that would have liked to frame EU-Member States 
                                                                                                                                                      
Communities (...) This does not mean, however, that by granting executory power to a judgment of the 
European Court of Justice the competent German authorities acted quasi as Community organs and are to that 
extent beyond the scope of control exercised by the conventional organs (...)”. 
176Opinion 2/13, Accession of the EU to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, ECJ, 18 December 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454. CJEU, opinion of 18 December 
2014, P-2/13. L. HALLESLOV STORGAARD, EU law autonomy versus european fundamental rights 
protection. On opinion 2/13 on EU accession to the ECHR, in Human Rights Law Review, 15 (3), 2015, pp. 
487ss. On the one hand, the art. 53 does not oblige the States to guarantee a higher level of protection than that 
of the ECHR, on the other the same CFREU must guarantee the same level of protection of the ECHR so that 
there is no conflict between the two provisions. Moreover, the CJEU has evoked the specificity of the Union's 
control system on respect for fundamental rights, in particular the principle of mutual trust in the areas of civil 
and criminal judicial cooperation, visa, asylum and immigration, namely the area of freedom, security and 
justice that obliges each member state to presume respect for fundamental rights by the other member states 
and the absence of their jurisdictional powers in the field of foreign and security policy. See also in case: C-
168/13 PPU, Jeremy F. of 30 May 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:358, published in the electronic Reports of the 
cases. The CJEU affirmed that: "(...) the absence of the necessary provisions of the Framework it frameworks, 
it must be that the framework for the implementation of the objectives of the framework to a European Arrest 
Warrant (...)". In the same spirit see also. CJEU, C-399/11 Stefano Melloni of 26 February 2013, 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:107; C-396/11 Ministerul Public-Parchetul de pe lângă Curtea de Apel Constanţa v. Radu of 
29 January 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:39, both of them published in the electronic Reports of the cases. F.M.W. 
BILLING, The right to silence in transnational criminal proceedings. Comparative law perspectives, ed. 
Springer, Berlin, 2016, pp. 323ss. C. JANSSENS, The principle of mutual recognition in EU law, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2013, pp. 208ss. F. KORENICA, The EU accession to the ECHR: Between 
Luxembourg's search for autonomy and Strasbourg's credibility on human rights protection, ed. Springer, 
Berlin, 2015, pp. 282ss. S. MORANO-FOADI, L. VICKERS (eds.), Fundamental Rights in the EU-A matter 
for two Courts, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015. T. LOCK, The future of EU accession to the ECHR 
after Opinion 2/13: Is it still possible and is it still desirable?, in Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper 
Series, 2015. F. PICOD, La Cour de justice a dit non à l’adhésion de l’Union européenne à la Convention 
EDH, in La Semaine Juridique, Édition Générale, 2015, pp. 230, 234. J.P. JACQUÉ, The accession of the EU 
to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, in Common Market Law Review, 
48 (4), 2011, pp. 995, 1005. S. PEERS, The EU's Accession to the ECHR: The dream becomes a nightmare, in 
German Law Journal, 16, 2015, pp. 213, 222. E. SPAVENTA, A very fearful Court? The protection of 
fundamental rights in the EU after Opinion 2/13, in Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 22, 
2015, pp. 51ss.  M. KUIJER, The accession of the EU to the ECHR: A gift for ECHR's 60th anniversary or an 
unwelcome intruder at the party?, in Amsterdam Law Forum, 4 (3), 2011, pp. 17-32. C. LADENBURGER, 
Vers l'adhésion de l'Union européenne à la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme, in Revue 
Trimestrielle de Droit Européen, 47 (1), 2011, pp. 20-26. T. LOCK, The ECJ and the ECtHR: The Future 
Relationship between the Two European Courts, in The Law and Practice of International Courts and 
Tribunals, 8, 2010, pp. 375-398. D. ASHIAGBOR, N. COUNTOURIS, I. LIANOS, The EU after the Treaty of 
Lisbon, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012, pp. 109-135. N. O'MEARA, A more secure Europe of 
rights? The European Court of Human Rights, the Court of Justice of the EU and EU Accession to the ECHR, 
in German Law Journal, 12, 2011, pp. 1813-1832. J. POLAKIEWICZ, EU law and the ECHR: Will the EU's 
accession square the circle?, in European Human Rights Law Review, 6, 2013, pp. 592-605. A. POTTEAU, 
Quelle adhésion de l’Union Européenne à la CEDH pour quel niveau de protection des droits et de l’autonomie 
de l’ordre juridique de l’UE?, in Revue Générale Droit International Public, 115, 2011, pp. 77-111. A. 
TORRES PEREZ, Too many voices? The prior involvement of the Court of Justice of the EU? in European 
Journal of Human Rights, 40, 2013, pp. 565-583. L. BESSELINK, M. CLAES, J.H. REESTMAN, A 
Constitutional moment: Acceding to the ECHR (or not), in European Constitutional Law Review, 11,  2015, 
pp. 2ss. D. HABELSTAM, It’s autonomy stupid. A modest defense of Opinion 2/13 on EU accession to the 
ECHR, and a way forward, in Michigan Law Paper 105, 2015. L.H. HALLESKOV STORGAARD, EU law 
autonomy versus european fundamental rights protection-On Opinion 2/13 on EU accession to the ECHR, in 
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responsibility reports along the lines of what was proposed for investment agreements -the 
opposite approach has been favored, for which the State is responsible for the acts carried 
out by its own bodies, regardless of whether the conduct was carried out in compliance with 
a European restriction. This approach is clearly expressed in the dictum of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) for which "a Convention Party is responsible under article 
1 of the ECHR for all acts and omissions of its organs regardless of whether the act or 
omission in question was a consequence of domestic law or of the necessity to comply with 
international legal obligations (in the case in hand, obligations under EU Law)"177. 
Therefore, a Member State can be held liable when the conduct of one of its bodies conflicts 
with the provisions of the ECHR-ma reasoning may apply to any international agreement-
regardless of whether the body of that State acted in compliance with obligations imposed 
on him by other legal systems. The ECtHR first articulated the principles by which it would 
afford protection to award creditors in its 1994 decision in Stran Greek Refineries & Stratis 
Andreadis v. Greece (Stran) of 9 December 1994. The Stran case concerned the validity and 
enforcement of a purely domestic arbitral award-although the ECtHR would extend the 
same principles to international arbitral awards in its subsequent jurisprudence178. In case 
                                                                                                                                                      
Human Rights Law Review, 15, 2015, pp. 485. J.P. JACQUÉ, CJUE-CEDH: 2-0, in Revue Trimestrielle de 
Droit Européen, 40 (4), 2014 pp. 823ss. C. KRENN, Autonomy and effectiveness as common concerns: A path 
to ECHR accession after Opinion 2/13, in German Law Journal, 16 (1), 2015, pp. 147ss. S. LAMBRECHT, 
The sting is in the Tail: CJEU Opinion 2/13 objects to draft agreement on accession of the EU to the European 
Convention on Human Rights, in European Human Rights Law Review, 15 (1), 2015, pp. 185ss. M. PETITE, 
The battle over Strasbourg: The protection of human rights across Europe has suffered a setback, thanks to the 
Court of Justice of the EU, in Competition Law Insight, 2015, pp. 10ss. R.A. WESSEL, A. ŁAZOWSKI, When 
Caveats Turn into Locks: Opinion 2/13 on Accession of the EU to the ECHR, in German Law Journal, 16, 
2015, pp. 179ss. B. DE WITTE, Article 53, in S. PEERS et al. (eds.), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
A Commentary, Hart Publishing, Oxford & Oregon, Portland, 2014, pp. 1523-1538. J. MEYER (ed.), Charta 
der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union, ed. Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2014, pp. 813-826. J.P. JACQUÉ, La 
Cour de Justice de !'Union et !' application de la Charte dans les Etats membres: "Mehr Licht", in European 
Yearbook on Human Rights, 14, 2014 pp. 125-147. 
177ECtHR, Bosphorus case of 30 June 2005 and in the case of Michaud v. France of 6 December 2012. See in 
argument: A. JAKUBOWSKI, K. WIECZYŃSKA, Fragmentation vs the constitutionalisation of international 
law: A practical inquiry, ed. Routledge, London & New York, 2016. C. LACCHI, The ECtHR's interference in 
the dialogue between National Courts and the Court of Justice of the EU: Implications for the preliminary 
reference procedure, in Review of European Administrative Law, 9 (1), 2015, pp. 96ss.D. SPIELMANN, 
L’adhésion de l’Union européenne à la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme, (Réunion conjointe de 
la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne et de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme-Réseau des 
présidents des Cours suprêmes judiciaires de l’Union européenne, Helsinki 6 septembre 2013). A. TIZZANO, 
Les Cours européennes et l’adhésion de l’Union à la CEDH, in Il Diritto dell’Unione Europea, 2011, pp. 12ss. 
X. GROUSSOT, T. LOCK, L. PECH, Adhésion de l’Union européenne à la Convention européenne des droit 
de l’homme: analyse juridique du projet d’accord d’adhésion du 14 octobre 2001, in Fondation Robert 
Schuman/Question d’Europe, n. 218 (7 novembre 2011), pp. 5ss. T. LOCK, Beyond Bosphorus: The European 
Court of Human Rights case law in the responsibility of Member States of international organizations under the 
European Convention on Human Rights, in Human Rights Law Review, 10 (4), 2010, pp. 530ss. C. 
COSTELLO, The Bosphorus ruling of the European Court of Human Rights: Fundamental rights and blurred 
boundaries in Europe, in Human Rights Law Review, 6 (1), 2006, pp. 88ss. S. DE VRIES, U. BERNITZ, S. 
WEATHERILL, The EU Charter of fundamental rights as a binding instrument: Five years old and grooming, 
Hart Publishing, Oxford & Oregon, Portland, 2015, pp. 32ss. J. NEGRELIUS, E. KRISTOFFERSSON, 
Human rights in contemporary European law, Hart Publishing, Oxford & Oregon, Portland, 2015, pp. 17ss. C. 
BÜYÜKBAY, D. ERTIN, EU-Skeptizismus am Bosporus?, in Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen, 2017, 
n. 2. 
178In the same spirit see the next cases: Bramelid and Malmström v. Sweden of 12 December 1983; Nordström-
Janzon and Nordström-Lehtinen v. the Netherlands of 27 November 1996; Miceleff v. Malta of 15 October 
2009. 
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Regent Company v. Ukraine of 3 April 2008, involved an arbitral award rendered under the 
auspices of the Ukrainian Chamber of Commerce in favor of a Czech company and against a 
State-owned corporation. In Kin-Stib & Majkić v. Serbia of 20 April 2010 and went further 
still in Sedelmayer v. Germany of 1st July 2011. The regional human rights courts-and in 
particular the ECtHR-provide a potential avenue of public law redress to award creditors 
frustrated by a State’s interference with the arbitral process or an arbitral award. While there 
are substantial gateway issues limiting access to the three human rights courts surveyed 
above, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR has developed in a reasonably protective manner. A 
State’s wrongful annulment of an arbitral award or agreement, or its failure to enforce a 
binding award in full and within a reasonable (if expansive) timeframe, can result in liability 
under either Protocol 1-1 or article 6 of the ECHR. The chief open question concerns when 
an arbitral award will be sufficiently enforceable to constitute “property” for purposes of the 
Protocol 1-1 (or article 6) analysis, and in particular the level of scrutiny the ECtHR would 
be willing to apply in cases of arguably justified setting-aside or non-enforcement. 
According to the ECtHR it was established that an arbitration agreement is not a blanket 
waiver of procedural human rights guarantees. Irrespective of the dispute resolution method, 
the essence of procedural guarantees must be preserved. By consenting to arbitration the 
parties merely renounce their right of access to a State court and the right to a public 
hearing. However, fair trial guarantees still apply. In this regard, the ECHR explicitly ruled 
that no one is entitled to waive ex ante the right to independent and impartial tribunal. The 
question whether arbitrators consider themselves bound by article 6(1) remains open. 
Answering the question would necessitate analysis of the relationship between the ECHR 
and arbitral proceedings from the viewpoint of arbitration rather than from the perspective of 
requirements imposed by the ECHR as interpreted by the controlling organs179. 
This approach would be moreover compliant with the general principle of attribution 
enumerated in art. 4.1 of the Draft of Articles on the International Liability of the State 
pursuant to which "the conduct of any State shall be considered as an act of that State under 
the international law, or the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other 
functions"180. On the other hand, the Commentary to the draft articles does not establish that, 
if the organ of the State acted as a result of a supranational obligation, the responsibility 
passes from the State to the Organization to which it belongs. The proposal's approach, 
which could anticipate the forecasts that will be contained in future EU agreements, takes on 
the opposite view, namely that the States act in the same way as bodies of the Union and 
that, therefore, the latter is called to respond acts they perform in violation of international 
obligations181. By setting the control theory as its legal basis, the EC provides for the 
transfer of responsibility to the Union for the conduct of Member States in violation of the 
obligations of the international agreement, but in compliance with the european constraint. 
Although not shared because it distinguishes the perpetrator of the infringement and the 
legitimized party to stand trial, the choice made can be understood in light of the fear of the 
Union to open up to foreign judges in general and, in particular, in case of courts arbitrators 
                                                 
179J. NEGRELIUS, E. KRISTOFFERSSON, Human rights in contemporary European law, op. cit. 
180J. KLABBERS, A. WALLENDAHL (eds), Research handbook on the law of international organizations, op. 
cit. 
181Convention of Washington, 1965, art. 25: “(1) The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute 
arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of 
a Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State) and a national of another Contracting State, which 
the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre. When the parties have given their consent, 
no party may withdraw its consent unilaterally”. 
      
                                                                                                            Número 1 
                                                                                              2019 
   
 
untied from any legal system. In practical terms, in fact, the traceability of the conduct of the 
State to the Union allows the latter to participate in most of the proceedings that may arise 
on an extra-EU BIT and thus to have control over the correct application and interpretation 
of EU law. On the basis of the foregoing, it emerges that the EC preferred to adopt a 
"special" system to guarantee the possibility of bringing proceedings in the largest number 
of cases and thus to defend the correct and uniform application of EU law. The role of the 
Union is thus strengthened, since the ultimate aim of the proposal is to maintain the unity of 
the internal and external representation of this regional organization. The approach is also in 
line with international and EU law, although there remains the doubt that the role of Member 
States has been excessively compressed. In any case, as it is a proposal still at the beginning 
of the complex legislative process described in art. 218 TFEU182, it is possible to expect the 
Council to impose amendments aimed at rebalancing the role between the parties. 
 
9."Problematic" jurisdiction and choices of procedural rules for judgments arising 
from future european agreements. 
 
Until now, in fact, for the EU the problem has never been posed to take part in arbitration 
proceedings regarding investment and, therefore, the referral to some Member States, such 
as the ISCID one, as a rule preferred by the investor. In the formulation of the arbitration 
clause, the identification of the jurisdiction and the procedural rules to be applied must be 
the result of a balance between the foreclosures that limit the options for the Union and the 
needs expressed by the European Institutions on this point. In fact, the latter have expressed 
their willingness to accept arbitration proceedings within the limits in which transparency, 
disclosure of information and rulings, as well as the participation of third parties is 
guaranteed183. These requirements guarantee to the institutions that, if a Member State is 
called to respond and not the Union, the latter may intervene in court or be informed in 
every stage of the proceedings and thus be able to adopt, where appropriate, the appropriate 
precautions of the Member States. Pending the conclusion of the next international 
agreements on investment, we can only hypothesize-in light of the advantages, limits and 
preclusions of each-which is the institution and the Regulation of procedure that the Union 
may have interest in refer to the arbitration clause. With regard to foreclosures, it is better to 
specify the reasons why it is argued that, at present, the use of ICSID184 arbitration by the 
                                                 
182R. GEIGER, D.E. KHAN, M. KOTZUR, EUV/AEUV, C.H. Beck, München, 2016.  M. DECHEVA, Recht 
der europäischen Union, ed. Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2018. C. BARNARD, S. PEERS, EU law, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2017, pp. 586ss. 
183ICSID, Additional Procedural and Facility rules, 10 April 2006, art. 2. 
184We noticed from ICSID the annulment in case of Piero Foresti v. South Africa (Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli 
& Others v. The Republic of South Africa, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/1.) and refused amicus briefs in four 
cases (Caratube International Oil Company v. Kazakhstan (Caratube International Oil Company LLP v. The 
Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/12.) Von Pezold/Border v. Zimbabwe (TECO Guatemala 
Holdings, LLC v. Republic of Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/23.) Apotex v. USA  and the annulment 
proceedings in Iberdrola Energia v. Guatemala ( Iberdrola Energía S.A. v. Republic of Guatemala, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/09/5), Apotex Holdings Inc. (Apotex Inc. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/12/1.). In each of these cases, the tribunal referred to various criteria within the amicus provisions of 
the ICSID Arbitration Rules or the ICSID Additional Facility Rules when accepting or denying applications to 
file amicus briefs. G.A. AVILA, ICSID Annulment procedure: A balancing exercise between correctness and 
finality”, Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), Arbitration Advocacy in Changing Times, ICCA Congress Series, 
Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2011, pp. 292ss. D. KIM, The annulment committee's role in 
multiplying inconsistency in ICSID arbitration: The need to move away from an annulment based system, in 
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Union does not represent a solution in any of the possible modalities185. 
Firstly, as regards the bilateral appeal, art. 25 of the Washington Convention on 18 March 
1965186 prescribes the conditions under which an ICSID Tribunal has jurisdiction to settle 
the dispute; more specifically, and for the part that interests us, the ICSID is competent if the 
dispute is between the investor of a Contracting State and another State187, part of the 
                                                                                                                                                      
New York University Law Review, 86, 2011, pp. 272ss. For the cases of annulment see also the enxt cases: 
TECO Guatemala Holdings, LLC v. Republic of Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/23, Annulment 
Decision, 5 April 2016, para 73.  Duke Energy International Peru Investments No. 1 Ltd. v. Republic of Peru, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/28, Annulment Decision, 1 March 2011, para. 144. Alapli Elektrik B.V. v. Republic 
of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/13, Annulment Decision, 10 July 2014, para. 232. Mr. Tza Yap Shum v. 
Republic of Peru ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6 Annulment Decision, 12 February 2015. 
185Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula, S.C. European Food S.A., S.C. Starmill S.R.L. and S.C. Multipack S.R.L. v. 
Romania, ICSID Case No. Arb/05/20 (Dec. 11, 2013); Commission Decision (EU) 2015/1470 of 30 March 
2015 on State Aid SA.38517(2014/C) (ex 2014/NN) Implemented by Romania-Arbitral Award Micula v. 
Romania of 11 December 2013, 2015 O.J. (L. 232/43); European Commission Press Release IP/15/4725,  
Micula, et al. v. Government of Romania, Case No. 15 Misc. 107(LGS), 2015 WL 4643180 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 
2015) (resulting in an order and judgment recognizing the award). Romania appealed the decision and the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) 
provided the only and exclusive means for the enforcement of an ICSID arbitration award against a sovereign 
and the summary ex parte proceeding utilized to convert the award into a judgment did not meet the 
requirements of the FSIA, including service of process on the sovereign; furthermore, New York was not an 
appropriate venue. See Micula, et al. v. Government of Romania, 714 F. App’x 18 (2d Cir. 2017). 
Accordingly, a petition to confirm the ICSID arbitration award and enter judgment was submitted to the US 
District Court for the District of Columbia (Civil Action No. 17-CV-2332). The tribunal in Micula v. Romania 
specified that the EC should “bear its own costs incurred in connection with its participation in the proceeding, 
including any costs relating to any appearance by the EC’s representatives (...) at the hearing (...). On the 
annulment proceedings that ensued, on its decision on costs, the committee held that: “(...) the present case 
involved a ‘difficult and novel question of public importance’ due to the intervention of the EC representing 
the EU’s interests (...)”. For details see: H. LENK, Challenging the notion of coherence in EU foreign 
investment policy, 8 in European Journal of Legal Studies, 8, 2015, pp. 6ss. C.I. NAGY, Hungarian cases 
before ICSID Tribunals: The hungarian experience with investment arbitration, 58(3) in Hungarian Journal of 
Legal Studies, 58 (3), 2017, pp. 292ss. C.I. NAGY, Clash of paradigms: Actors and analogies shaping the 
investment treaty system, in American Journal of Internatonal Law, 107, 2013, pp. 46ss. A. ROBERTS, State-
to-State investment treaty arbitration: A hybrid theory of interdependent rights and shared interpretive 
authority, in Harvard International Law Journal, 55 (1), 2014, pp. 6ss. T.S. VOON, A.D. MITCELL, J. 
MUNRO, The impact of mutual termination of investment treaties on investor rights, 9(2) in ICSID Review- 
Foreign Investment Law Journal, 9 (2), 2014, pp. 456ss. A. ROBERTS, Triangular treaties: The extent and 
limits of investment treaty rights, 56 in Harvard International Law Jounral, 56 (3), 2015, pp. 354ss. G. 
ZARRA, The arbitrability of disputes arising from intra-EU BITs, 25 in American Review of International 
Arbitration, 25, 2014, pp. 574ss. M. DOUGAN, Judicial review of Member State action under the general 
principles and the Charter: Defining the “scope of Union law,” 52 in Common Market Law. Review, 52, 2015, 
pp. 1203ss. N. LAVRANOS, Member States’ Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs): Lost in transition?, in 
Hague Yearbook of International Law,  25, 2012, pp. 282ss. H. WELAND, The enforcement of intra-EU BIT 
awards: Micula v. Romania and beyond, in The Journal of World Instrument & Trade, 17 (6), 2016, pp. 944ss. 
186S.G. TONDAPU, International Institutions and dispute settlement: The case of ICSID, in Bond Law Review, 
22 (1), 2010. 
C. LENG LIM, J. HO, M. PAPARNSKIS, International investment law and arbitration. Commentary, awards 
and other materials, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2018 pp. 63ss. P. WAUTELET, T. KRUGER, G. 
COPPENS, The practice of arbitration. Essays in honour of Hans Van Houtte, Hart Publishing, Oxford & 
Oregon, Portland, 2012. 
187As we noticed form the next cases in particular: Eli Lilly, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Procedural Order 
No. 4 (Feb. 23, 2016).Philip Morris, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Procedural Order No. 3 (Feb. 17, 2015) and 
Procedural Order No. 4, (March 24, 2015).Philip Morris, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award (July 8, 2016), 
parr. 49-55. LSF-KEB Holdings SCA and others v. Republic of Korea, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/37.Infinito 
Gold Ltd. v. Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/5. The tribunal stated that-the most important criteria is (…) 
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Convention188. The unilateral-only recourse by investors from EU countries, part of the 
Convention-to ICSID arbitration should also be excluded. In fact, it is an abstractly 
practicable option189, but in fact hardly feasible since it involves more risks than benefits. 
On the one hand, not all european investors can appeal to it, since some Member States, 
including Poland, are not members of the 1995 Washington Convention. On the other hand, 
third States can not agree to include in future agreements with the EU an arbitration clause 
referring to the ICSID arbitration, considering that its investors will be precluded from the 
possibility of starting such arbitration against the EU190, which is not a member of the 
Convention. 
Still remaining in the ICSID191, system, we note the possibility of using the Additional 
Procedural and Facility rules, which can be applied if one of the conditions-subjective or 
objective-of the ICSID arbitration procedure is lacking. These rules, therefore, can be 
applied in the event that only one of the parties has acceded to the Washington Convention 
of 1995, but do not guarantee the same benefits that vice versa are assured by a "classical" 
ICSID arbitration192. The parties using the ICSIDs Additional Procedural and Facility 
                                                                                                                                                      
whether the applicant‘s submission would assist the Tribunal‖ and pointed out that the amicus provisions 
contained only non-exhaustive-criteria‖ and not-conditions (...)". According to our opinion the lessons from the 
above cases are: a) increasing receptiveness towards amicus briefs continues; b) amidst the increasing 
receptiveness, there is a notable countervailing concern about the potential effects such an approach may have 
on proceedings. These effects include increased costs to disputing parties and delay in proceedings caused by 
the need to deal with an amicus brief; c) considering an application to file an amicus brief, tribunals are guided 
predominantly by the question of whether the brief will assist the tribunal (by providing perspective, 
knowledge or insight that is different from that already before it); d) some uncertainty remains as to the extent 
to which an amicus should be “independent” and precisely what that term means; e) the wording of amicus 
provisions is by no means settled. Amicus provisions will continue to evolve, and possibly diverge, across a 
spectrum of legal instruments. 
188Against, European Parliament, Report on the future European International Investment policy, A7-
0070/2011, (2010/2203(INI)) of 22 March  2011, par. 33. 
189M. BURGSTALLER, Investor-State Arbitration in EU International Investment Agreements with third 
States, in Legal Issues of Economic Integration, 39 (2), 2012, pp. 215. The author stresses the limits of the 
procedural rules adopted by the Arbitration Centers administered and by UNCITRAL to resolve commercial 
disputes and this leads to the reluctance of States to use these Centers to resolve disputes arising from an 
Investment Agreement . Contra, it is observed that in the Charter they build according to the needs; the 
impasse, if one wishes to define it, can therefore be overcome by calling, as the case may be, referees expert in 
the matter or forming new ones. 
190See also Antoine Goetz et al. v. Republic of Burundi, ICSID Case No. ARB/95/03, Award (embodying the 
parties' settlement agreement), 10 February, 1999, par. 94 ((...) sans doute la détermination du droit applicable 
n’est-elle pas, à proprement parler, faite par les parties au présent arbitrage (Burundi et investisseurs 
requérants), mais par les parties à la Convention d’investissement (Burundi et Belgique). Comme cela a été le 
cas pour le consentement desparties, le Tribunal estime cependant que la République du Burundi s’est 
prononcée en faveur du droit applicable tel qu’il est déterminé dans la disposition précitée de la Convention 
belgo-burundaise d’investissement en devenant partie à cette Convention et que les investisseurs requérants ont 
effectué un choix similaire en déposant leur requête d’arbitrage sur la base de ladite Convention (...)". 
191Vattenfall AB v. Federal Republic of Germany (II), ICSID Case No ARB/12/12 (Vattenfall II). N. 
Bernasconi, Background Paper on Vattenfall v. Germany Arbitration, IISD, 2009, parr 4ss. N. BERNASCONI-
OSTERWALDER, R.T. HOFFMANN, The german nuclear phase-out put to the test in international investment 
arbitration? Background to the new dispute Vattenfall v. Germany (II), IISD, 2012, pp. 5ss. J. LEVASHOVA, T. 
LAMBOOY, E. DEKKER (eds), Bridging the gap between international investment law and the environment, 
Eleven Publishing, The Hague, 2016, pp. 340ss. 
192This reformulation makes it possible to align the rules of the UNCITRAL procedure with those of the ICSID 
arbitration, widely revisited in 2006 to guarantee more transparent and public procedures. The revision of the 
ICSID procedure rules has been defined “a step in the right direction towards transparency, allowing for 
interested third parties to intervene in arbitral proceedings at the discretion of the tribunal and to attend 
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rules193 waive the particularly advantageous cancellation procedure in the ICSID system, as 
entrusted to the ad hoc Committee, as well as to the automatic recognition mechanism of the 
awards194 and to the facilitated procedure for the execution of the same. It follows from the 
foregoing that two options remain to the Union which the arbitration clause may refer to, 
alternative or concurrent. Firstly, the Union may decide to resort to arbitrations administered 
under the aegis of the main international arbitration institutions, the International Chamber 
of Commerce ("ICC") and the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce ("SCC")195. The EU can 
hypothesize the establishment of ad hoc arbitrations that apply the UNCITRAL arbitration 
Regulation whose rules are open to all, without distinction between States and international 
organizations196. 
Competence and specialization in a sector seems more appropriate to dwell on the 
advantages and limits that derive from each of the aforementioned procedures to identify the 
one, or those, which are more suitable to guarantee the interests of EU197. With regard to ad 
hoc arbitration with UNCITRAL rules198, it is noted that the recent adoption of the Rules on 
Transparency in the Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration of 1st April 2014199 ("Rules of 
Transparency")200, seems to have grasped the requests, from more advanced parties, more 
transparent arbitration proceedings. In practical terms, the new transparency rules provide 
for a general obligation to exchange information, memoirs and documents - with the limit 
for those particularly sensitive-and recognize to the courts the possibility of admitting third 
                                                                                                                                                      
hearings, although not automatically to see documents created as part of the proceedings (...)”. 
193M. BURGSTALLER, Investor-State Arbitration in EU International Investment Agreements with third 
States, op. cit. 
194William Ralph Clayton, William Richard Clayton, Douglas Clayton, Daniel Clayton and Bilcon of Delaware 
Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-04, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, 17 
March 2015. L.N. SKOVGAARD POULSEN, E. AISBETT, Diplomats want treaties: Diplomatic agendas and 
perks in the investment regime, in Journal of International Dispute Settlement, 7 (1), 2016, pp. 73ss. 
195See in particular the next cases: Eiser Infrastructure Limited and Energia Solar Luxembourg S.À R.I. v. 
Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/36, Award, 4 May 2017 and Isolux Netherlands, BV v. Kingdom of Spain, 
SCC Case V2013/153, Award, 12 July 2016. The tribunal rejected the claimants' claims based on the scaling 
back of the subsidies. In the Isolux arbitration, the tribunal assessed the same measures as the Eiser tribunal, 
but saw that these did not constitute a breach of the claimant's legitimate expectations. In case Isolux, the 
Charanne arbitration concerned earlier modifications to the aid scheme, but again the tribunal rejected the 
claimant's claims. 
196The Union could build its own arbitration clause in the light of those normally included in the bilateral 
agreements. Practically, the compromise clauses of the BITs refer to more than one arbitration proceedings and 
may be of two types: the first type refers to either the ICSID Convention, or ad hoc arbitration regulated by the 
UNCITRAL rules. The second type, on the other hand, is defined as multi tiered because it foresees that the 
investor has a wide range of possibilities to choose from to resolve the dispute - this is a different approach to 
the 'oppositional' approach, typical of the first type of clauses. A. REINISCH, Expropriation, in P. 
MUCHLINSKI, F. ORTINO, C. SCHREUER (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008, pp. 693ss. 
197D. LIAKOPOULOS, Limitation of State sovereignty in bilateral investment treaties and investment 
contracts and the role of investor-State arbitration,  in International and EU Legal Matters, 2017 
198D.D. CARON, L.M. CAPLA, The UNCITRAl arbitration rules. A commentary, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2013, pp. 572ss.H. HANNAN, Cross-border insolvency: The enactment and interpretation of the 
UNCITRAL Model law, ed. Springer, 2017, pp. 9ss. 
199See also the Proposal for a COUNCIL DECISION on the signing, on behalf of the EU, of the United Nations 
Convention on transparency in treaty-based investor-State arbitration, COM/2015/021 final-2015/0013 (NLE). 
200Both regulations provide for the possibility that the arbitrators, with the consent of the parties, call experts in 
court (Article 25.4 ICC, Article 29.1 CCS). One wonders whether the possibility of being able to participate as 
an expert-and not a third party-reduces the Commission's fear of being excluded from a proceeding concerning 
a mixed agreement but for which the ability to respond in judgment to the Member States. 
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party memoirs that are not parties to the bilateral agreement investment or which, although it 
is, have not yet formally entered the trial201. In the old formulation, the UNCITRAL 
Regulation in art. 21.3 it was only precluded the participation of third parties in the hearing. 
However, this limit applies only to hearings and no other provision of the Regulation 
expressly excluded the participation of third parties in the proceeding. In the case of 
Methanex v. United States202 the Arbitration Tribunal has admitted the memoirs of the curiae 
friends, noting that in the UNCITRAL Regulation the same are not excluded and indeed, art. 
15.1 UNCITRAL leaves the referee the possibility to organize the proceedings. The Court 
also specified that: "receipt of submissions from a person other than the disputation 
parties"203. UNCITRAL ad hoc arbitration, Decision on the request of third parties to 
participate as an amicus curiae of 15 January 2001, in Methanex houses v. United States par. 
30. The new formulation expressly declares the possibility, for third parties, of predicting 
part of the proceedings. The new rules are binding and, together with those of procedure, 
will be applied automatically to the judgments concerning investment agreements entered 
into after April 1, 2014 unless-and this is the real limit-that the parties exercise the opting 
out. To overcome this risk, which would in fact undermine the benefits of the new 
UNCITRAL proceeding, it can be assumed that the EU will include in the stipulated 
investment agreements a clause requiring the counterparty to apply the new procedural rules 
thus excluding the option of opting out. As for the arbitrations administered, it is noted that 
the procedural rules do not contain obligations that require the arbitrators to publish the 
information of the proceedings or the rulings, nor do they decide on the participation of third 
parties. On these points the rules are particularly flawed, in the sense that they do not have, 
but neither do they preclude. 
According to our opinion amicus interventions could be based on the WTO model204, which 
implies that the arbitrators would request the amicus curiae submissions. Thus, the arbitral 
tribunal would decide which submissions might be of interest for the case and therefore not 
admit unrequested amicus briefs. This system has some advantages. For example, in ICSID 
cases205 there have been no amicus submissions, although the court has offered such a 
possibility through a procedural order. Applying this alternative system, the lack of 
                                                 
201As a rule, recognition and enforcement are conducted before national courts, in compliance with the 
provisions of the 1958 New York Convention for the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitration 
awards. This Convention simplifies the procedure for the execution of judgments and harmonizes the 
impediment cirrtencies in the presence of which the national courts may refuse, the admission to arbitration 
awards issued in another Member State. LEBEN claims that: “(...) cette Convention a joué un role primordial 
dans la généralisation de l’arbitrage comme mode de règlement habituel de litiges du commerce international 
(...) mais elle était inadaptée aux litiges opposant non pas des personnes privées entre elles, mais de personnes 
privées et des Etats, et non pas à propos d’échanges commerciaux au sens strict du terme, mais à propos 
d’investissement (...)". C. LEBEN, La théorie du contrat d' État et l'èvolution du droit international des 
investissements, Recueil des Cours, vol. 302, ed. Bruylant, The Hague, 2003, p. 360. 
202UNCITRAL, Methanex v. United States, Decision on the request of third parties to participate in quality of 
amicus curiae of 15 January 2001. For analysis see: L. BASTIN, Amici Curiae in investor-State arbitration: 
Eight recent trends, in Arbitration International 30 (1), 2014, pp. 126ss. P. DUMBERRY, The formation and 
identification of rules of customary international law in international investment law, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2016. 
203UNCITRAL, Methanex v. United States, Decision on the request of third parties to participate in quality of 
amicus curiae, op. cit. 
204J. TIJMES, Who wants what? Final offer arbitration in the World Trade Organization, in European Journal of 
International Law, 26 (3), 2015, pp. 588ss. 
205See in particular: Philip Morris Brands Sàrl v. Oriental Repub. of Uru., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Decision 
on Jurisdiction (July 2, 2013). 
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participation of NGOs can be supplemented by a proactive positioning of the court. Besides 
that, the arbitrators would make much more targeted requests, avoiding requests which are 
redundant or too generic. Analyzing this system from the opposite perspective, its 
implementation could generate a dangerous situation of helplessness. The public interest206 
would not be taken into account if, due to a lack of information or awareness, the court did 
not make any or enough amicus requests. On the other hand, institutions managing 
investment arbitrations could establish a new institution exclusively and permanently 
dedicated to defending the collective interest. Although appealing, this proposal would 
require a major change to the system, so that success would only materialize in the medium 
to long term207. 
With regard to the publication of rulings, the procedural regulations of the administered 
arbitrations do not contain specific provisions, but it is noted that this can be guaranteed at 
the time of recognition or execution208. In such circumstances it may in fact result in greater 
transparency and acceptability of the acts of arbitration, given that, with the activation of a 
national proceeding, the praises, becoming the object of scrutiny by national judges, are 
subtracted only to the availability of the arbitrators and the parties. The analysis of the rules 
and of the arbitration procedures administered deserves an independent study, but for what is 
of interest here it is sufficient to highlight the lack of clarity on some issues and, at the same 
time, the lack of preclusions. To bridge the limits of the arbitration procedures administered, 
it can therefore be assumed that the Union specifies in the international agreements 
stipulating those points-access to information, publication of the rulings, participation of the 
third-which are deemed indispensable and that the procedural rules currently in force for 
administered or ad hoc arbitrations do not guarantee. It is also noted that the provision of 
procedural clauses directly in international agreements is a solution already used. The BIT 
USA model provides in fact to art. 28.3 that "the tribunal shall have the authority to accept 
and consider amicus curiae submissions from a person or entity that is not a disputing 
party"209. Clauses of similar tenor can then be included in future european BITs, perhaps 
                                                 
206E. DE BRABANDERE, NGOs and the public Interest: The legality and rationale of amicus curiae 
interventions in international economic and investment disputes, in Chicago Journal of International Law, 12 
(1), 2011, pp. 108ss. 
207E. DE BRABANDERE, NGOs and the public Interest: The legality and rationale of amicus curiae 
interventions in international economic and investment disputes, op. cit. 
208In Article. 29 of the Model BIT USA is then contained the transparency clause based on which: “(...) the 
respondent shall, after receiving the following documents, promptly tran Member Statesit them to the non-
disputing Party and make them available to the public:(a) the notice of intent;(b) the notice of arbitration; 
(c)pleadings, memorials, and briefs submitted to the tribunal by a disputing party and any written submissions 
submitted pursuant to Article 28(2) (Non-Disputing Party submissions) and (3) (Amicus Submissions) and 
Article 33 (Consolidation); (d) minutes or transcripts of hearings of the tribunal, where available; and 
(e)orders, awards, and decisions of the tribunal”. 
209The parties to the BIT may refer, potentially, to the provisions of any legal system with that expression: “(...) 
un ensemble de règles spécifiques et d’organes aptes a les appliquer, qui émerge de la formation et de l’activité 
d’un groupe social lui-même spécifique (...)". B. GOLDMAN, L’arbitre, les conflits de lois et la lex mercatoria, 
in Actes du premier colloque sur l’arbitrage commercial international, Paris, 1986, p. 8. The existence of a 
legal system therefore depends on a set of specific rules and the jurisdictional bodies that apply them, referable 
to an equally specific social group. The boundaries of the concept of legal system have been voluntarily left 
wide; it postulates an equivalence between legal system and state even if, today, this concept can also be 
applied to the international legal system-which regulates relations between states- and transnational. 
Transnational, in the sense that it will be applied exclusively to relations between individuals and private 
groups, overcoming state borders without the involvement of States. For the doctrine, inclined to place the lex 
mercatoria at the base of an autonomous, independent and separate legal system. 
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alongside those with others that require the publicity of information and the publication of 
judgments. Such forecasts would be binding on the parties and arbitrators and could be 
applied at least until the UNCITRAL transparency rules are applied, ie until the CCI or the 
CCS have similar rules. Ultimately, ad hoc arbitration conducted under UNCITRAL rules 
and administered arbitration are presented as valid alternatives to ICSID arbitration. The 
latter, although conventionally considered to be the center that offers greater guarantees to 
the investor and transparency of the proceedings, does not represent the solution for today or 
for the future. The options currently open for the Union are valid to the point that they can 
not be considered a "fallback", at least until the Washington Convention is open to  
International Organizations. 
 
10.The appeal of EU law in arbitration proceedings concerning investment: The 
conventional reference to Union law. 
 
In arbitration proceedings-as well as in national ones where the judge is examined by a 
transnational dispute-can be referred to more than one legal body; for example, the lex rei 
sitae deals with the creation and transfer of real rights, the national law of one of the parties 
is applied to assess whether there is the ability to stipulate the arbitration agreement and, 
finally, the lex loci arbitrators finds to find the conditions validity of the agreement itself in 
the absence of any explicit choice of the parties. Arbitration is a dispute resolution 
mechanism that is based on the autonomy of the parties and therefore the arbitrators must, 
firstly, look for the BIT or the contractual regulation inter partes if the State and the investor 
have identified one or more bodies of the law to be applied to resolve the dispute210. One 
speaks of one or more laws because, when a case presents links with more than one system, 
the parties, adopting the technique of depeçage, can decide to regulate it with a plurality of 
sources deriving from as many legal systems. In the absence of the express provision of the 
law, the arbitrators shall identify it according to the applicable rules of procedure. As a rule, 
in fact, any Arbitration Regulation contains a clause that indicates to the college the 
applicable law, or better, the criteria and the conditions for identifying it. In these cases, the 
process of identifying the law is divided into two phases: first the arbitrator seeks the law-
rectius, the legal body to be applied- then the content of the law which can be effectively 
applied to the case211. Based on these premises, it is necessary to assess whether, and under 
what conditions, EU law can be applied to settle disputes before an arbitrator and whether 
the arbitrator is free to apply and interpret it. In the most recent arbitration proceedings, 
incardinated in relation to the alleged violation of a european BIT or the derived contractual 
regulation, the parties' exceptions on the applicable law-normally raised by the agreed States 
                                                 
210Y. BANIFATEMI, The law applicable in investment Treaty arbitration, in C. YANNACA-SMALL (eds.), 
Arbitration under international investment agreements: A guide to the key issues, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2010, pp. 191ss. 
211Not infrequently, in the judgments hitherto raised before Arbitration Courts, the arbitrators have been 
accused for violation of both the BIT and the underlying contractual regulation; it is recalled that the questions 
on the contracts are legitimized in arbitration, to the extent that the BIT contains an umbrella clause whose 
effect is, precisely, to raise the presumed violations of the inter partes contract at the level of the treaty. In the 
AES case, for example, the Court found that it could not pronounce itself on the violation of the contract 
because, despite the Energy Charter in art. 26 foresees the umbrella clause, there are no contracting parties, 
including the defendant state in court, which have excluded its application in the disputes involving them. 
ICSID, Decision of the ad hoc Committee on the judgment for annulment of 29 June 2012, in case ARB/07/22, 
AES v. Hungary, par. 164. 
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to recall EU law and thus legitimize their conduct, in (presumed) violation of the 
international source-imposed on the referees to argue on the legitimacy of the reference to 
EU law. The multiplicity of cases in which the reference to EU law has been admitted is 
understood in light of the multifaceted nature of this normative body which is, at the same 
time, the right of an autonomous legal system, the EU law, national law of Member States 
and international law, as derived by the founding Treaties. 
This implies that EU law can be applied directly as a right of the EU system, or indirectly as 
part of the international and/or national legal system. In practice, it is noted that all 
arbitration procedure rules allow direct or indirect referral to EU law. More specifically, art. 
42.1 of the ICSID Convention distinguishes two possible situations: in the first, the parties 
explicitly refer to the rules of law that the arbitrator will apply to the dispute212.  In the 
second, the same art. 42.1 recognizes that, in the absence of explicit reference to a law, the 
arbitration panel applies the law of the State party to the dispute, including the rules of 
conflict, together with the principles of international law on the matter213. Therefore, EU law 
is applicable in the hypothesis both of optio legis made by the parties and of reference to 
international law. In the case of optio legis, the practice and the jurisprudence are unanimous 
in considering that the expression "rules of laws"-which is found in the English formulation 
of the aforementioned rule-and not "laws", gives the parties the right to refer also to the rules 
of a non-state nature, such as the principles of law, the lex mercatoria214 and also, as far as is 
relevant here, EU law215. In other words, there is no limit to the faculty to refer to non-state 
laws, since it is sufficient that the rules indicated are endowed with juridical nature, since 
they are the expression of a given legal system or of a social group. Regarding the first, art. 
35.1 of the UNCITRAL rules of procedure provides that the arbitrator makes use of the rules 
identified by the parties as the law applicable to the dispute, since, in the absence, reference 
to the right that it deems appropriate216. The clause thus formulated presents a "classical" 
structure, providing that, in the absence of precise forecasts, the judge is free to identify the 
body of law to draw from the substantive discipline to resolve the case under examination217. 
                                                 
212Z. DOULAS, J. PAUWELYN, J.E. VIŇUALES, The foundations of international investment law. Bringing a 
theory. Into practice, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014. 
213C. DUGAN, D. WALLACE, N. RUBINS, Investor-State arbitration, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011. 
Z. DOULAS, J. PAUWELYN, J.E. VIŇUALES, The foundations of international investment law. Bringing a 
theory. Into practice, op. cit. T. BROUDE, Y. SHANY, Multi sourced  equivalent norms in international law, 
Hart Publishing, Oxpord & Oregon, Portland, 2011. 
214S.A. ALEXANDROV, Reservations in unilateral declarations accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
International court of justice, ed. Brill, Leiden, 1995, pp. 10-15. 
215It seems correct the conception that the meaning of rules of law-therefore of the norms that the parties 
indicate as applicable to the case - must be interpreted in the widest possible meaning thinking: “(...) all’Etat 
hôte comme étant n système global, vivant et ouvert capable donc d’inclure, outre les dispositions d’un droit 
étranger éventuellement évoqué, les règles internationales applicables, quelles soient conventionnelles ou 
coutumières, ainsi que le droit européen primaire et secondaire en matière d’investissement pour ce qui est des 
Etats membres de l’Union. A. GIARDINA, Le developpement de l’arbitrage: les besoins spécifiques de 
l’Union européenne, in C. KASSEDJIAN (sous la direction de), op. cit., pag. 151. As for the form, it is 
believed that the parties' agreement on applicable law should be expressed; the search for an implicit 
agreement would not be necessary, providing for the same art. 42 an alternative method to find the applicable 
law in the absence of optio legis. 
216UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules of 2010, art. 35.1: “1.The arbitral tribunal shall apply the rules of law 
designated by the parties as applicable to the substance of the dispute. Failing such designation by the parties, 
the arbitral tribunal shall apply the law which it determines to be appropriate”. 
217The new version of the UNCITRAL rule provides that the arbitrators can refer to the rules of law and no 
longer to law, as it appeared in the pre-reformulation formulation of 2010. The effects of this reformulation are 
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Art. 17218 of the rules of procedure prepared by the International Chamber of Commerce 
provides that the parties can refer to the rules of law to be applied and, failing that, the 
arbitrators can refer to the appropriate rules of law. Likewise,  art. 24219 of the Rules of 
Procedure of the Chamber of Commerce of Stockholm refers to the choice of law made by 
the parties and, failing that, to the right or to the rules of law deemed appropriate - including 
international law. In all the aforementioned hypotheses, where there has been an express 
choice of the parties, EU law can be referred to either as a right directly chosen by the 
parties or as part of national law or international law. 
This second option is possible because of the peculiar and "multifaceted" nature of EU law 
which, as already mentioned, is part of the national rights of the Member States that adapt to 
it and at the same time part of international law, finding a source in an international treaty. In 
other words, and more precisely, EU law can be described as "an internal ordre juridique of 
internationale origin"220. In the disputes so far arising on european BITs, the arbitrators did 
not directly apply EU law since, under no circumstances, the arbitration clause on the law 
applicable to the dispute referred to EU law. The dichotomy of "applicable law" and "fact" 
requires some clarification. It is often invoked in discussions concerning the question of 
whether arbitrators are obliged, ex officio, to know the content of the applicable law or 
whether the dispute should be decided solely with reference to the arguments of and legal 
grounds raised by the disputing parties. Some commentators frame this issue by asking 
whether the applicable law is a matter of law to be determined by the decision maker or 
rather a fact to be proven by the parties. In this approach, applicable law is either a fact or a 
matter of law depending on the way the tribunal determines its contents. But the dichotomy 
is used in another way as well. That states may not invoke provisions of domestic law to 
justify a breach of a treaty obligation is a recognized principle of international law. In other 
words, national law is only an element of fact when a state is accused of breaching its treaty 
obligations. Similarly, when an investor raises a claim against an EU member state, the 
provisions of the BIT are the applicable law as the dispute is resolved by assessing the 
member state's actions against the provisions of the BIT (and not against EU law). The 
relevant question in the present context is whether EU law can be part of the applicable law 
in the sense that it is applied to the merits of an investment dispute. The way in which 
tribunals determine the contents of the applicable law and of the law that is considered a fact 
is a different question, and one which will not be addressed in the following221. 
                                                                                                                                                      
not really clear, since law and rules of law have a different extension. In practical terms, however, and for what 
concerns our investigation, it should continue to be possible to refer to European law, which can also be 
subsumed in the classification of rules of law. 
218For details see: F.T. SCHWARZ, A guide to the ICFR internaitonal arbitration rules, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2011, pp. 247ss. 
219F.T. SCHWARZ, A guide to the ICFR internaitonal arbitration rules, op. cit. 
220It is noted that in the case of Eastern Sugar the court affirmed that the declaration attached by the defendant - 
which should have helped to interpret the arbitration clause-actually: "explains in a contorted way what art. 8.6 
of the BIT means". Therefore, to identify the law applicable to the dispute, the Court can go beyond the literal 
meaning of the arbitration clause, considering the application of international law to be appropriate not only as 
gap-filling therefore only when the national rule conflicts with this right but also in place of the national law 
referred to. Indeed: “it is only where international law is silent that the arbitral Tribunal should consider before 
reaching any decision how non-conflicting provisions of czech law might be relavant, and of so, could be taken 
into account”. CCS, Eastern Sugar v. Chezch Republic, op. cit., par. 196-197. 
221R. DOLZER, C. SCHREUER, Principles of international investment law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2012, pp. 290ss. Y. BANIFATEMI, The law applicable in investment Treaty arbitration, in K. YANNACA-
SMAL (ed.), Arbitration under international investment agreements: A guide to the key issues, Oxford 
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However, it is noted that doubts have arisen about the possibility of indirect referral to EU 
law as part of national or international law, referred to by the parties222. With regard to the 
first hypothesis, EU law may be applied in so far as the parties have decided to submit the 
case to the national law of a State which is a member of the Union. EU law, indeed, 
constitutes a supranational right but, once it has entered national law due to the adaptation 
procedures of Member States, it becomes national law itself223. When the choice falls on the 
right of an internal legal system, it includes all the sources of law present in the same. EU 
law can therefore detect both the fundamental principles and secondary sources incorporated 
into national law; equally, EU law can be recalled through the mechanism of conflict rules of 
the national system chosen by the parties. In the latter case, the arbitrators, starting from the 
rules of conflict of the national law referred to, may find in the european legal system the 
substantive rules to be applied to the case in question. In practical terms this means that, 
having chosen the legal system in which to search for the applicable law, the latter could 
refer to secondary EU law, which should therefore be used to regulate the case, or to the 
conflict rules contained in the European Regulations which will identify the law to be 
applied to the dispute. EU law can be referred to indirectly as international law, to which the 
arbitration clause expressly refers224. This legal corpus originates from the founding Treaties 
which are international treaties, regardless of whether they have created an autonomous 
regional system. This means that EU law is all international law. It is international law not 
only primary law, therefore the founding Treaties and general principles, but also secondary 
law, just as it has been established since the beginning of EU. The arbitral tribunal in the 
Electrabel case considered that "all legal rules are part of a regional system of international 
law and therefore have an international legal character"225. From this it follows that, when an 
arbitration clause refers, for example, to "the law in force of the contracting party concerned, 
the provisions of this agreement"226 could be referring to EU law227. The arbitrators 
acknowledged that EU law can be applied as part of the international law referred to but, as 
part of national law, it is only relevant as a fact228. 
In the Eureko case, the Court justified the reference to EU law, considering that "in principle 
EU law appears to fall within the scope of the first two and the last bullet point (of arbitral 
clause). Accordingly, the Tribunal considers that in principle the EU legal doctrines, 
including those of supremacy, precedence, direct effect, direct applicability are part of the 
                                                                                                                                                      
University Press, Oxford, 2010, pp. 192ss. 
222ICSID, Electrabel v. Hungary, op. cit., par. 4118. Secondo Alland il diritto dell’Unione è “droit interne 
d’origine internationale”. D. ALLAND, “Le juge français et le droit d’origine internationale”, in Y. KERBAT, 
P.M. DUPUY (ed.), Droit international et droit interne dans la jurisprudence comparée du Conseil 
constitutionnel et du Conseil d’Etat, LGDG, Paris, 2001, pp. 47-59. 
223CJEU, joined cases: C-415/05 P, Kadi & Al Barakaat Int'l Foundation v. Council of 8 November 2008, 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:11. I-06351. See also: CJEU, C-124/95, Queen v. HM Treasury and Bank of England of 14 
January 1997, ECLI:EU:C:1997:8, I-00081, parr. 56-61. Given the content of Article 103 of the UN Charter 
and the nature of Chapter VII resolutions, it is safe to say that this case law has no bearing vis-a-vis member 
state BITs. 
224In case Van Gend en Loos the CJEU stated that: “the community constitutes a new legal order of 
international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights (...)”, CJEU, 26/62, Van 
Gend en Loos of 5 February 1963, op. cit., p. 12. 
225ICSID, Electrabel v. Hungary, op. cit., par. 4.122 
226Art. 8.6 of BIT between Olanda and Czech Repubblic and Slovak, 1992. 
227Art. 8.6 of BIT between Olanda and Czech Repubblic and Slovak, 1992. 
228ICSID, Elctrabel v. Hungary, op. cit., par. 4.127 ss. 
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EU law that might fall to be applied by the Tribunal in this case under art. 8.6, BIT"229. It is 
noted that in two arbitration proceedings EU law was referred to as fact. In the Summit 
Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erdma Kft. v. Republic of Hungary (AES) case has made 
it clear that the agreement between the parties clearly referred, as applicable law, to the 
Energy Charter Treaty230 as well as to the principles of international law, but recognized that 
EU law can be considered as fact "Community law, including Community competition law, 
is considered the equivalent of internal or municipal law for the purpose of the proceeding. 
Community law is thus merely a fact to be considered by the tribunal when determining the 
law applicable (...)"231. 
EU law was referred only to help the referees in the qualification of the case in question. EU 
law thus becomes an instrument for identifying material norms suitable for framing the case 
in question. Ultimately, the arbitrators, starting from the arbitration clause, can conclude that 
they have to apply EU law. The reference to this right, if and within the limits in which it is 
realized, is functional to resolve the dispute, so it detects to qualify the case and regulate it. 
EU law must help the judge in the hermeneutic-interpretative activity, adding elements to 
arrive at the solution of the case. On the other hand, the reference to EU law does not imply 
that the arbitrators judge whether the party's conduct is contrary to it232. The application of 
EU law can not become an abuse. And indeed, since the subject of the examination of the 
arbitrators is the compatibility of a conduct with respect to the provisions of an international 
agreement or an investment contract, EU law, like national and international, detects if and 
to the extent to which it expressly recalled or, as will be seen below, if identified by the 
arbitrators as a right to be applied in the absence of choice of the parties. Like the other 
sources mentioned above, it can not be imposed only for its classical attributes, primacy and 
direct applicability, which are valid only in intra-european relations and, with very different 
intensity, in external relations233. 
 
                                                 
229CPA, Eureko v. The Republic Slovak, cit. Par. 289. In the same spirit see also: Micula & Ors v. Romania & 
Anor (2017) Bus LR 1147, (2017) WLR(D) 35, (2017) EWHC 31 (Comm) (20 January 2017). Jiangsu 
Shagang Group Co Ltd v. Loki Owning Company Ltd., (2018) EWHC 330 (Comm), parr. 13-14; GPF GP 
S.à.r.l. v Republic of Poland, (2018) EWHC 409, parr. 64-72. 
230E. BONAFÉ, G. METE, Escalated interactions between EU energy law and the Energy Charter Treaty, in 
The Journal of World Energy Law and Business, 9 (1), 2016,  pp. 176ss. 
231ICSID, AES v. Hungary, op. cit., par. 7.3.4. It required to add to the ECT an additional condition not 
provided, see: Final Award, 21 January 2016,SCC Case No V062/2012 Charanne v. Spain, parr. 440-445; 
Decision on Jurisdiction, 6 June 2016, ICSID Case No ARB/13/30 RREEF v. Spain, par. 79ss; Award, 17 July 
2016, SCC Case V2013/153 Isolux v Spain, parr. 641-260; Award, 27 December 2016, ICSID Case No 
ARB/14/3 Blusun v. Italy, parr. 277-291; Award, 4 May 2017, ICSID Case No ARB/13/3 6 Eiser Infrastructure 
v. Spain, parr. 179-207. 
232In case Eureko the tribunal specified however that: “(...) is confined to ruling upon alleged breaches of the 
BIT. The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to rule on alleged breaches of EU law as such. The manner and 
extent to which that clear and fixed limitation on the jurisdiction of the Tribunal may impact upon the cases 
presented by the parties will become clear at the merits stage (...)” CPA, Eureko v. The Repubblic Slovak, op. 
cit., par. 290. 
233One can then hypothesize the reference of European law also through the reference to art. 31.3.c of the 
Vienna Convention, 1969 which provides for the systematic interpretation of the Treaties. According to this 
approach, from the lex specialis-that contained in the Treaty-we move on to the general context and, therefore, 
to the superordinate forecasts that can be applied to the case in question by the judges / arbitrators. From this 
perspective, it could be accepted that the provisions of a BIT are also interpreted in the light of EU law, since 
the latter is part of the legal system. See also: H. DE WAELE, Layered global player. Legal dynamic of EU 
external relations, ed. Springer, Berlin, 2011. 
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11.Application of EU law in case of absence of an explicit choice of law. 
 
EU law may be applied by arbitrators as a source of the right deemed appropriate to the case 
or as part of international law if the latter can be referred to234. In this regard, we have 
already said that art. 42.1 of the ICSID Convention states that if the parties do not expressly 
refer to the applicable law, the court applies not only the law of the contracting parties but 
also "such rules and principle of international law as may be applicable"235. This provision 
defines a hierarchy between the two sources - the national one and the international one - in 
the sense that the second one is applied only after the relevant national law has been 
identified236. Conversely, if the dispute concerns a breach of contract, art. 42 identifies, as 
applicable, the lex contractus - since these are inter-individual legal relationships-and the 
rules of private international law237. Having said that, it is interesting to understand the 
limits within which international law-and therefore also the EU law to be recalled to regulate 
this second type of relationship between the parties, should they not expressly refer to the 
applicable law238. In this regard, it is noted that a "both corrective" and "integrative" role is 
recognized in international law239. In the first case, international law operates only after the 
applicable law has been identified by the parties or by the courts-in this sense it is possible 
to find an analogy with the limit of public order240. With the "corrective" function of 
international law, it is intended, in fact, the possibility of curbing the application of national 
law, if "the conduct of the host State is formally correct in light of the applicable contractual 
law, but is in contrast with certain standards of protection investments, contained in 
                                                 
234If the dispute concerns a treaty claim, international law applies its own force and without the art. 42.1 
performs the recall function: for example, the VCLT must necessarily be applied to solve problems, perhaps 
interpretative, of the BIT between the parties. S.R. CUENDET, Les investissements intracommunautaires entre 
droit communautaire et Accord internationaux sur l’investissement: concilier l’inconciliable?, in Revue 
Générale de Droit International Privé, 115 (4), 2011, pp. 854ss. 
235According to english formulation: “and such rules of (...)” in french: “ansi que les principe de droit 
international (...)”. It is not clear whether the French translation reduces the scope of applicability of 
international law. However, as noted “(...) au niveau de la pratique per les commentateurs et par la 
jurisprudence des Tribunaux CIRDI semblent d’accord pour affirmer que tant les principes généraux que le 
droit conventionnel doivent être respectés et appliquées par le Tribunaux CIRDI”. A. GIARDINA, Le 
developpement de l’arbitrage: les besoins spécifiques de l’Union européenne, in C. KASSEDJIAN, op. cit., p. 
151. 
236See the case: Ioan Micula: “Pursuant to art. 42.2 of the ICSID Convention the Tribunal will certainly apply 
residually international law if the other applicable rules are silent or obscure or are eventually determined not 
to apply ratione temporis”. Tribunal ICSID, Decision on jurisdictionn and admissibility, in case ARB/05/20, 
Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula et al. v. Romania. 
237Article. 42 sometimes has the function of a norm of conflict, and this happens only when there are relations 
of a private nature. Otherwise: "The art. 42 can not be considered a rule of private international law, primarily 
referring to the national law of the host state. In fact, the privatistic nature of legal situations constitutes (...) the 
foundation and the limit of international private law. When the controversy concerns situations (...) originating 
in international law - such as the violation of the treatment standards laid down in the treaty-there is no room 
for a rule to rule intro "The reference:" to the right international alongside the lex contractus has the function of 
ensuring a certain stability of the regulatory framework to which the agreement is subject, which otherwise 
could be changed unilaterally to the State party to the detriment of the investor (...)". 
238C. SCHREUER, Investment Disputes, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 2009, pp. 
6ss. 
239H. DE WAELE, Layered global player. Legal dynamic of EU external relations, op. cit. 
240See in particular: E. LOUIN, El orden pùblico y el arbitraje, Editorial Universidad del Rosario, Bogotà, 
2017. 
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international, customary or contractual norms"241. That function does not imply a correction, 
in the technical sense of the wording, of the applicable national law, but the non-application 
of the national provisions which the court is required to apply but which are incompatible 
with international law242. From this it follows the replacement of national rules with 
international, conventional and customary rules, within the limits, obviously, where the 
former are in contrast with the latter. 
On the other hand, the term "integrative" refers to when international law intervenes in the 
presence of gaps in the applicable national law243. The integrative function reflects the fact 
that the areas of operation of the two sets of norms- national and international-are distinct, 
since the first rule inter-individual relations while the second relations between States244. 
Precisely for this reason, international law is applied after the search for the national law 
applicable to the specific case has taken place. In the light of the foregoing, EU law can be 
applied as a conventional international right. In this perspective, EU law is applied through 
mechanisms to fill the gaps in national law or, where appropriate, to correct it. In practical 
terms and assuming a hierarchy of sources from which to draw in the absence of the parties' 
express choice, the arbitrators called to settle a dispute over a contractual regulation must 
first seek the applicable national law, and then integrate it, or correct it, with international 
law that is EU law. 
With regard to arbitration systems for the resolution of disputes other than ICESID, it should 
be noted that the clauses on the applicable law contained in the UNCITRAL procedure rules, 
as well as the ICC and CCS administered arbitrations, do not refer to international law245. 
                                                 
241For an example of substitution of national rules in contrast with the national referral: Tribunal ICSID, award 
of 17 February 2000, in case ARB/96/1, Compania del desarollo de Santa Elena v. Costa Rica. See also: M. 
SZPUANR, Referrals of preliminary questions by arbitral Tribunals to the ECJ, in F. FERRARI (ed.), The 
impact of EU law on international commercial arbitration, in Juris 2017, pp. 85ss. 
242The ICSID system does not allow non-liquid rulings. From this it follows that the arbitrators, in the presence 
of gaps in the national law referred to, must find the norm to be applied in international law. Obviously: “the 
arbitrators should not reach the conclusion that there are gaps in applicable law too swiftly. It is only for those 
particular parts of the dispute where a true lacuna exists that a Tribunal would be authorized to apply 
international law”. G.R. DELAUME, The pyramids stand-the pharaos can rest in peace, in ICSID Review, 8, 
1993. 
243In case LETCO the Tribunal ICSID recognized that: “the law of the Contracting State is recognized as 
paramount within its own territory, but it is nevertheless subject to control by international law”. ICSID, 
ARB/83/2, Liberian Eastern Timber Corporation v. Republic of Liberia, final award  (31 March 1986), par. 
658. 
244E. GAILLARD, Y. BANIFATEMI, The meaning of "and" in Article 42(1), Second sentence, of the 
Washington Convention: The role of international law in the ICSID choice of law process, in ICSID Review-
Foreign Investment Law Journal, 18, 2003, pp. 392ss. 
245The ruropean jurisprudence has always recognized that the EU respects the principles of international law. In 
a passage from the Poulson ruling we read that: "the position of the Community in relation to the law of the 
European Community must respect international law in the exercise of its power and (...)consequently, the 
relevant Community rule must be interpreted, and its scope of the relevant rule of the international law of the 
sea (law applied in this case). CJEU, C-286/90, Anklagemindigheden v. Poulsen and Diva Navigation of 24 
November 1992, ECLI:EU:C:1992:453, I-06019. In the Räcke case, then, the international custom is applied, 
indirectly, as an instrument to interpret and legitimize a european principle: “the Community had to respect 
international law in the exercise of its powers and was required to comply with the rules of customary 
international law when adopting a regulation suspending the trade concession granted by an agreement. It 
followed that the customary international rules concerning the termination and the suspension of Treaty 
relations by reason of a fundamental change of circumstances were binding upon the Community institutions 
and formed part of the Community legal order (...)”. CJEU, C-162/96, Räcke c. Hauptzollamt Mainz of 16 
June 1998,  ECLI:EU:C:1998:293, p. I-03655. See in argument. P.C. MÜLLER-GRAFF, O. NESTAD, The 
rising complexity of european law, BWN Berliner Wissenschafts Verlag, Berlin, 2014, pp. 105ss. 
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Therefore, in the absence of a specific reference to international law contained in the BITs or 
in the contractual regulation, EU law, as international law, can be called only if the rules of 
the former are considered relevant to resolve the case246. It is noted that when EU law is 
referred to as part of international law, it is applied to the extent that it does not conflict with 
the principles of international law and the rules that govern the relationship between 
conventional international sources and between conventional and customary sources. EU 
law must therefore respect the principles of international law and, at the same time, can not 
prevail over a conventional international source, if the latter has been signed after the first 
(lex posterior posterior derogation priori principle). This limitation is justified in the light of 
the fact that the european legal system when it is referred to in external relations is subject to 
all the rules which apply to the international legal system, of which it is a part. 
In Eureko case, the Court ruled that, taking into account that its jurisdiction is rooted in BIT, 
the consequences of the application of EU law must be assessed "within the framework of 
the rules of the international law and not in disregard of those rules"247. On the basis of all 
the foregoing, it can be concluded by claiming that EU law is one of the rights that the 
arbitrators can identify as applicable to the case in question. For the sake of completeness, 
however, it should be noted that the choice to apply it as part of national law or as part of 
international law produces different political consequences. The first is the perspective 
preferred by the European Institutions, as it confirms the primacy of EU law on the rights of 
Member States, from a federalist point of view which places the Union at the top. On the 
other hand, the prospect of applying EU law as international law finds the consensus of 
Member States, since it respects the autonomy of each of them to define their external 
relations with third countries. The judgments incardinated before courts of arbitration have 
up to now had rulings only on jurisdiction; the problem of the applicable law has therefore 
had a rather marginal role, as it is an issue that is relevant in merit phase248. 
 
12.Prevalence of international obligations in the european perspective. Choice required 
or optional? 
 
The double perspective is useful, since arbitration disputes can arise both from agreements 
signed in mixed form, from Union and Member States, and from agreements of which only 
Member States is a member. In order to resolve the conflict between european and 
international sources, it is therefore essential to evaluate whether, and to what extent, the 
Union and Member States are bound to respect international obligations and which rank they 
assume in the relationship between the sources of the two laws on recalled. As for the 
perspective of the Union, the relationship between international and EU law can be qualified 
                                                 
246CPA, Eureko v. The Repubblic Slovak, op. cit., par. 220ss. 
247CJEU: C-41/74, Van Duyn v. Home Office of 4 December 1974, ECLI:EU:C:1974:133, I-01337; joined 
cases C-89,104,114,116,117 and 125 129/85, Ahlström  Osakaytiö and others v. Commission of the European 
Communities of 27 September 1988, ECLI:EU:C:1988:447, I-05193; T-115/94, Opel Austria v. Council of 22 
January 1997, ECLI:EU:C:1998:3, I-00039. For details see: R. BIEBER, F. MAIANI, Précis de droit européen, 
ed. Stämpfli, Berne, 2011. 
248“the case in this area is very much the counter part of the case on the direct effect and supremacy of the 
Treaties and of internal legislation, the defining features of european ConstitutionaliMember States”. P. 
EECKHOUT, EU external relations Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011, pp. 435ss. A. VON 
BOGDANDY, M. KOTTMAN, C. ANTPHÖLER, J. DICKCHEN, D. HENTREI, M. SMARKOU, Reverse 
solange- protecting the essence of fundamental rights against EU Member States, in Common Market Law 
Review, 49, 2012, pp. 490ss. 
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on a par with that between the EU and Member States, in the light of the theory of limits and 
counter-limits249. The European Institutions are bound both to the international agreements 
signed by the Union and to customary international law and to the principles of international 
law, insofar as such sources do not conflict with european fundamental rights250. 
As regards the international treaties signed by the Union, the CJEU jurisprudence has 
always recognized that the Union is interpreted in accordance with Finnish and therefore EU 
law. The CJEU instead recognized the incompatibility between the provisions of the two 
regulatory sources-the BIT and the law of the Union-arguing that the first could not be 
interpreted also in the light of EU law. The CJEU maintains that BIT's forecasts must be 
interpreted in the light of the VCLT and be bound by international patent law to which it 
belongs251. International agreements are part of the european internal legal order and, in the 
order of sources within this system, take the same rank as secondary legislation. Obviously, 
this is done as long as the formal conditions are respected and, therefore, the Union-like the 
State law (national law)-is bound to the international treaty on the condition that it has given 
valid consent and that it has entered into within its own limits. The jurisprudence then 
acknowledged that, under certain conditions, the international agreements signed by the 
Union have direct effect. More specifically, if the treaties "establish a clear and precise 
obligation that is not subordinate to execution or effects, to the intervention of any further 
act"252, the individual can assert the rights that derive from him by the international 
agreement before any national court, or may challenge the european legislative act which is 
not in conformity with the international source. As in the relationship between the EU and 
Member States, the direct applicability of international law within the EU is conditioned by 
the character of the rules contained in international agreements that must be precise, clear 
and unconditional. The control over the characteristics of the obligations deriving from an 
international agreement is delegated to CJEU253. 
                                                 
249CJEU, C-118/07, European Commission v. Finland, op. cit., parr. 39ss. See, P. KOUTRAKOS, EU 
international relations law, Hart Publishing, Oxford & Oregon, Portland, 2015, pp. 337ss. 
250CJEU, C-366/10,  Air Transport Association of America and others of 21 December 2011, 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:864, I-13755. 
251CJEU, C-104/81, Hauptzollamant Mainz v. C.A. Kupferberger & Cie KG of 26 October 1982, 
ECL:EU:C:1982:362, I-03641; the Advocate General Van Gerven in his opinion to the Banks case clarifies 
that: "a rule has direct effect when it is sufficiently clear to complete that it can be directly applied by a court", 
C-128/92, Banks v. British Coal of 13 April 1994, ECLI:EU:C:1994:860, I-01209. In the same spirit the 
opinion of Prechal: “direct effect is the obligation of a court or another authority to apply the relevant provision 
of Community Law, either as a norm which govern the case or as a standard for legal review”, in S. 
PRECHAL, Directives in EC Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, pp. 241ss. C. BLUMANN, L. 
DUBOUIS, Droit institutionnel de l’Union européenne, LexisNexis, Paris, 2013, pp. 478ss. C. BOUTAYEB, 
Droit institutionnel de l’Union européenne: Institutions, Ordre juridique et Contentieux, LGDJ, Paris, 2014, pp. 
119-125. 
252C. BOUTAYEB, Droit institutionnel de l’Union européenne: Institutions, Ordre juridique et Contentieux, op. 
cit. 
253However, it is noted that in some cases the European court has denied the direct effect of international 
agreements on the grounds that it is mainly political. In this regard, it is noted that the Court excluded that the 
provisions contained in the WTO Agreement and in the Montego Bay Convention have direct effect; in both 
cases, denying the direct applicability of the rules contained therein, the ECJ has chosen to protect itself from 
international law, subjecting the application of the international source to the intervention of the European 
Legislator and thus restraining the "uncontrolled" entry of the international law in the European system. Fro the 
jurisprudence see: CJEU, C-68/89, Nikajima all precision Co. Ltd v. Council of european Communities of 7 
May 1991, ECLI:EU:C:1991:433 I-2069; C-149/96, Portugal v. Council of 23 November 1999, 
ECLI:EU:C:574, I-08395; C-280/93, Germany v. Council of the EU of 5 October 1994, ECLI:EU:C:1994:367,  
I-04973, parr. 110-111; C-70/87, Fediol v. Commission of 22 June 1989, ECLI:EU:C:1989:254,  I-01781. C-
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With regard to counter-limits, it is noted that international law does not apply 
unconditionally. EU agrees to bind itself to international law by giving up part of its 
sovereignty within the limits, however, of the respect of fundamental european principles 
that can not be violated by the international juridical corpus. In Kadi case254, the CJEU 
considered the provisions of Regulation no. 881/2002255, implementing Resolutions n. 1267 
and 1333 of the United Nations Security Council. The CJEU reached this conclusion on the 
premise that "the U.N. system may not be counted on adequately safeguarding fundamental 
rights as the Courts conceives them"256. The integration of international law into the 
european system can therefore be enshrined in the concept of Unionisation: international law 
accesses the EU law without conditions, provided that these are jus cogens standards and 
within the limits set by the EU constitutional set of values in all other cases257. 
                                                                                                                                                      
366/10, Air Transport Association of America (ATAA) and others v. Secretary of State for Energy and Climare 
Change of 21 December 2011, ECLI:EU:C:2011:864, I-13755, par. 49. For details see: S. BOGOJEVIĆ, 
Legalising environmental leadership: A comment on the CJEU's ruling in C-366/10 on the inclusion of aviation 
in the EU emissions trading scheme, in Journal of Environmental Law, 24 (2), 2012, pp. 346ss. In particular 
see in argument: “if the European legal order unilaterally introduced direct applicability, it would entail reverse 
discrimination, that is discrimination against domestic producers”, according to: A. VON BOGDANDY, 
Pluralism, direct effect and the ultimate say:on the relationship between international and domestic 
constitutional law, in International Journal of Constitutional law, 6 (3/4), 2008, pp. 398ss. per altri, poi, “giving 
direct effect to an international agreement may involve submitting to the case law of a international court or 
tribunal”. For the agreement WTO see: CJEU, joined cases C-21/72 and 24/72, International Fruit Company 
n.v. And others v. Produktshap voor Groenten en Fruit of 12 December 1972, ECLI:EU:C:1972:115 I-01219; 
C-308/06, The Queen on the application of international Association of independent tanker (Intertanko) and 
others c. Secretary of State for Transport of 3 June 2008, ECLI:EU:C:2008:312, I-04057, par. 65: “it must be 
found that UNCLOS does not establish rules intended to apply directly and immediately to individuals and 
confer upon them rights or freedom capable of being relied upon against States (...) the absence of individual 
rights and obligations, together with the nature and the broad logic of UNCLOS prevents the Court from being 
able to assess the validity of a Community measure in the light of that Convention”. For details see. P. 
KOUTRAKOS, EU international relations law, Hart Publishing, Oxford & Oregon, Portland, 2015, pp. 337ss. 
N. FOSTER, EU law directions, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016. A. THIES, International trade disputes 
and Europan Union liability, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013. D.A.O. EDWARD, R. LANE, 
Edward and Lane on EU law, Edward Elgar Publishers, Cheltenham, 2013. 
254CJEU, joined cases: C-415/05 P, Kadi & Al Barakaat Int'l Foundation v. Council of 8 November 2008, op. 
cit. 
255M. FEINBERG, Sovereignty in ther age of global terrorism. The role of International Organisations, 
Brill/Nijhoff, Leiden/Boston, 2016. 
256joined cases: C-415/05 P, Kadi & Al Barakaat Int'l Foundation v. Council of 8 November 2008, 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:461, I-6351. For details see, R. UERPMANN-WITTZACK, Rechtsfragen und 
Rechtsfolgendes Beitritts der Europäischen Union zur EMRK, in Europarecht, 2012, pp. 167ss. C. NOWAK, 
Europarecht nach Lissabon, ed. Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2011. D. CHALMERS, G. DAVIES, G. MONTI, EU 
law, Cambridge University Press, Cambidge, 2014. J. TILLOTSON, N. FOSTER, Text, cases and materials on 
EU law, Gavedish Publishing, New York, 2013. M. HORSPOOL, M. HUMPHREYS, EU law, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2012, pp. 552ss. SATZGER, International and european criminal law, Hart 
Publishing, Oxford & Oregon, Portland, 2017. T. OPPERMANN, C.D. CLASSEN, M. NETTESHEIM, 
Europarecht, C.H. Beck, München, 2016. 
257CJEU, C-366/10, ATA v. Secretary of State for Energy and climate change of 21 December 2011, 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:864, I-13755, "(...) it follows that the validity of a Union act can be undermined by its 
incompatibility with those rules of international law. If that invalidity is invoked before a national court, the 
Court checks-as requested by the referring court in its first question - whether certain conditions are met in the 
case before it, in order to determine whether, under the 'art. 267 TFEU, it is possible to examine the validity of 
the contested Union law act in the light of the rules of international law relied on "parr. 50 to 51. R. 
SCHÜTZE, T. TRIDIMAS, Oxford principles of EU Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018. C. 
BARNARD, S. PEERS, EU law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017, pp. 788ss. C. TIETJE, The status of 
international in the European legal order: the case of international Treaties and non-binding international 
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The CJEU reserves the right to exercise direct control over respect for fundamental rights by 
the EU Institutions or indirectly, through the referral system, which allows national courts to 
submit any questions concerning the compatibility of international law with EU law258. The 
only limit, such as to justify the non-application of an international standard, consists in the 
exception of european public order, or in the existence of a european standard of application 
necessary. In a consistent sense, the arbitration boards were also expressed in two recent 
cases involving european BITs. The acceptance of the exceptions relating to public policy 
prevented the arbitrators from ruling on the conflict between the two legal systems and, in 
particular, on the obligation of Member State to make EU law or international obligations 
prevail; question, the latter, which is strictly internal to the relations between EU and 
Member States259. In particular, in the appeal judgment of AES award-introduced by the 
unsuccessful party to the outcome of the arbitral proceedings instituted before an ICSID 
tribunal-the plaintiff claimed that the question of legality under Hungarian and EU law was a 
significant issue in the original proceedings, having been raised at the hearing and having 
received substantial attention in their written submissions. According to AES, the evidential 
the ad hoc Committee did not accept the appellant's objection and denied the reference to 
EU law, specifying that, even if this had been applied, the outcome of the negative dispute 
for the actress-company would not have changed. More specifically, the ad hoc Committee 
has decided that "the question of legality under Hungarian and EU law was a significant 
issue in the original proceedings, having been raised at the hearing and having received 
substantial attention in their written submissions. According to AES, the evidential weight 
that such a finding would have had renders the issue outcome-determinative"260. The ad hoc 
Committee did not accept the appellant's objection and denied the reference to EU law, 
specifying that, even if this had been applied, the outcome of the negative dispute for the 
actress-company would not have changed. More specifically, the ad hoc Committee has 
decided that "(...) Hungary been motivated to reintroduce price regulation with a view to 
                                                                                                                                                      
instrument, in J. WOUTERS, A. NOLLKAEMPER, E. DE WET (eds.), The europeanization of international 
law: The status of international law in the EU and its Member States, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2008. 
258It is noted that the opening that EU law shows towards international law also has political implications, as it 
reflects the increasingly active role of the Union on the international scene. It seems that one is happening, if it 
can be defined as "restructuring" of the relationship between international and European law. Rather than 
focusing on the direct or less direct effect of international law on the European one, it seems more important to 
question the conditions under which a provision outside a given system confers rights, or intends to do so, to 
individuals. Focusing on rights makes it possible to better assess what remedies can be in the event of a 
conflict between the internal EU law and a law that originates in a foreign system-ubi ius, ibi remedium. The 
rights of individuals are taking an increasingly central role in the European dimension. This is confirmed by 
some recent rulings which, adopting the criterion of balancing rights, opt for a solution to the dispute which is 
more inclined to protect individual rights. See from the CJEU: C-260/89, ERT of 18 June 1981, 
ECLI:EU:C:1981:254, I-02925; C-112/00, Schimderberger of 12 June 2003, ECLI:EU:C.2003:333, I-05659;  
C-36/02, Omega Spielhallen of 14 October 2004, ECLI:EU:C:2004:614,  I-09609 In the event of conflicts 
between two forecasts, it no longer seeks a balance between fundamental rights and economic freedoms-
important in the cases in question. On the contrary, on the basis of the very foundations of the Community 
legal order concept, the Court unconditionally defends fundamental values, regardless of potential conflicts 
that may result from freedom and economic rights. On the other hand, as correctly observed: “no mature 
constitutional order is willing to accept such international law pre-eminence, in the absence of equivalent 
standards at the international level”, according to P. EECKHOUT, EU external relations law, op. cit., pp. 43ss. 
P. CRAIG, G. DE BÚRCA, EU law. Text, cases and materials, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011. 
259ICSID, AES v. Hungary, op. cit., par. 7.6.7.-7.6.9; ICSID, EDF v. Hungary, op. cit.. 
260ICSID, Decision of the ad hoc Committee on the judgment in annulment of 29 June 2012, in causa 
ARB/07/22, AES v. Hungary, par. 164. 
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addressing the EC’s state aid concerns,261 there is no doubt that this would have constituted a 
rational public policy measure (...)"262. 
In EDF case263, the arbitrators noted the existence of a public interest capable of legitimizing 
the introduction of the Member States measure and concluded that "GEO (the measure 
introduced by the defendant State) although possibly aiming as well toward a gradual 
alignment with the EU system, was certainly prompted by the need to fight corruption, as 
indicated by the Substations Note and as confirmed by the foregoing circumstances. 
GEO104 was therefore a measure falling within the police power of the State, taken in the 
public interest (...)"264. 
By transferring the reasoning on the level of the investment agreements of which the Union 
is also a member, the conduct assumed by a Member State in violation of an international 
obligation, but respecting a european constraint, can be justified only in the presence of a 
forecast of public order or a necessary enforcement rule, which constitute conditions 
impeding the recognition of the binding nature of an external source. In light of this last 
consideration, the solution adopted in AES and Electrabel disputes in which the arbitrators 
have prevailed over the rules of the Energy Charter Treaty over the european ones265. This is 
because, in those cases, the conflict did not concern the violation of a european public order 
standard or of necessary application nor could the prevalence of EU obligations be sustained 
as the lex specialis-criterion admitted by international law to establish an order of sources 
below the jus cogens. The arbitrators exclude the primary application of EU law, noting that 
the Energy Charter Treaty266 contains art. 16 a provision expressly indicating the criteria for 
                                                 
261T. KENDE, Arbitral awards classified as State Aid under EU Law, 1 in Elite Law Journal, 1, 2015, pp. 38ss. 
262In case AES the arbitrators were asked about the relationship between European obligations and obligations 
deriving from the Charter; to resolve the controversies, the colleges therefore had to assess whether there was 
any incompatibility between the two sources and, if so, which of the two to prevail. In both judgments, the 
defendant states sought to demonstrate the legitimacy of their conduct in the light of European law. More 
specifically, Member States have pointed out that if they acted in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, 
they would violate European law, thus assuming that the former are in conflict with the latter. The Member 
States, therefore, not only detect the conflict between the forecasts of the two sources but resolve it in the light 
of the primacy of European law. 
263ICSID, Award of 8 October 2009, in case ARB/05/13, EDF (Services) Limited v. Romania. 
264ICSID, Award of 8 October 2009, in case ARB/05/13, EDF (Services) Limited v. Romania, par. 292. 
265The arbitral College deny the confiscation and for it the pre-eminence of the European obligations on those 
of the Charter. To arrive at this conclusion, the referees perform an argument that develops on two floors. First, 
they state that the inter partes relationship is governed by the provisions of the Charter, secondly, they 
recognize that any conflicts between sources are resolved as prescribed in the conflict rule contained in the 
Charter without having to operate, therefore, any conciliation between the sources. In the AES judgment, for 
example, the College recognizes the primacy of the Charter and excludes the need to assess the conduct of the 
respondent State in the light of EU law provided that the measures introduced by the State are to be considered 
and taken into account as a relevant fact". ICSID, AES v. Hungary, par. 7.6.12. In the Electrabel case, the Court 
found that the only possible conflict between sources that can be found concerns the absence, in this second, of 
the arbitration clause. However, becoming part of the Charter, the EU has accepted the possibility of being able 
to be brought before an arbitral court in a dispute against both a foreign and European investor. Since there is 
no disconnect clause in the Charter and, on the contrary, it is envisaged that in case of conflict with the 
provisions of an international agreement the Charter's forecasts prevail if more favorable to the investor, then 
there is no conflict between the provisions of the two sources of law and there is no need to harmonize the 
arbitration clause of the Charter with European law. The conduct of the Member State, although bound by a 
European obligation, must therefore be interpreted in the light of the provisions of the Energy Charter and, 
therefore, can be scrutinized by an arbitration panel because “there is in this case no true conflit between the 
provisions of the ECT and the mandatory public policy EU competition law”. ICSID, AES v. Hungary, op. cit., 
par. 7.2.5. 
266K. HOBÉR, Investment arbitration and the Energy Charter Treaty, in Journal of International Dispute 
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effect267 of which, in the event of a conflict between sources, the one prevailing must be 
identified268.  From the aforementioned provision, EU law could not have prevailed, given 
that the protection afforded by the latter to the investor is less extensive than the one 
prepared by international source-rectius the Energy Charter Treaty. 
 
13.Competition of obligations between international and EU law. The composition by 
the referees. 
 
In the absence of a certain criterion for resolving ex ante antinomies, and therefore at the 
level of relationships between systems, it is believed that the resolution of conflicts must be 
delegated to the arbitrators. It is hypothesized that they can focus on the antinomy between 
the individual forecasts, adopting the interpretative tools at their disposal. In this regard, two 
options can be proposed. On the one hand, if possible, the presumed antinomy could be 
composed by finding a balance between the forecasts of the sources; on the other hand, in 
the case of conflicts that are not otherwise modular, the arbitrator could identify the solution, 
legitimizing the conduct of the respondent State in the light of the european public order or 
of a necessary implementing rule. As for the first option, one wonders about the ways in 
which the arbitrators can resolve conflicts between the sources that are applied in the trial. In 
this regard, it is noted that in the arbitration judgments in which the relationship between 
two juridical bodies emerged, before deciding on the primacy of one source over the other, 
an attempt was made to adopt a solution of conciliation or harmonic interpretation of the two 
sources. In  ADC Affiliate case269, for example, the panel found that the measure introduced 
by the defendant State went beyond the provisions of Directive 96/97270,  which provided 
that air traffic control and airport operations were managed by two separate operators. The 
respondent State had in fact introduced a provision that implied the expropriation of a 
project of two Cypriot investors for the management of the restructuring and control 
operations of the Budapest airport. However, the arbitrator found that in order to align with 
the provisions of EU law, it would have been sufficient to deprive the investor of only one of 
the two powers mentioned above and therefore condemned the respondent State by having 
the latter unjustifiably violated the international agreement. This argument dissolves the 
                                                                                                                                                      
Settlement, 1 (1), 2010, pp. 154ss. 
267Lauder (Ronald S) v. Czech Republic (3 September 2001), 14(3) World Trade & Arbitration Materials 35 
(2003); CME Republic BV v. Czech Republic (13 September 2001), 14(3) World Trade & Arbitration 
Materials. See for more detail, J. D’AGOSTINO, O. JONES, Energy Charter Treaty-A step towards 
consistency in international investment arbitration?, in Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law 25 (3), 
2007, pp. 226ss. M. SATTOROVA, Investor rights under EU law and international investment law, in The 
Journal of World Instrument & Trade, 17 (6), 2016, pp. 897ss. 
268From the european perspective, the Union, not being part of the international agreement-even if it did not 
have the transfer of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the Agreement-can adopt legislative measures that 
contrast the obligations assumed by the Member States. The latter, if they do not comply with it, are at risk of 
facing infringement or cancellation proceedings, which can go as far as the contentious phase before the Court 
of Justice. The Member States can not assert the international bond because, as will soon be said, an 
international treaty enters the national legal system and is equivalent to domestic law. As such, it must comply 
with European law. For international law, however, a legislative reform within a state can not affect the 
international agreement to which it belongs (art, 27 VCLT, 1969); the conduct of the State which conforms to 
an internal constraint may therefore be in violation of the international text unless it can be justified in the light 
of national or European public order or due to compliance with the necessary application rules. 
269ICSID, ARB/03/16, ADC Affiliate Ltd & ADC-ADMC Management Ltd v. Hungary of 2 October 2006. 
270In particular see: P.C. MÜLLER-GRAFF, E. SELVIG, Regulation strategies in the european economic area, 
BWV Berliner Wissenschafts Verlag, Berlin, 2011, pp. 98ss. 
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conflict between the sources of the two systems. The conduct of the State is, in fact, 
considered in violation of the investment protection clauses contained in BIT and EU law 
can not be called to justify it because the obligations that it derives from have not been 
correctly implemented271. Given that the respondent State had violated both international 
and european obligations, the arbitrator was able to avoid ruling on the alleged conflict 
between sources. In the Saluka case272, once again, the arbitration panel has refrained from 
ruling on the conflict between the legal systems, rejecting the plaintiff's request-aimed at 
ascertaining the violation of its legitimate expectations-claiming that "had no basis for 
expecting that there would be no future change in the Government’s policy towards the 
banking sector’s bad loan problem or in the Government’s willingness to adhere during the 
pre-accession period to the rules on State aid in the Europe Agreement"273. 
The arbitrator then provides a restrictive interpretation of legitimate expectations, excluding 
that the latter can make the internal legal system of a State unmodifiable. Thus arguing, the 
arbitrator was able to recognize the legitimacy of the measure introduced by the respondent 
State as a sovereign act, without having to rule on the existence, or not, of a european 
obligation from which the legislative amendment would have drawn legitimacy. In the 
aforementioned cases, the arbitrators avoided ruling on the conflict between the obligations 
of EU and international law, limiting themselves to finding, on a case-by-case basis, a 
compromise between the forecasts and thus favoring harmonious coexistence. This 
technique, in fact, does not reconcile but rather circumvents the risk of conflicts and can 
only be used when it is possible to find a compromise solution or to judge the violation 
regardless of the source of the violated obligations. 
 
14.Prevalence of EU law: The case of public order exception. 
 
The primacy is easy to define when an international agreement is brought to the arbitrator's 
scrutiny and the EU is also part of it; in these cases, in fact, the primacy of the international 
source can be detected because it also binds the Union274. A more complex question arises 
when the arbitrator must judge the relationship between the two systems in the light of an 
international agreement to which the Union is not party. In these circumstances it is to be 
excluded that the referee can refer to the concept of the primacy and the direct effect to 
justify the prevalence of the european obligation over the international one. These principles, 
                                                 
271“The tribunal does not accept that compliance with EU Law mandated the steps actually taken by the 
Respondents teh subject matter of this arbitration”. ICSID, ADC v. Hungary, op. cit., par. 272. 
272UNCITRAL, Ad hoc Arbitration, Saluka v. Czech Republic, partial judgment on jurisdiction and arbitrability 
(March 27, 2006). 
273UNCITRAL, Arbitral ad hoc, Partial decision on jurisdiction and arbitrability of the 27 March 2006, in case 
Saluka v. Czech Repubblic, par. 351 
274It is noted, for the sake of completeness, that if the BITs that bind the States Parties to the disputes contain 
the national treatment clause to be guaranteed also in the post-establishment phase, then it is more difficult to 
detect the existence of an infringement of the agreement or an expropriative case . The effects of the change in 
the internal legislative framework would, in fact, be mitigated by the provision of national treatment which 
should continue to guarantee the investor. If, therefore, the state regulatory framework has changed, but the 
BIT includes the national treatment clause, the Arbitral Tribunal should not follow up on the plaintiff's 
questions. This is even more true if we consider that the European system, which also provides hypotheses of 
extra-contractual responsibility, has adopted a restrictive concept of property rights and economic interests 
such that the non-contractual liability of one has never been declared. State for having modified its internal 
legislative framework. See, T. EILMANSBERGER, Bilateral Investment Treaties and EU Law, in Common 
Market Law review, 46, 2009, pp. 384ss. 
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it has already been anticipated, bind only Member States but can not be used to judge the 
violation by a Member State of an international source. The tendency of the referees seems 
to go-correctly in the opinion of the writer-in this direction. The court in Eureko case has 
established the prevalence of international law over the european one by establishing that 
"EU may represent a legal order for the constituent States but that, from an international 
legal perspective, it is nevertheless a subject of international law and bound along with its 
member States by its international engagements"275. The College seems to resume the 
position of CJEU for which Member States can not justify their violations of EU law by 
invoking provisions, including constitutional, of their legal systems. 
The only hypothesis in which the arbitrators can make EU law prevail over the international 
one is contingent if it is possible to justify Member States' conduct in the light of european 
public order. It is therefore necessary to understand whether or not the arbitrators can 
overcome the antinomy between legal sources in the light of european public order and thus 
make praises that are recognized and executed by the national courts of each Member States. 
This conclusion is reached by making a Member State between national and arbitral 
jurisprudence. In practice, the national courts of Member States may find themselves in a 
position to enforce european rules, which are of a public nature, even if the parties have 
chosen to regulate the relationship in the light of a right of a non-member state. In this sense, 
the Eco Swiss case was resolved in which the CJEU, referred to by the Dutch court during 
the preliminary ruling, was asked to assess whether the aforementioned judge had the power 
to annul an award in which the arbitrators had apply european competition law276. The CJEU 
replied in the affirmative, specifying that these rules were part of the concept of european 
public policy, whose non-application could have led to the annulment of the ruling. In 
practice, even the national courts involved in the recognition or annulment of an award have 
found that, to assess the alleged existence of a violation of the public order, rather than 
looking at the type of norm evaluating whether the same is or no part of the public order-the 
degree of violation of the same must be considered. It is a "mitigative" approach277 precisely 
because it accepts the exception of european public order, and legitimizes it for the violation 
of an international bond, only if compliance with this second would have led to a serious 
violation of the first. This approach requires the judge first to assess whether there has been 
a violation of a rule of public order and, secondly, if he believes there has been, requires him 
to assess its extent. The annulment of the award is, before the non-execution, a consequence 
of this double reasoning; in other words, the award must have violated the law of public 
order in a manifest and effective manner, cumulative and not alternative conditions278. 
The CJEU has instead preferred an approach aimed at an "accommodating conciliation" that 
takes into consideration not so much the violated norm, as the whole juridical corpus from 
which it comes. On the basis of this approach, the violation of the public order subsists if the 
award conflicts with the entire legal system in which it must be applied. This approach 
achieves even more stringent results than the mitigation one, as it increasingly recognizes 
violations of  european public order. In the case of Renault, for example, the CJEU, referred 
                                                 
275For example, the French Court of Appeal refrained from declaring the award for violating the European 
public order as null, since the violation did not concern a "manifest disregard of that body of law". Cour 
d'Appel, Paris, sentence of 18 November 2004, in case n. 02/19606, Thales air defence BV v. GIE Euromissile. 
276M. LÓPEZ-GALDOS, Arbitration and competition law. Integrating Europe through arbitration, in Journal of 
European Competition Law & Practice, 7 (6), 2016, pp. 384ss. 
277M. LÓPEZ-GALDOS, Arbitration and competition law. Integrating Europe through arbitration, op. cit. 
278French Court of Appeal, sentence of 1st June 2004, Sté SNF SAS v. Sté Cytec Industries BVCytec. 
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to on the basis of art. 267 TFEU279 by the French judge-engaged in the judgment of 
recognition of an award-did not exclude the execution of a sentence only because it was 
contrary to the fundamental european principles of the free movement of goods and 
persons280. On the contrary, the CJEU has specified that the defense of the public order can 
be asserted in the recognition and execution of the award when "would be at variance to an 
unacceptable degree with the legal order of the State in which enforcement is sought or 
constitute a manifest breach of a rule of law regarded as essential in the legal order of that 
State"281. By adopting a "conciliatory-accommodating" approach, the CJEU did not admit 
the public order exception tout court, as a last resort to avoid the execution of the award. On 
the contrary, he clarified that this exception can be raised only if the degree of violation is 
particularly intense. In essence, this exception must therefore be accepted only if a violation 
                                                 
279The CJEU's judgment in this case is contrary to the opinion given by Advocate General Wathelet on 19 
September 2017 who considered, that: “(...) articles 18, 267 and 344 TFEU must be interpreted as not 
precluding the application of an investor/State dispute settlement mechanism established by means of a 
bilateral investment agreement concluded before the accession of one of the Contracting States to the EU and 
providing that an investor from one Contracting State may, in the case of a dispute relating to investments in 
the other Contracting State, bring proceedings against the latter State before an arbitral tribunal (...)”. The 
CJEU, relying on the need to ensure “full effectiveness of EU law” could have gone as far as outlawing 
arbitration clauses in intra-EU BITs providing for ICSID arbitration or permitting the choice of a seat of 
arbitration outside the EU, but certainly not the specific arbitration mechanisms implemented in the Achmea 
proceedings that afforded all the protections normally required by EU law. The reasons put forward and the 
legal basis chosen by the CJEU did not justify the systematic prohibition of arbitration clauses in intra-
European BITs, but at most their unenforceability in particular circumstances only. See in argument: I. 
MÍCHOU, P. PINSOLLE, Arbitrage: l’arrêt Achmea, la fin des traité d’investissements intra-UE?, in Dalloz, 7 
mars 2018. B. HESS, The fate of investment dispute resolution after the Achmea decision of the European 
Court of Justice, in MPIlux Research Papers 2018. C.I. NAGY CAROLA GLINSKI, Achmea and its 
Implications for Investor Dispute Settlement, 21(1) in Zeistscrhift für Europarecht Studien, 21 (1), 2018, pp. 
48ss, according to the author: "(...) the ruling can only be understood in such a way that every dispute 
settlement mechanism in an area which is already covered by EU law bears at least the hypothetical risk of an 
interpretation or application of EU law and is incompatible with the autonomy of EU law-which is particularly 
true for intra-EU economic relations (...)". 
280In case 186/87, Ian William Cowan v. Trésor public of 2 February 1989, ECLI:EU:C:1989:47, I-00195 the 
CJEU established that: “(...) Community law guarantees a natural person the freedom to go to another Member 
State the protection of that person from harm in the Member State in question, on the same basis as that of 
nationals and persons residing there, is a corollary of that freedom of movement. It follows that the prohibition 
of discrimination is applicable to recipients of services within the meaning of the Treaty as regards protection 
against the risk of assault and the right to obtain financial compensation provided for by national law when that 
risk materializes (...)“. In case C-376/03, D. v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst/Particulieren/Ondernemingen 
buitenland te Heerlen of 5 July 2005, ECLI:EU:C:2005:424, I-05821, the CJEU held-in the context of free 
movement of capital-that double taxation treaties are not discriminatory, albeit they confer benefits on the 
residents of specific Member States with the exclusion of others. For details see also: M. WIBERG, The EU 
services directive. Law or simply policy, ed. Springer, 2014, pp. 189ss. 
281CJEU, C-38/98, Régie nationale des usines Renault SA v. Mexicar SpA and Orazio Formento of 11 May 
2000, ECLI:EU:C:2000:225, I-2973. The CJEU notes that the enforcement of a civil judgment ruling on 
damages, even if erroneous, can not be regarded as infringing the public order: "(...) any error of law, such as 
the one at issue in the main proceedings, does not constitute an manifest violation of a rule of fundamental 
right (...)", par. 34. Having failed to recognize a manifest infringement, the Court of First Instance denies that 
Article 27 of Reg. 44/2001, and the exception of public order contained therein. The positions of the US 
jurisprudence are very close to those expressed by the CJEU. It is noted that in the Mitsubishi case the 
Supreme Court: “distinguished between international arbitral awards that thwart the fundamental pourposes of 
a norm that is mandatory under domestic law and those that do not, suggesting that the latter, but not the 
former could be tolerated in the interest of arbitration. Mitsubishi Motors Corporations c. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc, 473, U.S. 614, 1985. 
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of the legal system has been integrated and can not be accepted only for the alleged 
infringement in the abstract282. 
The tendency of national judges to carry out a check on the correct application of EU law is 
understood in light of the fact that, the jurisdictional system, as an organ of  Member States, 
is bound by the provisions of art. 4.3 TEU as well as 351 TFEU283. The first rule establishes 
the duty of loyal cooperation between Member States and the EU; the second one recognizes 
in the first paragraph the right for Member States to maintain the international agreements in 
force by the same undersigned and at the second one imposes, according to them, the duty to 
align the provisions contained in the agreements signed by them with EU law. From this it 
follows that when a national court finds itself having to recognize and/or execute an 
arbitration award that is contrary to EU law, it has the tools to overcome the conflict 
between the obligation to respect the international validity of the arbitration ruling and the 
Union law. More precisely, even if the provisions referred to in articles 4.3 et 351 TFEU284 
are not qualified as jus cogens for the national courts and possibly for the CJEU itself, the 
aforementioned conflict should be resolved in favor of EU law-rectius law to protect the 
european public order-thus denying the recognition of the award285. 
On the other hand, "it would be surprising if Member States courts would not examine such 
awards with regard to their conformity with EU Law and, consequently, a decision by such a 
CJEU may affect the practical opportunities for a prevailing party to enforce di award"286. In 
light of the foregoing, it is also appropriate to consider whether it is reasonable to expect that 
the arbitrators in the stage of merit try to resolve the antinomies between european and 
international obligations by referring to the concept of public order287.  In other words, 
                                                 
282The CJEU has specified its position in the Mostaza Clara case when it was adjudicated to decide whether the 
National Court could determine whether the contested award was contrary to European public policy, although 
in the arbitration proceedings this exception had not been raised. On this point, the CJEU held that: "(...) the 
need for effectiveness of the arbitration proceeding justifies the fact that the control of arbitration awards is of a 
limited nature, and that the annulment of an award can be obtained only in exceptional cases (...)", par. 34, 
case: C-168/05, Mostaza Claro of 26 October 2006, ECLI:EU:C:2006:675, I-10421. In its argument the 
CJEUconfirms that the exception of European public order can not be abused, with the risk of reducing the 
effectiveness of the praises; however, this exception can be accepted when the appeals courts would accept it in 
order to avoid a violation of the national and European public order. In other words, the exception of public 
order also takes ex officio, when it concerns a violation of the legal system in which the award must be 
recognized. Inevitably, both the national public order and the European public order fall under the orders of a 
Member States. On this point, in the case of Eco Swiss, the CJEU ruled that: "(...) it should also be noted that 
the need for effectiveness of the arbitration procedure justifies the fact that the control of arbitral awards is of a 
limited nature and that an arbitration award can be declared void or the recognition is denied only in 
exceptional cases (...)", case: C-126/97, Eco Swiss of 1st June 1999, ECLI:EU:C:1999:269, I-3055, par. 35. 
283See, A. KACZOROWSKA-IRELAND, EU Law, Routledge, London & New York, 2016. F. MARTUCCI, 
Droit de l'Union europèenne, LGDG, Paris, 2017. M. POIARES MADURO, M. WIND, The transformation of 
Europe: Twenty-five years on, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017, pp. 321ss. R. SCHÜTZE, EU 
law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015, pp. 382. 
284 R. SCHÜTZE, EU law, op. cit. 
285M. BURGSTALLER, European law challenges to investment arbitration, in M. WAIBEL and others (eds.), 
The backlash against investment Arbitration, in Wolters Kluwer Law and Business, The Hague, 2010, pp. 
473ss. 
286T. EILMANSBERGER, Bilateral investment treaties and EU law, in Common Market Law Review, 46, 
2009, pp. 384ss. 
287The national public order includes the fundamental principles of a given legal system, the international 
public order-which in recent times has had an ever-increasing recognition - includes principles common to the 
nations of related civilizations and intended to protect fundamental human rights . International public order 
can also influence the individual state systems since the judge, addressed by the law of conflict to apply the 
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considering that the violation of  public order is a reason for many judgments of the appeal, 
it is hypothesized that the referees anticipate the reasoning on public order, thus avoiding 
adopting an award that can then be passed on cancellation upon recognition or execution. 
From an arbitration perspective, therefore, arbitrators can judge the conduct of the defendant 
state in court, also assessing it in light of the national and european public order, as well as 
the necessary enforcement rules present in  the two legal systems288. 
In particular, it is believed that the referee could, by adopting the CJEU approach, operate an 
"accommodating conciliation"289. In practical terms, the arbitrator could assess whether the 
Member States, not adopting legislation that is in conformity with EU law but contrary to 
international obligations, would have caused a serious and flagrant violation of the european 
legal system. If at the end of the reasoning the arbitrator arrives at an affirmative answer, 
then he could decide in the sense of not condemning the conduct of the member state as 
assumed in respect of the european public order, which prevails over any international 
constraint. In the opposite hypothesis, when the conduct of the State does not appear 
justifiable in light of the european public order, the arbitrator will find himself condemning 
Member States if he finds that his behavior is in violation of the BIT; as we have seen, EU 
law can not prevail over international law. 
Ultimately, it is possible to hypothesize three lines of reasoning of the arbitrators, according 
to the type of BITs subject of the dispute. In the case of intra-EU BITs, referees have two 
possibilities: in one sense, they can resolve conflicts by seeking a harmonic interpretation of 
the forecasts in the other, if the conflict is not modular, they can make european obligations 
prevail if they are justified by the light public order. In any case, they must reject the 
exceptions regarding the pre-eminence of EU law, a prerogative that only applies to internal 
                                                                                                                                                      
law of a state, not only seeks the basic principles of the same, but also those rules that have become part of the 
law. of the order referred to, as a consequence of its compliance with the precepts of international law. The 
doctrine is not uniform in defining which norms are in international public order. According to the classical 
current, the notion of international public order derives its contents solely from national legal systems. There 
are some who, while admitting the national “soul” of the concept of international public order, believes that its 
content can be determined not only with principles of a national nature, but also of an international or even 
transnational nature. This theory seems to have a great following, also because an evolution in this sense of the 
concept of international public order could "conduire à une convergence entre la notion d’ordre public 
employée par les juridictions nationales et celle employée par les arbitres”. In this sense, one could reach a 
conception of international public order that is the same, if applied in arbitration or in case of recognition of the 
award in a national judgment. L.G. RADICATI DI BROZOLO, Arbitrage commercial international et lois de 
police, Académie de l’Haye, Recueil de cours, vol. 312, ed. Brill, The Hague, 2005, pp. 266ss. 
288As regards european public policy, this includes all the fundamental principles of the Union, the four 
freedoms of the internal market as well as other matters from time to time subsumed in this category by the 
jurisprudence of the CJEU. In the case of Eco Swiss China, the CJEU has declared a progressive tendency 
towards "communitarization of public order, which should find further moments of development also through 
the jurisprudence of the ECtHR". The necessary application rules have been variously defined. According to 
the traditional approach: "with the exception of the necessary application rules are identified those substantially 
functional substantive rules aimed at safeguarding the political, social and economic organization of the State 
of the forum (...) it is self-limited rules as their field of application is established, unilaterally, by the state order 
of which they are expressed (...)". According to Audit: “(...) on parle de lois de police pour designer le 
mécaniMember Statese d’application d’une règle interne à une situation internationale en fonction de sa 
volonté et indépendamment de sa désignation par une règle de conflit”. B. AUDIT Droit International privé, 
LGDG, Paris, 2008, pp. 97. The necessary rules of application can have both a state and a supranational origin 
(Buxelles Convention 1974, The Hague Convention, 1978) and be linked to third-type sources (European 
Court of Justice, UN). 
289C. BOUTAYEB, Droit institutionnel de l’Union européenne: Institutions, Ordre juridique et Contentieux, op. 
cit. 
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relations between EU and Member States. It is also believed that the arbitrators are in a 
position to deny the existence of the conflict if they find that the conduct of the State is not 
detrimental to the legitimate expectations of investors290. It can therefore be assumed that, if 
the BITs contain the national treatment clause, then the violation of an international source 
clause subsists only if the legitimate expectation is proven to violate. The national treatment 
clause, in fact, mitigates the consequences that derive from the change in the legislative 
framework, placing the foreign investor on the same level as the national ones-even in the 
case of new national forecasts291. In such circumstances, the arbitrator can recognize that the 
State has acted ex lege-therefore in compliance with european obligations-without 
frustrating the legitimate expectations of the investor. 
For non-EU BITs, conflicts, as far as this is possible, can be resolved by adopting a 
harmonious interpretation of the forecasts. In any case, it is noted that for such agreements 
rather than questioning the conduct of Member States, now deprived of power in the field of 
foreign direct investment292,  it is appropriate to focus on the role of EU. The latter, even if it 
is not part of these agreements, has acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the matter and 
therefore it could be assumed that the Union is bound to respect the obligations deriving 
from the non-EU BITs. The latter should, therefore, avoid adopting regulatory provisions 
that result in the processing by the Member States of measures that conflict with the 
obligations contained in international agreements. Obviously, it would not be a legal 
constraint, more than a soft law obligation, justified by the need to preserve relations with 
third countries and to guarantee, to foreign investors, the consistency and reliability of the 
european legal regime in the matter of investments. As correctly noted, "once the EU 
subjects itself directly, as a participant, to that regime, it will have a heightened difficulty in 
insisting that its internal norms-even those of a public policy nature-take precedence over its 
investment treaty"293. 
As regards the agreements that the Union will sign with third countries, the inclusion of 
protection clauses should be avoided which, by protecting the european legal system from 
external influences, effectively reduce the participation of the Union on the international 
scene. It should therefore be excluded the inclusion of appropriate clauses to preclude the 
referral to the arbitration mechanism or the application of some rules of the agreement, if 
these come into conflict with EU law294. The Union, indeed, by establishing relations with 
                                                 
290P. STRIK, Shaping the single european market in the field of foreign direct investment, Hart Publishing, 
Oxford & Oregon, Portland, 2014, pp. 258ss. 
291Against, ICSID, award of 12 May 2005, in case ARB/01/8, CME Gas TranMember Statesission Company v. 
Argentina: “(...) there can be no doubt (...) that a stable legal and business environment is an essential element 
of a fair andequitable treatment (the same Tribunal considered the fair an equitable treatment standard) as “an 
objective requirement and therefore unrelated to the reasons for the challenged measures”, par. 274-280. 
292H. BASHMILL, Foreign investment disputes settlement under ICSID and the protection of FDI, in Journal 
of Internet Banking & Commerce, 21, 2016, pp. 148ss 
293“(...)L’Union Européenne est fréquemment tentée de ses soustraire au jeu d’un accord multilatéral qu’elle 
conclut pour lui préférer, à l’intérieur de son ordre juridique, l’application de ses propres regelés, droit qui n’est 
pas reconnu en revanche à ses partenaires conventionnels (ce mécaniMember Statese de « la clause de 
déconnection (...))”. J.S. BERGE, M. FORTEAU, Interactions du droit international européen. Contribution de 
l’Union européenne au développement du droit international général. Combinaison et hiérarchisation du droit 
national et hiérarchisation du droit national européen, in Journal du droit international, in Clunet, 3, 2010, pp. 
6ss. 
294In the Dorsch case, the ECJ specified that "the Court shall take into account a set of elements such as the 
legal origin of the body, its permanent nature, the obligatory nature of its jurisdiction, the contradictory nature 
of the proceedings, the fact that the body applies legal rules and is independent (...)". CJEU, C-54/96, Dorsch 
Counsult of 17 September 1997, ECLI:EU:C:1997:413,  I-04961, par. 23. The CJEU has therefore ruled that 
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third countries, must necessarily give away part of its sovereignty and, therefore, must bind 
itself to international forecasts without allowing itself the possibility of referring to internal 
rules. 
 
 
 
15.The case of reference for a preliminary ruling as a guarantee for the uniform 
application of EU law: A foreclosure for referees. 
 
It is noted that any reference to EU law by foreign jurisdictional bodies might imply the 
non-uniform application and interpretation of EU law which, in the current system, 
constitutes the exclusive prerogative of the CJEU. 
One wonders, therefore, the existence of suitable facilities to ensure, in the event that the 
arbitrator directly or indirectly invokes EU law, that the latter is applied in accordance with 
EU internal practice. The question is aimed at finding instruments, or mechanisms, that can 
direct the arbitrator in the correct interpretation of EU law or correct the rulings in which the 
latter has been applied in a way that is different from european jurisprudential practice or 
from the provisions of the founding Treaties. On the merit, three mechanisms potentially 
able to reach the predicted result can be identified; they can intervene ex ante or ex post, 
depending on whether they are activated during or after the arbitration proceedings. In 
particular, this refers to the reference to the CJEU referred to in art. 267 TFEU295, the 
participation of the EC as amicus curiae or the appeal of the award before national courts of 
a Member State-the latter will be the subject of the following paragraphs. An arbitrational 
tribunal is not to be considered a "court" according to TFEU art. 267 (2)296. This position 
                                                                                                                                                      
the commercial arbitration courts can operate the postponement referred to in art. 267 TFEU, since they do not 
have characteristics that coincide with those identified by the aforementioned ruling-which will then be 
reaffirmed by the consistent jurisprudence of the CJEU according to the sentence Eco Swiss. In case: C-
102/81, Nordsee v. Reederei Mond of 23 March 1982, ECLI:EU:C:1982:107, I-01095.  The commercial 
arbitration, in fact, originates in a contract and is aimed at resolving a dispute arising on the same; the 
involvement of the public authority is absent and the parties do not have an obligation-either in law or in fact-
to refer the matter to the arbitrators, if not once they have agreed to insert the arbitration clause. It is considered 
that the tendency of the CJEU to exclude the postponement by courts of commercial arbitration is justified, in 
addition to the absence of the criteria mentioned above, also in light of the fact that, while excluding the 
postponement, the protection of the right Union is simply "delayed" in the sense that it can be guaranteed at the 
appeal stage. In this regard, the Eco swiss judgment states that: "the arbitrators, unlike a national court, can not 
ask the CJEU to give preliminary rulings on matters relating to the interpretation of EU law. Now, the european 
legal order has manifestly an interest, in order to avoid future divergences of interpretation, to ensure a uniform 
interpretation of all the provisions of EU law, regardless of the conditions in which they will be applied (...) EU 
requires that questions concerning the interpretation of the prohibition set forth in art. 85, n. 1 of the Treaty can 
be examined by the national courts called to rule on the validity of an arbitration award and may be the subject, 
if necessary, of a reference for a preliminary ruling before the CJEU (...)", sentence: Eco Swiss, op. cit., par. 
40. See also: CJEU, C-377/13 Ascendi Beiral Litoral of 12 June 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:1754, published in the 
electronic Reports o the cases, parr. 97-98. The Ascendi Beiral Litoral cases-which decided that tribunals in 
legally mandatory arbitration have the possibility of referring issues of EU law interpretation to the CJEU for a 
preliminary ruling-cannot be transposed to investment arbitration tribunals. For details see, R. CARANTA, G. 
EDELSTRAM, M. TRYBUS, EU public contract law: Public procurement and beyond, ed. Bruylant, 
Bruxelles, 2013. 
295R. SCHÜTZE, EU law, op. cit. 
296For more detals and analysis see: F. NICOLA, B. DAVIES, European Union law stories, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2017. J. USHERWOOD, S. PINDER, The European Union. A very short 
introduction, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018. J.L. DA CRUZ VILAÇA, European Union law and 
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was repeated in the Eco Swiss ruling from 1999297 and again in the preliminary ruling Guy 
Denuit and Betty Cordenier v. Transorient-Mosaique Voyages and Culture SA from 2005298. 
Given this, it is now necessary to assess whether, in practice, these systems can operate and 
which, among all, is the one that most guarantees the aforementioned purpose, that is to 
guarantee the uniform and correct application of the EU law. Regarding the referral to 
CJEU, it is noted that, in general, this is the mechanism that, more than any other, guarantees 
the uniform and consistent application of EU law by the national courts of Member States. 
In the specific case of arbitration in relation to investments, it is questioned whether the 
arbitration investment courts can make the reference referred to in art. 267 TFEU, 
considering that this duty-faculty was excluded for the commercial arbitration courts. This is 
supposed, in light of the fact that the arbitration in the matter of investments-unlike 
commercial arbitration-has such peculiarities that could make it one of the jurisdictions for 
which the reference for a preliminary ruling as per art. 267 TFEU299. 
More specifically, in the arbitrations now under discussion, questions relating to public law 
are raised-often, in fact, the conduct of a Member State is the subject of the dispute. These 
arbitrations, then, have their source in an international agreement concluded between two 
states and, also for this reason, the involvement of public authorities is clear. However, it 
does not appear that the public and non-private character, vice versa typical of commercial 
arbitrations, is sufficient to suggest that the arbitration boards in the field of investment are 
recognized powers, excluded from those that regulate a dispute in commercial matters. In 
favor of this conclusion, the jurisprudential interpretation of art. 267 TFEU300  and, in 
particular, the concept of "court of a Member State" referred to by that provision. On the 
concept of belonging to a state legal system, the CJEU has established a series of conditions 
in the presence of which a court belongs to the national legal system. 
In the Parfums Dior case, for example, the CJEU denied that the Board of Appeal could be 
considered a jurisdiction, pursuant to art. 267 TFEU. Although the CJEU acknowledged that 
the appeal body would have all the requirements identified by the european jurisprudence 
for the bodies referred to in art. 267 TFEU, however, noted that this College can not be 
considered as a court or a court of a State because "if it is true that the Chamber of Appeal 
was created by all Member States as well as the Union, it still constitutes a body of an 
international organization which, despite the functional links it has with the Union, remains 
formally distinct from the latter and from Member States"301. It would seem, therefore, that 
                                                                                                                                                      
integration. Twenty years of judicial application of European Union law, Hart Publishing, Oxford & Oregon, 
Portland, 2014. T.H. FOLSOM, Principles of European Union law, including Brexit, West Academic, 
Minesotta, 2017, pp. 278ss. R. GEIGER, D.E. KHAN, M. KOTZUR, EUV/AEUV, C.H. Beck, München, 
2016.  M. DECHEVA, Recht der europäischen Union, ed. Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2018. 
297C-102/81, Nordsee Deutsche Hochseefischerei GmbH v. Reederei Mond Hochseefischerei Nordstern AG & 
Co KG of 23 March 1982, ECLI:EU:C:1982:107, I-1095. C-393/92, Gemeente Almelo et al. v. NV 
Energiebedrijf Ijsselmij of 27 April 1994, ECLI:EU:C:1994:171, I-1277, "(...) it follows from the principles of 
the primacy of Community law and of its uniform application, in conjunction with Article 5 of the Treaty, that 
a court of a Member State to which an appeal against an arbitration award is made pursuant to national law 
must, even where it gives judgement having regard to fairness, observe the rules of Community law, in 
particular those relating to competition law (...)". 
298CJEU, C-125/04, Guy Denuit and Betty Cordenier v. Transorient-Mosaique Voyages and Culture SA of 27 
January 2005, ECLI:EU:C:2005:69, I-00923, par. 16. R.WHISH, D. BAILY, Competition law, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2012. 
299J.USHERWOOD, S. PINDER, The EU. A very short introduction, op. cit. 
300A. KACZOROWSKA-IRELAND, EU Law, op. cit. 
301The CJEU has recognized the possibility for the Benelux Court to make the reference for a preliminary 
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the jurisdictional body belongs to a national system if it originates in the same-so it is 
foreseen and regulated in the national regulatory sources-and it respects the procedural and 
substantive rules. In other rulings, the CJEU has admitted the postponement by external 
courts constituted by an international agreement, in so far as they safeguard the uniformity 
of EU law and do not violate "the autonomy of the legal system of the Union"302.  These are 
the cases, for example, of the Court of Benelux and the EFTA Court, to which the CJEU has 
recognized the status of Courts of a Member State303. 
In these cases, the CJEU extended the operation of the referral mechanism, adopting a 
teleological interpretation of  art. 267 TFEU304; irrespective of the source of the court, be it 
national or international, the latter can appeal to the CJEU because, even indirectly, it 
guarantees the correct and uniform application of EU law. From these assumptions, it 
follows that an arbitration court in the field of investments can not make the referral not 
being a jurisdictional body of a Member States or work to ensure the uniform application of 
EU law. The investment arbitration, in fact, respects autonomous rules from those of the 
national systems, different according to the procedure that is applied. In no case, such courts 
are subject to the control of the jurisdictional systems in which they act-if not after the 
enactment of the award through the appeal procedures-and the arbitrators are chosen with 
mechanisms and procedural rules other than those provided for the courts national. 
Moreover, the investment arbitrations concern disputes arising on an international agreement 
and, therefore, are not constituted with the sole purpose of ensuring between the parties the 
correct interpretation of EU law305. Consequently, it is hypothesized that even if the CJEU 
                                                                                                                                                      
ruling because it has powers that are more similar to those of a national court of last instance, rather than a 
court external to the European system. Indeed, the Court of Benelux was established with the task of ensuring 
the uniformity of the interpretation of the common legal rules between the three Benelux States, in an interim 
proceeding to the main ones raised before the national courts of these three States: "To allow a court such as 
the Court of the Benelux, when it has to interpret rules of Community law in the exercise of its functions, to 
avail itself of the procedure provided for by art. Article 177 of the Treaty thus responds to the objective of that 
provision, which is to safeguard the uniform interpretation of EU law (...)",C-337/95 Sentenza del 4 novembre 
1997, in causa 337/95, Parfums Dior v. Evora of 4 November 1997, ECLI:EU:C:1997:517, I-6013, par. 23. 
302Against, S. HINDELANG, Circumenventing primacy of EU Law and the ECJ’s Judicial Monopoly by 
resorting to dispute resolution mechaniMember Statess provided for in Inter-se Treaties?, op. cit., pp. 180ss. 
303F.A. MANN, The consequences of an international wrong in international and national law, in British 
Yearbook of International Law, 48, 1976-1977. 
304See for analysis: C. NOWAK, Europarecht nach Lissabon, ed. Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2011. D. 
CHALMERS, G. DAVIES, G. MONTI, European Union law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014. J. 
TILLOTSON, N. FOSTER, Text, cases and materials on European Union law, Gavedish Publishing, New 
York, 2013. M. HORSPOOL, M. HUMPHREYS, European Union law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2012, pp. 552ss.  T. OPPERMANN, C.D. CLASSEN, M. NETTESHEIM, Europarecht, C.H. Beck, München, 
2016. 
305In general, it is noted that the intervention of third parties is variously accepted in the meccaniMember 
Statesi dispute resolution: the art. 10.2 of the agreement on the rules and procedures governing the settlement 
of WTO disputes admits the participation of members as amicus curiae, art. 36.2 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights establishes that: "The President of the Court may, in the interest of the proper administration 
of justice, invite any High Contracting Party which is not a party to the proceedings or any person concerned 
who is not The Statute of the International Court of Justice provides instead a limited third intervention in 
Article 63.2 of the Court, the norm admits only the intervention of interpretation of a part of the Treaty object 
of the controversy of which part. According to Lagrande: “(...) on  observe  une  sensible  dévaluation  de  la  
qualité  de  l’intervenant,pratiquement ravalé au rang de simple amicus curiae qui s’offrirait simplement 
d’épargner à la Cour, seule garante de l’intégrité de la fonction juridictionnelle, le soin de collecter des 
informations utiles à cet égard (...)”. E. LAGRANGE, Le Tiers à l’instance devant les juridictions 
internationales à vocation universelle, E. RUIZ-FABRI, J.M. SOREL (a cura di), Le tiers à l’instance devant 
juridictions internationales, ed. Pedone, Paris, 2005, p.14. In reality, the role of friends curiae goes well beyond 
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has not yet expressly excluded the power of the arbitration investment courts to make the 
reference for a preliminary ruling pursuant to art. 267 TFEU there are no conditions for 
admitting it. Furthermore, it is noted that the recognition of the power of referral, in addition 
to being contrary to EU law and consistent european jurisprudence, would risk distorting the 
arbitral proceedings. The postponement implies, in fact, the suspension of the judgment of 
the judge/referee in question and binds him to the decision of the judge ad quem. The 
arbitration proceeding, on the other hand, is by its nature fast and not very procedural; 
moreover, the arbitrators are autonomous and third parties with respect to any legal system, 
not having their own jurisdictional forum306. Such guarantees would not apply if the latter 
were conditioned to comply with the rulings issued by a third judge. It must then be 
considered that, even if the primary EU law were amended to include the arbitral courts 
among those referred to in art. 267 TFEU, it is very likely that third countries would not 
agree to be bound by an international agreement in which a system of dispute resolution is 
envisaged including the referral to CJEU307. Finally, and to conclude, the arbitration practice 
has so far shown that the issues of EU law that may arise in litigation on an investment BIT 
do not imply knowledge of the arbitrator on fundamental principles of EU law or require 
him to give a binding and definitive interpretation of alleged violations of Union law. In all 
cases, in fact, the referees have ruled out that they must interpret the conduct of the 
respondent State in the light of EU law; the primacy and direct effect of EU law on Member 
States have not yet been called into question. Ultimately, therefore, it does not seem 
necessary, nor correct, to try to insert the arbitration investment courts among those referred 
to in art. 267 TFEU308. 
 
16.Participation of European Commission in the role of amicus curiae. 
 
The question is under what conditions, the participation of the EC in representing the Union 
can be justified in the arbitrations that touch even european interests; secondly, in light of the 
practice, it is necessary to evaluate to what extent the interventions of the executive can 
produce useful effects for the procedure309. With reference to the first question, it is noted 
                                                                                                                                                      
that of simple collectors of information, dealing rather with interveners who can propose qualifications and 
interpretations of the case in point of judgment, making available to the referee their skills. 
306E. LEVINE, Amicus curiae in international investment arbitration: The implications of an increase in third-
party participation, in Berkely Journal of International Law, 19, 2011. 
307A. KACZOROWSKA-IRELAND, EU Law, op. cit. 
308R. SCHÜTZE, T. TRIDIMAS, Oxford principles of European Union Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2018. C. BARNARD, S. PEERS, European Union law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017, pp. 788ss. C. 
TIETJE, The status of international in the European legal order: the case of international Treaties and non-
binding international instrument, in J. WOUTERS, A. NOLLKAEMPER, E. DE WET (eds.), The 
europeanization of international law: The status of international law in the EU and its Member States, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008. 
309The participation of amicus curiae, is not common practice, since these judgments are based on an 
arbitration agreement that involves only the parties that have signed it and that, for the effect, are the only ones 
to be able to take part in the proceeding. Unlike commercial arbitration, that of investment, involving a private 
party and a state, inevitably affects the public interests of the latter. In the specific case of proceedings arising 
from a European BIT, European public interests may also be relevant. Given this, it seems reasonable to 
assume the participation of the executive with the function of overseeing the procedure and the protection of 
European interests by the referees. The Commission is, in fact, the institution that can guarantee the superior 
interests of the Union, which may emerge during the arbitration proceedings, given that, by express provision 
of the founding Treaties, it has the task of "supervising the application of the Treaties". Article 17 TEU. On 
participation as an amicus curiae of the Union. See. S. MENETREY, La Participation “amicale” de la 
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that the participation of the EC depends on the procedural rules applied to the proceedings, 
in particular those governing the admission of the amicus curiae310. In ICSID311 arbitrations, 
the reform of the rules of procedure introduced in 2006 codified the practice of participation 
of the curiae friends and art. 37.2 has provided that, subject to the conditions listed therein, 
third parties may take part in the proceedings by producing statements relating to a specific 
matter which is inserted in the context of the litigation. In particular, the third condition 
referred to in the aforementioned provision establishes that the college admits an amicus 
curiae if "the non-disputing party has a significant interest in the proceeding"312. This 
requirement could be the one that, in concrete terms, would allow to legitimize the 
intervention of the EC, which, in fact, boasts a relevant interest in all the proceedings in 
which a problem of EU law arises313. Coming to the rules of procedure of the arbitration 
administered, they provide for the participation of third parties only if they are parties to the 
agreement subject to the proceeding. In these cases, therefore, the possible participation of 
the EC can be admitted if the Union is part of the agreement under examination of the 
arbitrators. By way of example, in the ad hoc arbitrations conducted in compliance with the 
UNCITRAL rules, the old provision pursuant to art. 17.5-which admits the participation of 
third parties as amicus curiae, only if part of the Agreements subject to the dispute-will soon 
be replaced by the provision introduced by the new rules of transparency which admit the 
amicus curiae, without this limit314. 
In light of the procedural rules, it seems that there are no procedural preclusions to the 
participation of the EC in the role of amicus curiae. This is also confirmed by recent 
arbitration practice. In the Eureko case, the EC was invited by the Court to intervene to 
present its position on the extinction of the BITs inter partes315. In the Electrabel case, the 
EC was authorized to present its observations on the applicability of EU law in an arbitration 
based on the Energy Charter Treaty. Furthermore, in the AES case, the EC it was able to 
                                                                                                                                                      
Commission Européenne dans les arbitrages liés aux investissements intracommunautaires, in Journal du droit 
International, 137 (7), 2010. 
310Art. 37.2 Rules of procedure ICSID: “(2) After consulting both parties, the Tribunal may allow a person or 
entity that is not a party to the dispute (in this Rule called the “nondisputing party”) to file a written submission 
with the Tribunal regarding a matter within the scope of the dispute. In determining whether to allow such a 
filing, the Tribunal shall consider, among other things, the extent to which: the non-disputing party submission 
would assist the Tribunal in the determination of a factual or legal issue related to the proceeding by bringing a 
perspective, particular knowledge or insight that is different from that of the disputing parties; the non-
disputing party submission would address a matter within the scope of the dispute; (c) the non-disputing party 
has a significant interest in the proceeding”. 
311Border Timbers Limited, Border Timbers International (Private) Limited, and Hangani Development Co. 
(Private) Limited v. Republic of Zimbabwe, ICSID Case ARB/10/25; Bernhard von Pezold and others v. 
Republic of Zimbabwe, ICSID Case ARB/10/15, Procedural Order No. 2, 26 June 2012. 
312S. MENETREY, La Participation “amicale” de la Commission Européenne dans les arbitrages liés aux 
investissements intracommunautaires, op. cit. 
313CPA, Eureko v. The Repubblic Slovak, op. cit., par. 175-196. 
314Art. 17.5 UNCITRAL: “The arbitral tribunal may, at the request of any party, allow one or more third 
persons to be joined in the arbitration as a party provided such person is a party to the arbitration agreement, 
unless the arbitral tribunal finds, after giving all parties, including the person or persons to be joined, the 
opportunity to be heard, that joinder should not be permitted because of prejudice to any of those parties. The 
arbitral tribunal may make a single award or several awards in respect of all parties so involved in the 
arbitration”. 
315ICSID, Electrabel v. Hungary, op. cit., par. 1.6: “neither the Commission of the European Communities nor 
the EU are named or disputing parties to the arbitration porceedings. At its request and upon the invitation of 
the Tribunal, the European Communities made writtem representations to the Tribunal as a non-disputing party 
under art. 37.2 ICSID”. 
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intervene to present its conclusions regarding the legitimacy of the concessions-rectius State 
aid316-recognized by the respondent State to the foreign investor in energy sales contracts317. 
Regarding the effects of the interventions of the curiae friends, it is maintained that even if 
the Courts are not obliged neither to accept nor to resume the observations of the third 
parties in their decisions, nevertheless they can be considered as effective tools to raise 
points and issues. of rights that would otherwise be omitted or misinterpreted318. The 
intervention of a third party, be it an institution or a local body - as happens in the federal 
States-allows in fact to raise issues and aspects of the affair that the parties may not have an 
interest in introducing319. As an example, in the AES case it was the EC as amicus curiae, to 
raise the question of the alleged illicitity with respect to the EU law of the contract being the 
subject of the dispute. That question could not have been raised by the investor, who would 
have introduced an issue unfavorable to him, or by the respondent State which would have 
risked triggering the infringement procedure within the Union. In the pleadings filed, the EC 
has explained the reasons why the contracts between the parties-stipulated in the form of 
public private partnerships320-would be contrary to the provisions set forth in articles 101 
and 102 TFEU321 in the part in which they recognize economic benefits to the investor322. 
The EC, highlighting the unlawfulness of the relationship, has brought out the distortive 
consequences that could have arisen from its maintenance in force, contrary to the european 
                                                 
316European Commission decision 2015/1470 of 30 March 2015 on State aid SA.38517 (2014/C) (ex 2014/NN) 
implemented by Romania. 
317ICSID, AES v. Hungary, op. cit., par. 3.18. 
318A.K. BJORKLUND, The partecipation of sub-national government units as amici curiae in international 
investment disputes, in C. BROWN, K. MILES (eds.), Evolution in investment treaty law and arbitration, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011, pp. 299ss. 
319As regards the value of the memoirs presented by the Curiae friends in the proceedings, it is noted that in the 
Eureko case the Court ruled that the Commission's memoirs have the same value as those presented by the 
parties, in fact: “(...) the Tribunal has considered carefully the submissions made by the parties, as well ad the 
observations of the […] and of the European Commission, all of which were helpful and for all of which the 
Tribunal thanks their respective authors. All of the points made in those submissions have been taken into 
account by the Tribunal ven though it is not necessary to address and decide in turn each and every one of these 
observations and submissions.” CPA, Eureko v. The Repubblic Slovak, op. cit., par. 217. In the case of AES, 
the pleadings filed by the Commission are not included in the procedural documents, however: “(...) the 
Tribunal also acknowledges the efforts made by the European Commission to explain its own position to the 
Tribunal and has duly considered the points developed in its amicus curiae brief in its deliberations”. ICSID, 
Aes v. Hungary, op. cit., par. 8.2. 
320L.E. PETERSON, European Commission seeks to intervene as amicus curiae in ICSID arbitrations to argue 
that long-term power purchase agreements between Hungary and foreign investors are contrary to European 
Community Law, in Investment Arbitration Reporter, 17 September 2008, pp. 14ss. 
321C-567/14, Genentech Inc. v. Hoechst GmbH, formerly Hoechst AG and Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH 
of 7 July 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:526, not yet published, par. 66. In particular the CJEU asked whether Article 
101 TFEU should be interpreted “as precluding effect being given, where patents are revoked, to a licence 
agreement which requires the silence of the CJEU on the compatibility of the minimalist standard of review 
applied by some domestic was received with a sign of relief from the part of the arbitration community holding 
minimalist views 
322It is noted that the Commission could have raised the issue of illegality elsewhere, thereby activating an 
internal infringement procedure against Hungary, the defendant State. However, the infringement procedure 
takes some time and before reaching a conclusion the decision of the Arbitration Committee could be issued, 
possibly contrary to EU law. Since this was an ICSID proceeding, the award should have been automatically 
recognized and since the ICSID rules do not provide for the exception of the public interest as an impediment 
to enforcement, a Member State might have been able to carry out on its territory a lodopararly contrary to 
European law. Hence the importance of having the Commission intervene directly in the arbitral proceedings. 
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competition law323. 
EC's intervention seems therefore justified in the light of a higher interest, which is 
independent of the specific case and which concerns the inadmissibility, for EU law, of the 
maintenance in force of agreements contrary to it. Obviously, the position of EC does not 
change the referee's perspective, which is always oriented to qualify a conduct in the light of 
the source that regulates the relationship. However, it is believed that the intervention of a 
third party, in this case EC, can be useful for framing the case in its broad context which, in 
the case of arbitrations concerning european BITs, involves three systems, international, 
european and national. The jurisprudential practice shows the tendency to admit the 
participation of EC in the role of amicus curiae; if this continues to be, the presence of EC 
could make up for the foreclosure of the arbitral courts to make the reference to CJEU. 
In this regard, it is also hypothesized that, should both solutions-referral and participation be 
admitted as amicus curiae-this second option would be the preferred option, since it 
produces the same results, therefore the uniform application of EU law, but preserves the 
typical characteristics of the arbitration procedure. The participation of an amicus curiae, in 
fact, does not impose the suspension of the judgment, lengthening the timing and 
complicating the procedure. The involvement of friends curiae is simpler and more direct 
and leaves the arbitrator the autonomy to decide the dispute, without being bound by the 
pronouncement of another judge. On the other hand, the mechanism of the preliminary 
ruling works very well and is justified in an integrated system, such as the european one, 
which is based, inter alia, on the principle of loyal collaboration between States and 
Institutions-and on the mutual recognition of judged. In other words, this tool works in a 
system that also supports thanks to a juridical corpus prepared and accepted by all the 
contracting parties and that therefore must be valid and be interpreted for all in the same 
way. Inevitably, such effects need not be guaranteed when the court is an arbitrator. Rather, 
the relationship established between the arbitration boards and EC is the one that best 
guarantees the autonomy of the referees; the intervention of the executive is, in fact, of an 
assistance type in the sense that it helps the referee to qualify and define difficult questions 
"compte tenu de leur complexité en droit et en fait"324. Lastly, it should be noted that the 
admission of the EC intervention should be encouraged also because it mitigates the risk, on 
several occasions, of conflicts between different legal regimes that can be referred to in 
arbitration proceedings325.  The investment law should, in fact, evolve and be interpreted in a 
manner consistent not only with the provisions of international law, including fundamental 
rights and environmental law, but also with EU law, obviously for those parties that protect 
interests higher or, more generally, of system326.  For all these reasons it is believed that EC's 
participation as amicus curiae is the mechanism that, better than others, guarantees ex ante, 
compliance with EU law327. 
                                                 
323M. BOTTA, Comment on "genentech". The arbitrability paradox in EU competition law, in International 
Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 38 (2), 2017, pp. 237ss. 
324C. BLANKE, G. NISSER, ICC draft best practice note on the European Commission acting as amicus curiae 
in international arbitration proceedings, in European Business Law Review, 19, 2008, par. 30. 
325U. PETERSMANN, Justice as conflict resolution: Proliferation, fragmentation, and decentralization of 
dispute settlement in international trade, in University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, 27, 2006, 
pp. 274ss. 
326A. VAN AAKEN, Fragmentation of international law: The case of international investment protection, 
University of St. Gallen Law School, Law and Economics Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2008-1, 
2008. 
327M. BURGSTALLER, Investor-State arbitration in EU international investment agreements with third States, 
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17.(Follows) The risk of abuse of appeals. 
 
Two types of ex post control can be hypothesized: the first is carried out through the 
recognition and execution procedures, as well as with the beginning of a cancellation 
procedure; the second one is activated after, or independently from the first one, and 
coincides with the EC opening of an infringement procedure against the defaulting Member 
State. The first type of ex post supervision works as long as there are two competing 
conditions: the rules of arbitration procedure must allow the use of national courts for the 
recognition and execution of the awards; these proceedings must then be initiated before the 
courts of a Member State. In the presence of these conditions, this monitoring allows in fact 
a double check. In one sense, the national court, within the limits of the procedural rules of 
its legal system, can reject the request for recognition or enforcement if it detects the 
existence of one of the impeding conditions referred to in art. V of the New York 
Convention of 1958328, among which there is the opposition to public order in the country in 
which the award must be recognized or executed. The New York Convention aims at 
eliminating the need for judicial confirmation of the award preliminarily to the enforcement 
procedure (so-called "double exequatur"); at restricting the grounds for refusal of 
enforcement of awards; and at shifting to the resisting party the burden of proof of the 
validity of the award. With this respect the New York Convention is the principal standard 
for enforcement, replicated in other regional agreements, in the UNCITRAL Model Law and 
in domestic laws329. 
The national court of a Member State can therefore assess the conformity of the award in the 
light of national and european public order330. In the other, the national courts have the right-
                                                                                                                                                      
in Legal Issues of Economic Integration, 39 (2), 2012, pp. 2078ss. A. DIMOPOULOS, The validity and 
applicability of international investment agreements between EU Member States under EU and international 
law, op. cit. 
328R.P. ALFORD, The convergence of international trade and investment arbitration, in Santa Clara Journal of 
International Law, 12, 2014, 
329See ex multis, A.J. VAN DEN BERG, Should the setting aside of the arbitral award be abolished?, in ICSID 
Review of Foreign Investment Law Journal, 29 (2), 2014, pp. 263ss. E. FRIEDMAN, Enforcement of 
international arbitration awards in New York: If you take them there, you can collect from anywhere, in 
Arbitration International, 27 (4), 2011, pp. 576ss. S.C. CHANG LENG SUN, T. WEIYI, Making arbitration 
effective: Expedited procedures, emergency arbitrators and interim relief, in Contemporary Asia Arbitration 
Journal, 6, 2013, pp. 350ss. S. WILSKE, Collective action in investment arbitration to enforce small claims-
Justice to the deprived or death knell for the system of investor-State arbitration?, in Contemporary Asia 
Arbitration Journal, 5 (2), 2012, pp. 166ss. R.P. ALFORD, The convergence of international trade and 
investment arbitration, op. cit. C. LEVESQUE, "Correctness" as the proper standard of review applicable to 
"true" questions of jurisdiction in the set-aside of Treaty-based investor-State awards, 5(1) in Journal of  
International Disputes Settlement, 5 (1), 2014, pp. 70ss. L.A. MISTELIS, Award as an investment: The value 
of an arbitral award or the cost of non-enforcement, in ICSID Review of Foreign Investment Law Journal,, 28 
(1), 2013, pp. 64ss. B.C. ROSENBERG, The intersection of international trade and international arbitration: 
The use of trade Benefits to secure compliance with arbitral awards, in Georgetown Journal of International 
Law, 44 (2), 2013. 
330CJEU, C-41/74, Van Duyn of 4 December 1974, ECLI:EU:C:1974:133, I-01337. In the Boucherau case, 
then, it was stated that: "the reference to the notion of public order can be invoked when in addition to the 
disturbance of the social order inherent in any infringement of the law, the existence of an actual and quite 
serious threat to one of the fundamental interests of the Community (...)", par. 35; C-30/77, Regina v. 
Boucherau of 27 October  1977, ECLI:EU:C:1977:172, I-01999. See, J.L. CLERGERIE, A. GRUBER, P. 
RAMBAUD, L’Union européenne, ed. Dalloz, Paris, 2014, pp. 543-545. M. DONY, Droit de l’Union 
européenne, Bruxelles, Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2014. J.C. GAUTRON, Droit européen, Dalloz, 
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which becomes mandatory for those of last resort-to refer the matter back to the CJEU. In 
this circumstance, the foreclosure of the arbitrators to bring the CJEU when a question of 
interpretation or application of EU law arises, is superseded by the reference to the latter, 
made by the national courts. 
The aforesaid ex post remedy is the one that most guarantees the uniform application and 
enforcement of EU law. Firstly, the remedy is ineffective if courts of a third country are 
appealed: in these cases there is a risk that the latter will not apply EU law-since they are not 
bound by it-or, noting the need to refer to the concept of order european public, apply it 
incorrectly, without mechanisms to correct the judgment. Secondly, there is a risk that the 
unsuccessful party of the arbitral judgment will abuse the appeal proceedings, trusting that 
the national proceedings will have a more favorable outcome. This recent type of "abuse" 
confirms the recent judgment incardinated by the Slovak Republic, unsuccessful in the 
Eureko ruling331, ahead of the Frankfurt am Main Court. In the judgment of 12 May 2012, 
the German national courts rejected the appellant's claims, seeking the annulment of the 
award, challenged for lack of jurisdiction of the arbitrators and the incompatibility of the 
arbitration clause with EU law. The latter, in fact, would have legitimized foreign 
jurisdictional bodies to apply and interpret EU law, an activity which, on the other hand, 
would compete exclusively with the CJEU. The judges in Frankfurt, on the other hand, 
reiterated the position of the arbitration panel on the legitimacy of the arbitration 
proceedings conducted within the Union332. They then confirmed the jurisdiction of the 
arbitrator by mentioning, among many reasons, that art. 344 TFUE333 is not applicable to 
proceedings arising between Member States and investor. Likewise, they excluded the 
opposition to the european arbitration clause by confirming its validity. The CJEU sentence 
is now the subject of scrutiny by the German Federal Court which, on 19 September 2013, 
issued an order rejecting the claims of the plaintiff again334. 
CJEU has not established the merits, highlighting, in essence, the absence of an interest in 
acting for the Slovak Republic. The partial award, issued on October 26, 2010, object of an 
appeal before the German national courts, has in fact been replaced by a definitive award. 
From this it follows that an eventual ruling on the proposed appeal would be useless given. 
In other words, even if the Court upheld the appeal, the national judgment would be 
ineffective since the inter partes relationship has already been regulated by the definitive 
award, made on 7 December 2012. The ruling marks a point in favor of investors; however, 
it would like to point out that the appeal to the appeals could encourage Member States, 
unsuccessful in arbitration proceedings, to introduce actions for annulment to challenge the 
                                                                                                                                                      
Paris, 2012, pp. 24ss 
331Eureko B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, op. cit. 
332Tribunal of Frankfurt am Main, 26 SchH 11/10, 10 May 2012. 
333In case C-459/03, European Commission v. Ireland (Mox Plant) of 30 May 2006, ECLI:EU:C:2006:345, I-
04635, parr. 123-132, the CJEU held that this provision covers Member State-Member State disputes that 
concern the interpretation and application of EU while in opinion 2/13 the Court argued that the possibility of 
the European Court of Human Rights to hear disputes between EU Member States undermines the re-
quirement set out in Art. 344 TFEU. The IST in Achmea v. Slovakia, the Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt, 
and the BGH all held that Art. 344 TFEU did not cover investor-Member State disputes. And in opinion 1/09 
on the European Patent Court, the Court held that Art. 344 TFEU did not cover disputes between private 
parties, since the prohibition is aimed at Member States.  In argument see: Ø. JOHANSEN, The 
reinterpretation of TFEU Article 344 in Opinion 2/13 and its potential consequences, in German Law Journal, 
16, 2015, pp. 169ss. 
334ICSID, Decision of ad hoc Committee on the cancellation proceedings, in case ARB/07/22, AES v. Hungary, 
op. cit. 
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lack of jurisdiction of the arbitrators outside the arbitral tribunals. From this arises the risk 
that the national courts involved-if not the CJEU-can come to conclusions opposite those of 
the referees, denying, perhaps, the jurisdiction of the latter. Given that the action for 
annulment is a right, in so far as the conditions that legitimize it exist, CJEU could, at least, 
highlight the abuse by the appellant, having established a judgment aimed exclusively at 
evading an award opposed to it, in fact re-proposing the same exceptions raised in the 
arbitration proceedings and in that office already exhausted. CJEU itself has established that 
the invalidity of an arbitration clause for contrasting with EU law must be pronounced by 
the said Board of Auditors or by the national court only if the EU violation is qualified as a 
rule of public order. 
It should be noted, then, that if such a trend began, then if appeal proceedings were 
developed, arbitration awards would risk losing the characteristic of finality and constraint, 
which should instead be their own. As for the second type of appeal ex post, this is presented 
as a garrison for the praise that can not be challenged before national courts. In this regard, it 
is noted that the praise issued following ICSID proceedings is precluded by the recognition 
and enforcement proceedings; in fact, the principle of automatic recognition between States 
party to the Washington Convention of 1965 is in effect and, in such hypotheses, the 
execution is carried out according to the rules of procedure of the State in which it is 
requested. Likewise, the appeal in annulment-if there is one of the conditions set forth in art. 
52 of the aforementioned Convention-an ad hoc Committee is resolved, which obviously is 
precluded by the deferral referred to in art. 267 TFEU335 but that, nevertheless, it can refer to 
EU law. From these considerations derives another reason why the national courts have, in 
fact, few opportunities to resolve a conflict between european and international obligations. 
In the appeal judgment of the AES award-introduced following an arbitral judgment 
instituted before an ICSID tribunal-the appellant claimed that "the question of legality under 
the law of the United Kingdom has been raised at the hearing and having received 
substantial attention in their written submissions. According to AES, the evidential weight 
that would be found in the outcome-determinative issue"336. The ad hoc Committee did not 
accept the appellant's objection and denied the reference to EU law, specifying that, even if 
it had been applied, the outcome of the negative dispute for the actress-company would not 
have changed. More specifically, the ad hoc Committee has argued that "Hungary has been 
motivated to reintroduce price regulation with a view to addressing the EC's state of aid 
concerns, there is no doubt that this would have constituted a rational public policy 
measure"337. 
In these hypotheses, in order to guarantee the correct application and interpretation of EU 
law also for these praises, the establishment of an internal control of the Union on the 
initiative of the EC is assumed. The european executive, in exercising its supervisory 
powers, is in fact entitled to start infringement procedures-regulated by articles 258-260 
TFEU338-against states that make an ICSID award-hence not challenged before a national 
                                                 
335J.USHERWOOD, S. PINDER, The EU. A very short introduction, op. cit. 
336M. BURGSTALLER, Investor-State arbitration in EU international investment agreements with third States, 
op. cit., 
337According to Burgstaller “because even ICSID award may end up before the ECJ, arbitral Tribunals 
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court-contrary to EU law. Regardless of the appeal before a national court, with the 
possibility of referral to the CJEU, this procedure can also ensure the correct and uniform 
application of EU law339.  In practical terms, it is assumed that if and when the decision of 
the ad hoc committee in the AES case is presented before a national court to obtain its 
execution, the EC may commence the above proceedings if it finds that the requested 
enforcement state has performed an award contrary to EU law340. 
According to our opinion, the fears of incorrect application and interpretation of EU law by 
arbitrators' parties are unfounded. The ex ante and ex post controls can, as illustrated, 
guarantee Union law even in cases where the latter is the object of application by arbitrators, 
therefore by foreign jurisdictional bodies. Among all those that can be experienced, it is 
believed that EC participation, wherever possible, represents the desirable solution since, 
unlike ex post remedies, it allows to solve the question of the correct and uniform 
application of EU law within the arbitration phase. Therefore, the intervention of the 
executive in the arbitration proceedings increases the chances that an award will be reached 
in all its parts in conformity with the law of the Union and, at the same time, reduces the 
need to activate judgments of cancellation or to find obstacles for recognition. and the 
execution of the award. This ensures greater certainty and stability of the lodi-rectius the 
definitiveness of the relationship between the parties-that vice versa can not be had when the 
conditions and conditions exist for activating appeal procedures or for hindering recognition 
and execution of the praises. 
 
18.Concluding remarks and outlook. 
 
The main problems that may arise from the arbitration proceedings concerning an intra-EU 
and non-EU BIT, as well as those relating to an agreement stipulating the EU have been 
identified-without claiming to be exhaustive. Therefore, it was a matter of purely procedural 
issues-with regard to the party that has the right to be judged and on which the financial and 
system-responsibility lies with regard to the compliance of the arbitration clause with EU 
law and its validity. As for the applicable law, on the other hand, it has been attempted to 
show that the multifaceted essence of EU law allows the referees to refer to more than one 
title, then as part of national, international or even, finally, autonomous legal corpus. The 
correct application and uniform interpretation of this right are guaranteed-we have seen it-
both during the arbitration proceedings-with the participation of the EC as amicus curiae-
and by activating the subsequent control of national forums and also, if necessary , of the 
CJEU, realizing in this way the dialogue between the Courts, external and internal to the 
EU. The starting point of the reflections carried out is found in the need not to give up 
arbitration proceedings as a way of resolving disputes governed by european investment 
agreements. The recognition of the Union's competence in the field of investments can not, 
in fact, de-legitimize recourse to arbitration courts by devolving jurisdiction on the matter to 
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the CJEU. The competence of the latter includes "the internal and external delimitation of 
the Union's legislative power, the verification of its correct implementation by the European 
Institutions, that of the respect of the relative acquis by Member States"341. It does not 
impose itself, however, in those reports that the parties, in accordance with their recognized 
freedom, have decided to devolve to foreign courts, such as arbitration, and even in relations 
involving a Member States and a foreign investor. In fact, in this sector there is no monopoly 
of the CJEU. With regard to the antinomies that may arise between the rules of different 
legal systems referred to in the arbitration proceedings, it has been seen that the arbitrator 
has the hermeneutic-interpretative tools to resolve them, favoring a conciliatory 
interpretation or mediating between conflicting forecasts. , through a restrictive 
interpretation. If conciliation is not possible, however, the judging panel is forced to make 
one source prevail over the other. In this case, it must hypothesize a hierarchy of sources and 
apply the one that is superior by protecting, however, the autonomy of the systems of 
belonging, so as to avoid transferring principles from one to the other. 
The CJEU has supported the EC’s view that the EU competition law has extraterritorial 
effect342. The adjudicator has to determine which of the involved overlapping competition 
law disciplines should be applied to solve the case. What makes this issue especially 
important is the fact that the competition law regime that results from the solution of the 
conflict of law question will substantially determine whether or not there is a breach of 
competition law, namely it will determine who wins the dispute. For instance, if the 
arbitrators apply the US antitrust law there will be no breach of law, while if the law 
applicable is the EU competition law the conduct could be considered anticompetitive. The 
CJEU needs to guarantee the uniform application of EU law also when it is applied by 
arbitral tribunals. The EU legal system allows the antitrust arbitrability counting on the fact 
that the involved public policy interests can be safeguarded by national courts during the 
second-look review of the award. This ex post control tool is employed to validate the 
conduct of arbitrators as emerging from the arbitral award. If arbitrators cannot refer cases to 
the CJEU for preliminary ruling, it may be difficult for them to meet the requirements of the 
extended second-look review.when arbitrators are facing a legal issue that requires a CJEU 
preliminary ruling, the effectiveness of their award may be limited and may be at risk the 
very essence of the arbitrability principle expressed above. Arbitrators have the power to 
decide whether mandatory norms are applicable or not and at the same time cannot assess 
whether a preliminary ruling is needed. Hence, during the second-look review of the award, 
a national court has to examine the arbitrators’ application of EU Law. The review can be 
performed in the context of any method of recourse available under the relevant national 
legislation and most importantly it has to inquire whether a preliminary ruling is necessary 
                                                 
341. M. BURGSTALLER, Investor-State arbitration in EU international investment agreements with third 
States, op. cit., 
342CJEU, 48/69, Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd v. Commission (Dyestuffs) of 14 July 1972, 
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to decide the case. 
The recognition of the supremacy of a supranational source on the other can not, therefore, 
derive by applying an internal perspective to only one of the european or international legal 
systems. Hence the foreclosure to assert the principles of direct effect and the primacy of EU 
law that apply only to the internal EU system. In some circumstances, then, the prevalence 
of a source can be recognized by detecting the existence of impedimental reasons that have a 
general value and transnational applicability, such as to make one prevail over another. It has 
therefore been hypothesized that the violation of an international treaty source may be 
legitimate if, and in so far as, it is put in place to protect european public order. Moreover, 
the arbitrator, as a judicial body untied by any legal system, can be placed in charge of a 
supranational public order that is emphasized during the proceedings. In other words, it is 
proposed that the arbitrator can legitimize the conduct of a Member State that is in contrast 
with an international obligation, but to guard european public order. There is therefore no 
reason to deny that the arbitration courts exercise their jurisdiction even by operating a 
check on compliance with the principles of their european public order. Moreover, even if 
we want to deny the postponement - we do not know with what legal arguments-european 
public order, it must be emphasized that the national one is also supplemented by 
supranational principles and of european origin. Directly or indirectly, the reference to the 
principles of european public order is therefore legitimate by the referees. This is also 
assumed by noting that a control carried out by the ex ante referees, therefore pending the 
proceedings, avoids the annulment or the non-recognition of the award for violation of the 
public order. All the issues raised have a common assumption, identified in the relationship 
between the legal systems, whose rules are applied in the arbitration proceedings. Only by 
framing the relationship between legal systems has it been possible to hypothesise solutions 
to the problems dealt with. 
In this regard, as is the case in the national legal systems, which have elaborated their 
theories-adopting a monist or dualist approach-to justify the opening of supranational legal 
systems, it is observed that the relationship between the international legal system and the 
european one can be inserted into theoretical-conceptual schemes343. 
The relationship between two systems is framed by considering three aspects: the validity, 
the direct effect and the acknowledged supremacy of the rules that migrate from one system 
to another. The purpose of every conceptual scheme has always been to identify a last-the 
Grundnorm conflict rule-that can resolve the antinomies that arise between two or more 
legal systems. In the past the concepts of monism and dualism have been elaborated; both 
are now obsolete because, by implying the subordination of one system to another, they do 
not take into account the increasingly common overlap and interconnection of supranational 
legal systems, developing also new concepts within which the relationship between different 
legal systems can be subsumed: we speak of constitutionalism or pluralism344. 
The legal systems are placed on a multilevel structure that rests on a common basis, which 
encompasses the fundamental principles and values, and the relationship between them is 
                                                 
343According to Von Bogdandy: "(...) monism and dualism should cease to exist as doctrinal and theoretical 
notions for discussing the relationship between international law and internal law (...) from a scholarly 
perspective they are intellectual zombies”, A. VON BOGDANDY, Pluralism, direct effect and the ultimate 
say:on the relationship between international and domestic constitutional law,  op. cit., pp. 400ss. 
344Z. BURLEY, The idea of arbitration, in Yearbook of Arbitration & Mediation, 7, 2015, pp. 356ss. K. FACH 
GOMEZ, Enforcing global law: International arbitration and informal regulatory instrments, in The Journal of 
Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 47, 2015. J. PALSSON, Arbiration in three dimensions, in International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly, 60 (2), 2011, pp. 292ss. 
      
                                                                                                            Número 1 
                                                                                              2019 
   
 
configured in terms of hierarchy, not of supremacy. The constitutional vision identifies the 
existence of a structure on three levels, in which it frames the relationship between EU law, 
international law and national rights "there exist a hierarchical superior value system across 
different regimes which can reduce the potential for inter-regime regulations conflict"345. 
This approach reconstructs a systemic unity around a complex of fundamental norms and 
principles, based on the relationship between the legal systems. Constitutive approach 
therefore recognizes a higher rank to some norms, because of the values they protect. This 
theory stems from the study of the constitutionalMember Stateso of the EU which, first, was 
opposed to the authority of the Constitutional Charts of individual Member States. 
Therefore, it is not the international, regional or national provenance-system of a standard 
that defines its level, but the values it bears. Rather, there is a hierarchically superior order of 
values that resolves conflicts between the predictions of two legal systems. In other words, 
"constitutional pluralisms recognizes that the european order inaugurated by the Treaty of 
Rome has developed beyond the traditional confine of the inter-national law and now makes 
its own independent constitutional claims, and that these claims exist alongside the 
continuing claims of States (...)"346. 
According to the pluralistic framework, however, the legal systems are integrated and placed 
all on a horizontal level: the strength and role of the rules depend on the system from which 
they derive. The pluralist approach shares with the dualist one a presupposition: the 
separation and distinction between legal systems, without this signifying that the two 
systems "pass by, ignoring themselves as ships in the night"347. Since the systems must be 
seen as autonomous and separate, the norms of one can not automatically access the other. 
Although it is difficult to get out of this hierarchy, it is important to note the tendency, 
proper to pluralism, to look at the substance of the rules and the level of protection they offer 
to the individual. Taking up again the jurisprudential practice of the CJEU, it is observed 
that in the Intertanko348 and Kadi cases349 the CJEU resolved the conflict by looking at the 
content of the norms rather than bringing down the prevalence of one over the other, by 
reason of the origin. In the first case, he resolved the issue considering the international 
nature of the WTO agreement350; in the second, reconstructing the presumed hierarchy 
among the United Nations-EU systems. In the event of an antinomy, the norm that offers 
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greater protection prevails and is set up to protect higher values. The pluralistic view seems 
to be more persuasive. Pluralism focuses on the interaction between legal systems not by 
seeking the ultimate rule of conflict, but by balancing the values defended by conflicting 
norms. 
The relationship between international and EU law can therefore be framed in the structure 
of the pluriversum which, by reformulating the concept of universum and the doctrine of 
direct effect351, advances as hypothesized, for a balancing of constitutional principles rather 
than a search for the hierarchy between legal orders. Therefore, the concept of direct effect is 
put aside, where it is not possible to interpret the rules in order to find a composition 
between the two supranational legal systems, it is necessary to balance the constitutional 
principles of the conflicting rules. Equilibrium, therefore, instead of hierarchy between legal 
systems. 
The antinomy between norms becomes in this sense a conflict between the substantial rights 
that they defend. The task of the jurisdictional bodies is to balance the interests at stake, 
making prevail the provision placed to oversee higher interests. 
Applying the theory to the practice one can expect that the arbitrators, called to resolve the 
antinomies between two legal systems, in case of non-modular conflict, apply the norm 
whose violation would prejudice higher values. The arbitrator can then decide now to apply 
the law that protects the investor, now to legitimize the conduct of the State as a defense of 
values that, even if not part of the public order, are still higher than the rights recognized in 
the investor. The arbitrator is entitled to argue in this sense and then to decide to apply one 
rule or the other in the light of the values that the same defends, despite being a court 
"without forum"352.  Regardless of belonging to a forum, the arbitrator is in fact called to 
resolve conflicts by looking at the sources mentioned during the dispute. No source 
precludes the possibility of making the one that protects higher interests prevail. As noted, 
"in a period of interdependence of the various legal systems, the classification of sources of 
law should no longer be the main criterion of the disciplinary identity: "international public 
law", "Union law" or "national law"353. Therefore, direct foreign investment should therefore 
no longer be regulated as an autonomous part of the various legal sources, but as an 
interconnected part so as to favor compliance with the principles of public order that are 
found in each source. 
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